Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Husband Imran Rasheed appealed the trial court’s grant of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement filed by wife Maryam Sarwat and its incorporation into a final decree of divorce. Husband contended that no settlement had ever been reached and that, in any event, the trial court’s order setting forth what it found as a complete settlement and the subsequent decree of divorce incorporating that settlement were too incomplete to be enforced. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the terms of the settlement agreement as found by the trial court were incomplete, and those terms did not address all required aspects of the divorce: “Though visitation is cursorily addressed, the word custody never even appears in the order. Furthermore, the order setting forth the settlement does not contain a permanent parenting plan that complies with OCGA 19-9-1. The order regarding settlement terms also appears to be incomplete with regard to property holdings, or, at the very least, requires a great deal of inferences from unspecified sources to determine who actually owns what, what must be sold, and how any proceeds should be split between the parties. A trial court errs when it seeks to enforce what amounts to a settlement containing incomplete terms of a divorce. By incorporating such an incomplete settlement into the parties’ divorce decree and using that settlement as the decree’s operative terms, the infirmities of the incomplete settlement agreement became the infirmities of the divorce decree, which omits fundamental considerations such as the custody of the minor children.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rasheed v. Sarwat" on Justia Law

C.D.G.E. was born in 2010. Since 2014, J.E. had primary residential responsibility of the child. A.P. was obligated to pay monthly child support payments. J.E. petitioned the district court to terminate A.P.'s parental rights. With his petition, he submitted an affidavit from A.P. in which she consented to terminating her parental rights. The petition referenced N.D.C.C. 14-15-19, which applied only "in connection with an adoption action," which was never contemplated here. All further proceedings, including J.E.'s proposed default order, J.E.'s argument at the hearing on the petition, and motion to reconsider, were considered by the parties and the district court under N.D.C.C. 27-20-45, which governed termination of parental rights where no adoption was pending. At the parental-termination hearing, J.E. argued that A.P. had both: (1) abandoned her child; and (2) consented to terminating her parental rights. The district court denied the petition without finding on the record whether A.P. had abandoned the child. In denying J.E.'s petition, the district court found that A.P. had not validly consented to terminating her parental rights. Ultimately, the district court denied the father's petition, concluding the child's welfare would not be served by terminating A.P.'s parental rights. J.E. appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition where it was not established that denying the petition would seriously affect the child's welfare. View "Matter of C.D.G.E." on Justia Law

This case was the result of a long history between Jon Norberg and Alonna Knorr. Once married, they divorced after Knorr alleged Norberg sexually abused her after drugging her with Propofol. Knorr's allegations resulted in criminal charges against Norberg, and a jury acquitted him of all charges in 2012. Norberg appealed the district court order denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law or new trial. He argued collateral estoppel established as a matter of law Knorr's liability for his abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and defamation claims, and it should not have been redecided by the jury. He further argued Knorr's dismissal of her lawsuit prevented her from raising affirmative defenses to his claims. Concluding collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of matters previous determined, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Norberg v. Norberg" on Justia Law

This case presented an issue stemming from an interlocutory appeal of the registration of an Ohio-issued divorce decree and the subsequent petition for modification by the obligee, a Mississippi resident. Asserting the continuing and exclusive jurisdiction of the Ohio court in matters involving the modification and alteration of the decree, the obligor-father appealed the chancery court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the obligee-mother’s complaint for modification of the decree. Reviewing the procedural history and the facts of the case, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that: (1) neither the Ohio court nor the parties consented in writing to the transfer of jurisdiction; and (2) because evidence indicated that the Ohio court never relinquished jurisdiction, that court was the proper forum for proceedings on modification. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s ruling and entered judgment in favor of the father, dismissing the mother’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hamilton v. Young" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were divorced in Colorado. After Father died, Mother and her two minor children moved to Florida. Grandparents subsequently initiated a proceeding in Colorado seeking visitation with the children. Mother filed a separate action in Florida to register the Colorado judgment dissolving her marriage and for a judicial determination that Grandparents had no legal right to timesharing with her children. Colorado then issued a judgment awarding Grandparents visitation with the children (the Colorado order). Thereafter, the Florida court entered a final order registering and domesticating the Colorado order. Mother appealed, arguing that the Colorado order was unenforceable as a matter of Florida law and public policy because it violated “childrearing autonomy.” The court of appeal concluded that the Colorado order was entitled to full faith and credit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Florida was required to enforce the Colorado order despite the fact that entry of a similar judgment by a Florida court under the circumstances presented here would be prohibited by the Florida Constitution. View "Ledoux-Nottingham v. Downs" on Justia Law

The State filed motions for termination of Mother’s parental rights to her five children due to abandonment, neglect, and aggravated circumstances. After a hearing, the county court granted the State’s motions to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The consolidated order was issued on April 4, 2016. On April 28, 2016, the court issued a consolidated order nunc pro tunc, which stated that the April 4 order would be vacated and reissued under the date of April 28 to allow the parties to have an appropriate amount of time to file an appeal. No party moved to vacate the April 4 order. Mother subsequently filed notices of appeal from the court’s April 28 order nunc pro tunc, arguing that the county court erred in finding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding (1) the district court had no authority to issue its April 28 order; and (2) Mother failed to file notices of appeal within thirty days of the April 4 order, and therefore, this Court was without jurisdiction. View "In re Interest of Luz P." on Justia Law

N.S. was placed in foster care at age 11. After she turned 18 in 2014, she remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a nonminor dependent. (Welf. & Inst. Code 11400(v)), having been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and depressive disorder. She was participating in therapy and taking medication. The report indicated that N.S. would be enrolled in an educational program. A 2015 report indicated that N.S. qualified for extended foster care because her mental health, prevented her from participating in education or an employment program. In 2016, the Agency recommended that N.S.’s dependency be dismissed because her exact whereabouts were unknown and she had not participated in any services. N.S. had admitted she was using methamphetamine. She was not interested in treatment referrals or placement. She was meeting with her therapist, Chan, sporadically. At the contested hearing, both N.S. and Chan testified. Counsel asked Chan about N.S.’s diagnosis; she and N.S. asserted the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The juvenile court concluded the privilege did not apply because N.S. had put her mental state at issue. The court of appeal disagreed, rejecting an argument that the Agency and the court will be unable to verify the eligibility requirement without information from Chan. It is the Agency’s position that it is N.S.’s substance abuse, and not her mental health condition, that prevents her from meeting the criteria. View "N.S. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Glen and Danielle Rollins divorced in December 2013, and they agreed at that time to submit to binding arbitration of their respective claims to certain furniture and furnishings in the marital home. The arbitrator rendered an award in July 2014, and Glen promptly moved for judicial confirmation. While his motion was pending, in August 2014, the trial court ordered Danielle to account for some of the furniture and furnishings that the arbitrator had awarded to Glen that he could not find. Dissatisfied with her accounting, Glen filed a motion to hold Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order. In April 2015, the trial court found Danielle was in willful contempt of the August 2014 order in at least one respect, and it entered an initial contempt order that directed Danielle to show cause why she ought not be incarcerated for her contempt. Danielle appealed the initial contempt order, both by filing an application for discretionary review with the Supreme Court, and by filing a notice of direct appeal. In May 2015, the Supreme Court denied the application for discretionary review. The direct appeal was not docketed until November 2015. In December 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal, explaining that any appeal of the initial contempt order had to come by application, and noting that it already had denied an application for discretionary review. In the meantime, the trial court held a final hearing on the motion for contempt and entered a final order on November 24, 2015, finding Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order in additional respects, directing her to immediately surrender any property awarded to Glen, ordering her to pay Glen for any such property that had gone missing or was damaged, and ordering her to pay fines for 34 separate instances of contempt. The trial court also awarded Glen attorney fees. Danielle then applied for discretionary review of the final contempt order, and the Supreme Court granted her application. Danielle argued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a final contempt order while her direct appeal from the initial contempt order still was pending with the Supreme Court. The Supreme agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

After an adjudicative hearing, the juvenile court found the three children of Mother and Father were within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) as to both parents due to physical abuse. The State subsequently filed a supplemental petition alleging that all three children were within the meaning of section 43-247(3)(a). Father filed a motion to dismiss the supplemental petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the allegations were barred by claim and issue preclusion. The juvenile court agreed and dismissed the State’s supplemental petition. The Supreme Court vacated the order of dismissal, holding (1) the juvenile court erred by not converting the motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment and allowing both parties an opportunity to produce evidence supporting their arguments; and (2) the doctrine of claim preclusion should not be strictly applied in abuse and neglect cases when doing so would fail to protect children from continuing abuse or neglect. Remanded for further proceedings on the supplemental petition. View "In re Interest of Noah B." on Justia Law

Appellee filed a complaint for dissolution of marriage against Appellant. During the pendency of the dissolution case, Appellant filed a separate complaint for declaratory judgment seeking an order regarding the parties’ rights under a prenuptial agreement. In the declaratory judgment action, the district court found the agreement to be valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court and remanded with directions to enter an order dismissing Appellant’s complaint for declamatory judgment, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it entertained Appellant’s declaratory judgment action when another action was pending involving the same parties and the same issues. View "Mansuetta v. Mansuetta" on Justia Law