Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

When a state fails to protect a foster child from harm, the foster child can sue the state under the special-relationship doctrine, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The special-relationship doctrine provides an exception to the general rule that states aren’t liable for harm caused by private actors. This case is about the geographical reach of the special-relationship doctrine: whether the special relationship (and its accompanying duty to protect)—crosses state lines. James Dahn, a foster child, sued two Colorado social workers responsible for investigating reports that he was being abused, along with others involved with his adoption. Dahn had been in Oklahoma’s custody until, with Oklahoma’s approval, a Colorado-based private adoption agency placed him for adoption with a foster father in Colorado. The foster father physically abused Dahn before and after adopting him. The private adoption agency was responsible for monitoring Dahn’s placement. Together with Colorado, it recommended approval of his adoption by the abusive foster father. Dahn eventually escaped his abusive foster father by running away. Dahn then sued the private adoption agency, its employees, and the Colorado caseworkers who were assigned to investigate reports of abuse from officials at Dahn’s public school. The district court dismissed all of Dahn’s claims except a section 1983 claim against the two Colorado caseworkers and two state-law claims against the agency and its employees, concluding the special-relationship doctrine allowed Dahn to move forward with the 1983 claim, and it exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The Colorado caseworkers appealed. Though the Tenth Circuit condemned their efforts to protect the vulnerable child, the Court concluded, under the controlling precedents, that the Colorado caseworkers were entitled to qualified immunity, and reversed. View "Dahn v. Amedei" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to two children: D.H. (born 2004) and S.C. (born 2006). She argued the family court improperly withheld its discretion by refusing to grant a thirty-minute continuance so that she could attend the termination hearing. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court determined that although mother’s absence was her mistake in light of the proper notice she was given, her attorney had spoken with her and represented to the court that mother could be there in a short time. Delaying the hearing for a brief time to allow mother to appear would not have disrupted the court’s calendar or prejudiced the children, DCF, or other litigants. The Court found that denying the request had a harsh effect on mother because it resulted in the case being decided based on the exhibits and testimony presented by DCF, but without mother’s testimony. This deprived mother of the opportunity to testify regarding her participation in treatment, her progress toward the case plan goals, and her strong relationship with the children. The trial court explicitly relied on mother’s absence as evidence supporting termination, even though mother’s attorney had informed the court that she was in touch with mother and requested the continuance while the hearing was still in progress. Furthermore, the record showed mother was actively involved throughout the proceedings below. For these reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the court’s decision to terminate mother’s parental rights, and remanded the matter to the family court for the evidence to be reopened so that mother may have an opportunity to participate. View "In re D.H. & S.C." on Justia Law

In an earlier action in which Florencia Garcia petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Juan Garcia (Dissolution Action), the family court found that Florencia did not meet her burden of establishing a valid marriage and quashed service as to Juan and dismissed the action. Florencia then filed the underlying action in which she petitioned for nullity of marriage (Nullity Action). In the Nullity Action, Juan appealed two family court orders: (1) one in which the court found that Florencia was Juan’s spouse or putative spouse, and she could proceed with the claims in her petition (Putative Spouse Order); and (2) one in which the court directed Juan to pay Florencia spousal support arrears, ongoing spousal support and attorney fees and costs (Support Order). In challenging the two orders, Juan raised a single legal issue for review on appeal: under res judicata, did the judgment in the Dissolution Action bar the relief Florencia sought in the Nullity Action? The Court of Appeal concluded the Dissolution Action and the Nullity Action involved different primary rights, and thus affirmed the Support Order. Because the Putative Spouse Order was not final, the Court dismissed Juan’s appeal. View "In re Marriage of Garcia" on Justia Law

A district court must analyze all four Stout-Hawkinson factors in determining whether a custodial parent may move out-of-state with a child. Cody Booen appealed a district court's order granting Jessica Appel's motion to relocate. Appel cross-appealed the orders granting her motion to relocate and to show cause finding her in contempt. Booen argued the district court erred by granting the motion to relocate because it did not properly analyze and weigh the Stout-Hawkinson factors. Appel argued the district court erred in establishing a parenting plan, by finding her in contempt and requiring her to pay half of Booen's attorney fees. Finding no abuse of the district court's discretion in either decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's orders. View "Booen v. Appel" on Justia Law

An individual seeking to adopt a child must ordinarily obtain the written consent of the child's parents, though if written consent is not provided, it must be proven the parent either (1) for one year failed significantly without justifiable cause to communicate with the child or provide for the care and support of the child or (2) abandoned the child. A.F. appealed a district court order denying his petition to adopt J.L.F. The district court denied his petition after finding the child's biological father neither consented to the adoption nor abandoned his child. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. View "Adoption of J.L.F." on Justia Law

Divorced parents shared equal custody of their son pursuant to an agreement. The mother asked the superior court to modify the agreement to allow her to move with the child to Hawaii. Following a two-hour hearing the court modified custody, granting primary physical custody to the mother; it also modified legal custody to allow the mother final decision-making authority, subject to later court ratification, though neither party had asked that legal custody be modified. The father appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion when it granted modification and awarded primary physical custody to the mother, and it affirmed that part of the superior court’s decision. However, the Supreme Court held it was an abuse of discretion to modify legal custody when neither party had requested it, the parties were not on notice that it was at issue, and the evidence did not demonstrate a need for it. The modification of legal custody was therefore vacated. View "Judd v. Judd" on Justia Law

Paul Schaffner appealed a district court order denying his petition to modify his parenting time from supervised visitation to unsupervised. The district court denied his petition after finding Schaffner failed to show a material change in circumstances had occurred since the previous order establishing his parenting time. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schaffner v. Schaffner" on Justia Law

The court terminated mother’s parental rights, 22 M.R.S. 4055(1)(A),(B), finding that she is unfit to parent the children because she has abandoned them, she is unwilling and unable to protect them from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs, and she has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with them. The court also terminated the parental rights of the father of each child. Mother did not challenge the findings relating to termination of her rights but claimed that the children’s current placement, with their maternal grandparents, is unsafe, and that permanent placement there would not be in the children’s best interests. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the best interests determination in connection with the termination of mother’s parental rights was not a determination of who will adopt the children or that any particular placement is in their best interests. To the extent that mother seeks to challenge the court’s order identifying adoption as the permanency plan, 22 M.R.S. 4038-B(3), that order is interlocutory and not appealable. View "In re: Dominic B." on Justia Law

In 2014, father had partial custody of S.H.; S.H. accused mother of abuse and fled from her home to father. Father sought a temporary order of full custody. A Pennsylvania judge granted mother emergency custody. S.H. was referred to Centre County’s Children and Youth Services (CYS) because of the abuse allegations. CYS concluded that the allegation did not meet the definition of child abuse but continued its investigation, giving S.H. the option of moving into a group home or remaining with his mother. S.H. did not want to stay with her. Mother arranged for S.H. to stay in Youth Haven and objected to any contact with father, claiming that she had sole custody. CYS and Youth Haven allowed contact. After a visit, father complained about Youth Haven, which told CYS that S.H. could not stay due to problems with father. CYS informed father that he could no longer contact S.H. at Youth Haven. Hamilton filed a federal suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights by “placing S.H. in a shelter tantamount to confinement” and “arbitrarily and capriciously terminating all paternal visits and contact.” While that case progressed, S.H. left Youth Haven. A new Pennsylvania judge vacated the prior emergency custody order, granted father physical custody of S.H., and prohibited contact between S.H. and mother. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that the case was mooted when father obtained custody. View "Hamilton v. Bromley" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the trial court’s dismissal of her parentage action under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), as well as its denial of her motion to reconsider. She and father were the parents of a child born in Vermont in June 2016. The child also lived with parents for a time in Virginia. Father initiated child custody proceedings in Virginia in August 2016 and was granted custody of the child. Mother appealed that decision within the Virginia court system. Mother then filed a parentage action in Vermont. Following a joint hearing before Virginia and Vermont courts, the Virginia court retained jurisdiction over the custody case, and the Vermont court dismissed the parentage action. Mother essentially argued to the Vermont Supreme Court that Vermont, not Virginia, should have asserted jurisdiction over this child custody case. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s decision, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pierce v. Slate" on Justia Law