Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Amanda Copeland appealed the termination of Gary Copeland’s child-support obligation to his two minor children. After their divorce, Gary and Amanda were awarded joint legal custody of their minor children, with physical custody awarded to Amanda and visitation awarded to Gary. Gary subsequently filed a Petition for Citation of Contempt and For Modification and a Motion for Temporary Relief. During the trial on Gary’s petition and motion, his seventeen-year-old daughter and thirteen-year-old son testified. The chancellor found they no longer loved their father and they wished to terminate any relationship with him. Each child acknowledged sending hateful emails and texts, which included expressed desires either to kill their father or see him dead. The numerous text messages and emails admitted into evidence were filled with vitriolic invectives, expressing deep-seated anger, resentment, and ill-will not only toward their father, but also toward his parents and sister. The court determined that the conduct of the children was so egregious that was appropriate to terminate the support obligation. The issues presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court’s review were: (1) whether the chancellor manifestly wrong in granting relief that was not requested; (2) did the children’s animosity toward their father exist at the time of the divorce; and (3) was the chancellor’s decision supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court found the chancellor did not abuse his discretion, was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, and did not apply an erroneous legal standard. The chancellor’s findings of fact were supported by substantial and credible evidence. View "Copeland v. Copeland" on Justia Law

Father lived the child and her mother, outside of Maine, until 2008, when the child was about six months old. After that time, he maintained regular contact with the child, who resided primarily in New York, but was never her primary caregiver. In 2016 Mother moved to Maine with the child. Father, who is incarcerated in Massachusetts, did not oppose the move. While he was incarcerated the child asked a neighbor for help and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services commenced a child protection proceeding. Father made no effort to take responsibility. The Department obtained a preliminary protection order, 22 M.R.S. 4032-4036, and placed the child in foster care after hospitalization for psychiatric care. Father was served with notice and provided with appointed counsel, who moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction because Father is not a Maine resident, has never traveled to Maine,and otherwise lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Maine. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the court’s rejection of that motion. The court was not required to have jurisdiction over Father to have authority to issue a jeopardy order to protect the child. View "In re Emma B." on Justia Law

Under Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5, no family case manager at the Indiana Department of Child Services can oversee more than 17 children at a time who are receiving services. The statute does not require the Department to perform any specific, ministerial acts for achieving that number. Price, a family case manager, filed a proposed class action. She alleged that her caseload was 43 children and sought an “order mandating or enjoining [D]efendants to take all necessary steps to comply with [Section 5].” The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Price’s claim prior to class certification. Judicial mandate is an extraordinary remedy—available only when the law imposes a clear duty upon a defendant to perform a specific, ministerial act and the plaintiff is clearly entitled to that relief. The statute at issue does not impose a specific, ministerial duty. View "Price v. Indiana Department of Child Services; Director of Indiana Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

Kelcey Patton, a social worker for the Denver Department of Human Services (“DDHS”), was one of those responsible for removing T.D., a minor at the time, from his mother’s home, placing him into DDHS’s custody, and recommending T.D. be placed and remain in the temporary custody of his father, Tiercel Duerson. T.D. eventually was removed from his father’s home after DDHS received reports that T.D. had sexual contact with his half-brother, also Mr. Duerson’s son. DDHS later determined that during T.D.’s placement with Mr. Duerson, T.D. had suffered severe physical and sexual abuse at the hands of his father. T.D. sued Patton under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his right to substantive due process, relying on a “danger-creation theory,” which provided that “state officials can be liable for the acts of third parties where those officials created the danger that caused the harm.” Patton moved for summary judgment on the ground that she is entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "T.D. v. Patton" on Justia Law

A father appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his defamation, negligence, and monetary claims against mother and her sister (aunt). Father alleged that mother and aunt coached daughter into saying “Daddy hit me” and submitted defamatory audio and video recordings of daughter’s statements to his parole officer. Father also alleged that mother made false statements to his parole officer and in mother’s petition for relief from abuse. The trial court ruled that these recordings and statements were absolutely privileged. Father also brought several monetary claims against mother premised on his allegation that he had loaned money to mother. On appeal, father argues the trial court (1) erred in concluding that the recordings and statements were protected by absolute privilege and that they should have instead been protected only by qualified privilege; (2) erred in dismissing his monetary claims against mother; and (3) abused its discretion in denying his motion for a court-appointed expert. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s entry of summary judgment on all claims except for certain monetary claims. View "Couture v. Trainer" on Justia Law

Paternal great-grandparents Ed and Yvonne H. appealed an order denying their request for joinder and petition to seek visitation with their great-grandchildren. Ed and Yvonne's argued the court erred in finding they lacked standing to join as parties seeking visitation. Specifically, they argued the court erred by determining that Family Code sections 3103 and 3104, which allow a court to grant visitation rights to grandparents if certain conditions are met, did not permit great-grandparent visitation. Alternatively, Ed and Yvonne contend the court erred by not considering that their grandson, the father of the great-grandchildren, consented to and joined in their request for visitation, and by not considering whether they had standing as psychological or de facto parents. The Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature did not intend section 3104 of the grandparent visitation statutes to authorize great-grandparents to petition for visitation, and thus the court did not err by concluding Ed and Yvonne lacked legal standing to seek visitation. View "Ed H. v. Ashley C." on Justia Law

In 1990, appellant Matthew Albert Parker and respondent Mary Katherine Parker divorced. Mary and Matthew shared two children. In 2014, Matthew sought an order (1) requiring respondent San Bernardino County Department of Child Support Services (the Department) to prepare an accounting of the child support arrears owed by Matthew; and (2) discharging the child support arrears for the period in which the children resided with Matthew (Trainotti credits). The family court denied Matthew’s requested order. Matthew appealed, arguing: (1) res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar an award of Trainotti credits; and (2) the family court erred by not applying the doctrine of laches to discharge the arrears owed to the Department. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Marriage of Parker" on Justia Law

D.H. was removed from, and failed to reunify with, his paternal grandparents, who had been caring for him under a probate guardianship. The entire case, from the petition, to removal, to termination of services, focused on the grandparents, not the child’s father. In this dependency appeal, D.H., Sr. (father), the presumed father of D.H., argues on appeal of that decision, the juvenile court violated due process by terminating his parental rights without making an unfitness or detriment finding against him by clear and convincing evidence at any point in the proceedings. Respondent Riverside Department of Social Services (DPSS) urged the Court of Appeal to adopt, in the dependency context, the best interest of the child standard for terminating parental rights under Probate Code section 1516.5. The Court declined: Probate Code section 1516.5 applied when a legal guardian seeks to have the child declared free from the custody and control of one or both parents and was designed to “mak[e] it easier for children in probate guardianships to be adopted by their guardians.” That provision did not apply in a case like this, where the only reason the court was considering terminating parental rights was because the state brought a successful dependency action against the guardians. “Father’s entitlement to the constitutional safeguards articulated in Gladys L. does not vanish simply because D.H. was under a legal guardianship at the outset of the dependency.” View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

The sperm of Brian Cole was used to inseminate Mie Tsuchimoto, who gave birth to a boy (the child). When the child was six years old, the County of Orange filed a complaint to declare Cole to be the child’s father and to seek child support from Cole. Cole defended on the ground that under Family Code section 7613, he could not be the child’s parent. The trial court found that, notwithstanding section 7613: (1) there was a rebuttable presumption under section 7611(d) that Cole was the child’s parent because Cole had received the child into his home as his natural child and openly held out the child as his own; and (2) Cole had not rebutted that presumption. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the trial court’s findings regarding section 7611(d) were supported by substantial evidence. "The inability to establish parenthood under section 7613 does not preclude a finding of parenthood under section 7611(d)." View "County of Orange v. Cole" on Justia Law

Respondent Harry Dow, IV appealed a circuit court order requiring him to pay alimony to petitioner Leslie Dow in the amount of $750 per month for three years. When it calculated the amount of alimony, the trial court declined to impute income to petitioner, concluding that it had no authority to do so under RSA 458:19 (Supp. 2016). On appeal, respondent argued, among other things, that the trial court erred because RSA 458:19 authorized the imputation of income for the purpose of determining the amount of alimony. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with respondent and, therefore, vacated and remanded. View "In the Matter of Leslie Dow & Harry Dow, IV" on Justia Law