Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Dale Miller and Jessica Smith agreed to an irreconcilable-differences divorce, leaving for the Chancery Court to decide custody, care, and visitation of their two children, Smitty and Morgan. As to Smitty, the chancellor terminated Miller’s parental rights because Miller was not the biological father of Smitty nor did he stand in loco parentis to Smitty. As to Morgan, the biological child of Miller and Smith, the chancellor awarded custody to Smith. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor’s judgments. On petition for certiorari to this Court, Miller argued: (1) the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights to Smitty; and (2) his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and his right to be present under Article 3, Section 25 of the Mississippi Constitution were violated when the chancellor removed Miller from the courtroom during the testimony of Smith’s oldest daughter of a previous relationship. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, yet with respect to the second issue, the court found removing Miller from the courtroom as a harmless error. View "Miller v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that defendant attorney’s failure to adequately inform plaintiff Hannah Sachs of the risks of delay in filing a parentage action “negligently fell short of the standard of reasonably competent legal representation.” Despite the court’s conclusion that defendant breached her professional duty of care, the trial court determined that plaintiff failed to demonstrate direct causation or measurable damages as a result of defendant’s negligent advice. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the court’s legal conclusions and contends that the court’s factual findings established both causation and damages. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff, and reversed. View "Sachs v. Downs Rachlin Martin, PLLC" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015, which provides for the enforcement of liens for attorney fees, as amended in 2013, provides for the enforcement of a retaining lien for attorney fees.Respondent represented Appellant in a paternity action. Respondent later filed and served a notice of a retaining lien against Appellant for $13,701 for unpaid legal fees. Respondent filed a motion asking the district court to adjudicate the rights of counsel, for enforcement of attorney’s lien, and for a judgment for attorney fees. Appellant argued that Respondent was asserting a charging lien, not a retaining lien, and that the purported charging lien failed as a matter of law. The district court granted Respondent’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of section 18.015 unambiguously permits an attorney to enforce a retaining lien; and (2) the district court did not err by enforcing Respondent’s valid retaining lien against Appellant under section 18.015. View "Fredianelli v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Appellants Gordon and Donna Runyon were once married. In 2010, respondent Comerica Bank (Comerica) obtained a joint and several judgment for breach of guaranty against Gordon and some other defendants. Gordon and Donna then divorced, the other judgment debtors settled with Comerica, and post-divorce, Comerica obtained an order to show cause why real property that was formerly community property but then owned as separate property by Donna, should not be sold to satisfy the remaining debt owing on the judgment. Donna and other debtors each paid certain sums, and eventually the judgment was satisfied in full. Gordon filed an application for order of contribution contending he paid more than his proportional share of the judgment through his community property interests. He requested contribution from the cojudgment debtors. The court denied the motion on grounds the application failed to demonstrate it was timely filed. In this appeal, Gordon argued he satisfied the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 881 through 883 under which he sought contribution, because when his application was heard Comerica had not yet filed a satisfaction of judgment and therefore it was timely filed. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed as to Gordon. However, the Court found Donna lacked standing, so her appeal was dismissed. View "Comerica Bank v. Runyon" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in this case to consider what constituted a “compelling reason” for early termination of delinquency supervision under Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 632. At the time of the May 2014 delinquency termination hearing at issue herein, D.C.D. was an intellectually low-functioning and socially immature twelve-year-old boy who was a victim of sexual abuse. He originally entered the delinquency system in the fall of 2012, at age ten, due to allegations that he committed indecent assault against his five-year-old sister. Rather than formally adjudicating him delinquent at that time, the juvenile court entered a consent decree pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 6340, which allowed for the suspension of delinquency proceedings prior to formal adjudication, and placed D.C.D. in a specialized foster care program administered by Pressley Ridge. In subsequent years, D.C.D. would be placed in multiple foster homes, removed each time for sexual harassment against foster family members, and for trying to start fires in the homes. Some residential treatment facilities (RTF) were unwilling to accept children who had incidents of fire-starting, and others could not provide services for his level of intellectual functioning. Given the available options, the parties agreed that D.C.D. should be moved to the Southwood Psychiatric Hospital - Choices Program (Southwood), a RTF which had a bed immediately available and which focused specifically upon his cohort: intellectually low-functioning, sexual offenders. Despite the parties’ agreement to place D.C.D. at Southwood, Southwood informed them that it could not accept him due to his adjudication of delinquency for a sexual offense. However, the director stated that they could accept D.C.D. if the delinquency supervision was terminated. As a result, D.C.D.’s counsel filed a motion for early termination of delinquency supervision under Pa.R.J.C.P. 632 to which the York County District Attorney objected and requested a hearing. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court properly determined that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in granting early termination to the juvenile in this case to allow him to obtain necessary and immediate treatment, after properly taking into account the three aspects of balanced and restorative justice (BARJ) embodied in the Juvenile Act and incorporated into the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. View "In Re: D.C.D." on Justia Law

A.D., mother of P.T.D., C.R.D., P.A.D., P.P.D., and N.A.D., appealed a juvenile court order finding her five children were deprived under N.D.C.C. 27-20-02(8). These proceedings arose after the State alleged the children were subject to repeated exposure to domestic violence between A.D. and T.D.; A.D.'s methamphetamine and other substance abuse and the presence of controlled substances in the home; T.D.'s suicide attempts; and other mental health issues. After the deprivation hearing, the juvenile court found the children were deprived by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court ordered the children removed from the care, custody, and control of their parents on February 13, 2017. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the juvenile court noted drug use, mental health issues, domestic violence, and other health issues in its order, but it failed to connect those facts to the children's deprivation. The Court remanded with instructions that the juvenile court make adequate findings of fact to determine whether P.T.D., C.R.D., P.A.D., P.P.D., and N.A.D. were deprived children based on the evidence presented at the initial deprivation hearing. View "Interest of P.T.D." on Justia Law

Shawn Brew appealed a judgment granting him a divorce from Jennifer Brew, distributing their marital property, and ordering him to pay child support. Shawn argued the district court's property distribution was inequitable, the court improperly calculated his child support obligation, and the court erred in ordering him to pay attorney's fees. A district court is required to equitably distribute marital property in a divorce proceeding, and a property division does not need to be equal to be equitable. Under the child support guidelines, a district court averages a self-employed obligor's income over the most recent five years to determine income from self-employment. The district court has discretion to award attorney's fees when one party's actions have unreasonably increased the time spent on a case. Finding no clear error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Brew v. Brew" on Justia Law

In January 2014, after approximately three years of marriage, Appellant David Patton filed a complaint for divorce against Appellee Jocelyn Vanterpool, M.D. During the pendency of the divorce, the parties consented to Appellee undergoing in-vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment, which would eventually utilize both donor ova and donor sperm. Appellee traveled to the Czech Republic for the IVF procedure. Four days after leaving, a final judgment and decree of divorce was entered in the divorce action. The divorce decree incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement, which reflected that, at the time of the agreement, the parties neither had nor were expecting children produced of the marriage. Approximately 29 weeks later, Appellee gave birth as a result of the IVF procedure. Appellee subsequently moved the superior court to set aside the decree of divorce, seeking to include the minor child in the divorce agreement; this motion was denied. Appellee thereafter instituted a paternity action against Appellant, alleging that he gave written, informed consent for IVF and that OCGA 19-7-21 created an irrebuttable presumption of paternity; Appellee also sought child support. In response, Appellant argued that he did not meaningfully consent to IVF and that, even if he did, OCGA 19-7-21 was unconstitutional. The trial court sided with Appellee, granting her summary judgment on the issue of paternity. In September 2016, the Georgia Supreme Court granted Appellant’s application for discretionary appeal to address whether that irrebuttable presumption applied to children conceived by means of IVF. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not and reversed the judgment of the superior court. View "Patton v. Vanterpool" on Justia Law

A trial court determined the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) failed to demonstrate it made reasonable efforts to reunify a family. Nonetheless, the court terminated Kylie L.’s parental rights to her daughter, finding that OCS’s failure was “excused.” The mother appealed, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s “excuse.” View "Kylie L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Divorced parents reached a custody settlement giving the mother sole legal and primary physical custody of their son; the father had visitation at the mother’s discretion. After the father later requested joint legal and shared physical custody, the mother sought authorization to relocate with the child out of state. At a combined hearing on both issues the father presented evidence that the mother may have committed domestic violence against a former boyfriend. The superior court denied the custody modification request for failure to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances. The court granted the mother authorization to move, finding her reasons for relocating legitimate and determining that the child’s best interests were served by staying with the mother. Under the court’s subsequent order the mother maintained sole legal and primary physical custody, with limited visitation by the father. The father appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the determination that the mother’s move was for legitimate purposes; however, it vacated the underlying finding that no domestic violence occurred between the mother and her former boyfriend and remanded that issue for renewed consideration. Necessarily, the Court remanded the custody and visitation decisions for renewed consideration. View "Bruce H. v. Jennifer L." on Justia Law