Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

K.R. filed suit in the domestic-relations court to establish paternity and to allocate parental rights and responsibilities for M.W.’s minor child. On Friday, April 14, the court held a hearing on its own motion; Magistrate McKinley issued a decision, finding probable cause to believe that the child was a neglected, abused, and/or dependent child, that she was in immediate danger, and that removal was necessary to prevent immediate or threatened physical or emotional harm. He ordered the child placed in the immediate custody of Richland County Children Services (RCCS) and ordered the case transferred to the juvenile court. The following Monday, RCCS sought to set aside that decision. Days later, Judge Cockley signed a judgment entry adopting the magistrate’s decision. RCCS sought a writ of mandamus to compel a ruling on RCCS’s motion and a writ of prohibition vacating the decision and barring the domestic-relations court from issuing future custody orders that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the motion to dismiss, granted a peremptory writ of prohibition, and denied the requested writ of mandamus as moot. The domestic-relations court’s only recourse, upon suspicion of abuse, neglect, or dependency, is to transfer the matter to the juvenile court. Magistrate McKinley and Judge Cockley unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order that the child be placed in the immediate custody of RCCS. View "Richland County Children Services. v. Richland County. Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the narrow issue of whether sovereign immunity barred an award of attorney’s fees against a public entity. The trial court found that the Moffat County Department of Social Services (“the Department”) committed a discovery violation in the course of a dependency and neglect proceeding, and it awarded attorney’s fees to Petitioner C.K. pursuant to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The court of appeals vacated the fee award, holding that it was barred by sovereign immunity. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. There are two additional relevant, yet distinct, issues that remained to decide whether an award of attorney’s fees is proper in this case: (1) whether, under the facts of this case, C.R.C.P. 37 applied to proceedings governed by the Children’s Code, and, if it did, (2) whether C.R.C.P. 37 contained the express language required to authorize attorney’s fees against a public entity. While the Court discussed these issues briefly to give context to its holding, ultimate resolution was left to be addressed on remand. View "C.K. v. Colorado in the Interest of L.K." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a juvenile court validly terminated a mother’s parent-child legal relationship without first entering a formal written order adjudicating her children as dependent or neglected. The juvenile court accepted the mother’s admission that her children were neglected or dependent, but did not enter a formal order before it terminated the mother’s parental rights approximately a year later. The court of appeals held that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the mother’s parental rights because it had not entered the order. The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals that the trial court’s failure to enter an order adjudicating the children’s status as neglected or dependent divested the trial court of jurisdiction. Because the trial court accepted the parents’ admission, the Supreme Court concluded the purpose of the adjudicative process was met and the children’s status as neglected or dependent was established, thus permitting state intervention into the familial relationship. Moreover, both the Department and the mother proceeded as if the court had adjudicated the status of the children: the mother participated in subsequent hearings and attempted to comply with the trial court’s treatment plan; she never sought to withdraw her admission; and she never challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction or otherwise objected below to the trial court’s verbal or written termination orders finding that the children had been adjudicated neglected or dependent. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s failure to enter an adjudicative order confirming the children’s status as neglected or dependent did not impair the fundamental fairness of the proceedings or deprive the mother of due process. View "Colorado in Interest of J.W." on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were divorced in 1995; the final decree of divorce incorporated a settlement agreement that provided for child support and at least half of his Armed Services retirement pay monthly. The child support obligation terminated in 2006, and his first payment of retirement benefits was due to Wife the following month. Husband, however, never paid. Although Wife employed attorneys to demand payment from Husband, Wife took no court action until February 25, 2016, when she filed a motion for contempt. The trial court held that the first payment of retirement benefits became due on July 1, 2006, and the judgment went dormant on July 1, 2013. Although filing a scire facias within three years of dormancy would have revived the judgment if it were dormant, Wife made no such filing. Therefore, the trial court held: that although Husband “clearly and knowingly failed to uphold his obligations under the decree,” it could not hold him in contempt. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in its analysis: Wife’s first viable opportunity to enforce the judgment occurred in July of 2006, when the initial payment became due. The dormancy period did not begin to run until each installment is due. Here, installments that became due within seven years preceding the issuance and recording of the execution are collectible and enforceable. Installments that were dormant remain subject to revival pursuant to OCGA 9-12-61. View "Holmes-Bracy v. Bracy" on Justia Law

R.W.D. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his two children, K.S.D. and J.S.D. After a review of the juvenile court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded clear and convincing evidence established that the children were deprived, the deprivation was likely to continue, and the children had been in foster care at least 450 of 660 nights. The Court also concluded active efforts to prevent the breakup of this Indian family were made and those efforts have been unsuccessful. However, the Court found nothing in the record to satisfy the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) requirement of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of a qualified expert witness, that continued custody by the parents would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children. Accordingly, though the Court retained jurisdiction over this case, it remanded for testimony from an ICWA qualified expert witness. View "Interest of K.S.D." on Justia Law

Jane Doe and John Doe (2017-19) (“Mother,” “Father,” and collectively, “Parents”) appealed a magistrate court’s Final Judgment terminating their parental rights to Jane Doe II (“Child”). Jane Doe I and John Doe I (“Grandmother,” “Grandfather”) initiated the underlying action by filing a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and a Petition for Adoption. The magistrate court issued a Final Judgment terminating Parents’ parental rights after concluding that Parents had abandoned Child and that the termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child’s best interest. On appeal, Parents challenged the magistrate court’s conclusion that Child was abandoned and that termination of parental rights was in Child’s best interest. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the termination. View "John & Jane Doe (2017-19) v. John & Jane Doe I" on Justia Law

Fred Kamgar appealed a judgment ordering him to pay his wife Moira Kamgar $1,952,056.50 for breach of his spousal fiduciary duties in failing to disclose to her that he engaged in options trading, and traded an additional $8 million more than the $2.5 million in community assets she agreed he could trade in their investment account. The trial court determined Fred’s undisclosed and reckless trading resulted in a loss of almost $4 million, in addition to losing the initial $2.5 million. Fred contended the evidence did not support the conclusion he violated his fiduciary duties. Moira contended she was entitled to more than the $1.9 million award she received as her community interest in the $4 million loss. Finding the law and the evidence amply supported the trial court’s award, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Marriage of Kamgar" on Justia Law

Paternal grandparents sought a court order for visitation with their grandson. The superior court denied their request because they did not allege that the child suffered any detriment from a lack of court-ordered visitation. Finding no reversible error in that denial, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed: “[t]he balance of interests that due process requires was resolved in favor of the parents, and the result is the ‘showing of detriment’ test which the grandparents here have failed to even argue they could satisfy.” View "Jordan v. Watson" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, petitioner Emily Sanborn, and respondent Timothy Sanborn, appealed circuit court orders that ruled on Timothy’s post-divorce motions. Emily argued the trial court erred by ordering that respondent was entitled to continuation coverage under her dental insurance plan pursuant to RSA 415:18, XVI (2015). Timothy cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred by denying his request for attorney’s fees. Emily argued that because Timothy received dental coverage pursuant to a 2013 amendment to the divorce decree retroactive from April 2011 to April 2014, he received all of the coverage that he was entitled to under the statute. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with this contention and reversed the circuit court as to this point. The Supreme Court affirmed with respect to denial of attorney fees. View "In the Matter of Emily Sanborn and Timothy E. Sanborn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by Parent challenging the district court’s placement decision following the termination of Parent’s parental rights where Parent entered into a stipulation agreeing to the termination of her parental rights but reserving the right to participate in a contested pre-termination hearing regarding the child’s placement. The Supreme Court held that Parent lacked standing to challenge the placement decision because Parent’s parental rights were clearly terminated, and therefore, Parent no longer had any substantial interest that could be affected by the court’s placement decision. Further, the Supreme Court’s prior order denying writ relief did not confer standing on Parent. View "In re Parental Rights as to T.L." on Justia Law