Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Alamosa County Department of Human Services interviewed Mother, who admitted that she was addicted to prescription medications, although she denied selling drugs from her home. Mother had a history of prior referrals to the Department, and her older children had previously been temporarily removed from her home due to her drug use. Meanwhile, the father of the children had been incarcerated following a criminal conviction and remained in custody at the time the Department conducted its investigation. Father had a history of methamphetamine use. In light of the foregoing, the Department filed a dependency and neglect petition with regard to E.M., L.M., and E.J.M. (the “Children”). Although both Mother and Father initially denied the allegations contained in the petition, they subsequently entered admissions, and the court adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected. This case called on the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether the State could seek to terminate a parent’s parental rights under the relinquishment provision of the Colorado Children’s Code (the “Code”), section 19-5-105, C.R.S. (2017), when the child is already subject to a dependency and neglect proceeding under Article 3 of the Code, sections 19-3-100.5 to -805, C.R.S. (2017). The Court concluded that when a dependency and neglect proceeding is pending, the State can terminate parental rights only through the procedures set forth in Article 3 of the Code and cannot use the more limited processes provided in Article 5. View "Colorado in Interest of L.M." on Justia Law

The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect concerning minor child R.S., and naming both parents as respondents. The mother requested a bench trial to adjudicate the dependent or neglected status of the child; the father requested a jury trial. The court held a single adjudicatory trial, with the judge serving as fact-finder with respect to the Department’s allegations against the mother, and a jury sitting as fact-finder with respect to the allegations against the father. The judge ultimately concluded that the child was dependent or neglected “in regard to” the mother. In contrast, the jury, as the father’s fact-finder, concluded there was insufficient factual basis to support a finding that the child was dependent or neglected. In light of these divergent findings, the trial court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected and continued to exercise jurisdiction over the child and the mother, but entered an order dismissing the father from the petition. The mother appealed the adjudication of the child as dependent or neglected; the Department appealed the jury’s verdict regarding the father, as well as the trial court’s denial of the Department’s motion for adjudication notwithstanding the verdict. In a unanimous, published opinion, the court of appeals dismissed the Department’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the dismissal of a single parent from a petition in dependency or neglect based on a jury verdict was not a final appealable order because neither the appellate rule nor the statutory provision governing appeals from proceedings in dependency or neglect expressly permitted an appeal of a “no adjudication finding.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that, with limited exceptions, the Colorado Children’s Code authorized appealed in dependency and neglect cases of “any order” that qualified as a “final judgment.” Here, the trial court’s order dismissing the father from the petition was not a “final judgment,” so the court of appeal lacked jurisdiction and properly dismissed the Department’s appeal. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals but under different reasoning. View "Colorado in Interest of R.S." on Justia Law

The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the magistrate court in an expedited appeal regarding the termination of John Doe (2017-32)'s parental rights. John Doe is the father of minor children KB and AB (the “Children”). The Children entered the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (“IDHW”) custody in December 2014 after the Twin Falls Police declared them to be in imminent danger. The Children were in their mother’s (“Mother”) care when the police arrested her for possession of a controlled substance. Law enforcement described the condition of Mother’s home at this time as “filthy, cluttered, and containing numerous safety hazards, including raw sewage being present in the basement.” An Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) case plan, filed January 2015, included number of enumerated tasks for both Doe and Mother to complete in order for them to reunite with the Children. The case plan sought to provide Doe and Mother a framework to address “stable housing, sanitary living conditions, the need to obtain controlled substance abuse treatment, to remain clean/sober, and [to] stay out of jail.” Mother relapsed within weeks of a December 2016 order and was arrested for felony possession, kicked out of Drug Court, and went to prison. IDHW sought to terminate Doe and Mother’s parental rights. Doe had not completed his required drug treatment regimen by a first trial, he became more actively involved in his treatment plan by the time of a second trial. Doe showed other encouraging signs between the first and second trial as well, including significant progress on his case plan. However, the magistrate court noted that, despite progress, Doe still had not completed his case plan nor reunified with his children in the intervening period between the first and second trial. The court issued a Memorandum Decision granting termination of Doe and Mother’s parental rights on October 2, 2017, and entered a corresponding judgment ten days later on October 12, 2017. Mother did not appeal, but Doe timely filed his notice of appeal. The Supreme Court found the magistrate court’s December 2016 order stating that termination was not in the Children’s best interest was irreconcilable with IDHW’s first official recommendation following that order that termination “remains” in the Children’s best interest. The magistrate court’s October 2017 decision following the second trial highlighted Doe’s failure to reunify with the Children as a substantial factor in his ultimate decision to terminate. The magistrate court’s procedural error in not entering judgment for Doe and dismissing the petition upon finding that termination was not in the Children’s best interest affected Doe’s fundamental rights in this case. View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. John Doe (2017-32)" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nila Collean Carter sought to revoke her consent to the adoption of her two biological children. Throughout the proceedings, Petitioner was never provided an opportunity to be heard on the merits of her claim before the adoption was finalized. The South Carolina Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' unpublished decision affirming the family court's denial of Petitioner's motion to set aside the final adoption decree pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP. Because Petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion was timely filed and sufficiently alleged extrinsic fraud, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this matter to the family court for further proceedings. View "Ex Parte: Carter" on Justia Law

At issue was the appropriate standards and procedures for requests by the Commonwealth and parties to a care and protection proceeding in the juvenile court for the release of impounded records of the proceeding.Here, Mother and Father were the subjects of a care and protection proceeding, the records from which were impounded, and the defendants in criminal child abuse cases. Father and the Commonwealth sought access to the impounded records in conjunction with the upcoming criminal trials. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) where a party to a care and protection proceeding or the Commonwealth seeks access to impounded records of the proceeding, the requestor must demonstrate that the records should be released under the good cause standard of rule 7 of the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure; and (2) if the good cause standard is met, records may be disclosed for limited, confidential review and use, but the discoverability of the records does not also make them admissible at a subsequent criminal proceeding. View "Care and Protection of M.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of divorce, defaulting Husband, holding that the district court did not err in determining that service by publication was adequate.When Wife filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Husband, Husband fled to Florida in order to evade service of process. Two months later, Wife prepared a complaint for divorce from Husband, but neither she nor the sheriff’s office was able to find him to serve him with the divorce complaint. The district court granted a motion for service of the divorce complaint by alternate means, allowing Wife to effect service by publishing notice of the complaint in the Lewiston Sun Journal. When Father failed to appear at the divorce hearing, the district court entered a judgment of divorce defaulting Husband. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Me. R. Civ. P. 4 did not impose a requirement that a copy of the order granting alternate service be personally delivered to Husband; and (2) the district court’s decision not to require Wife to send an email to Husband’s possible email address or notify Husband’s attorney of the order for service by publication did not result in a failure of due process. View "Schulz v. Doeppe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of divorce, defaulting Husband, holding that the district court did not err in determining that service by publication was adequate.When Wife filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Husband, Husband fled to Florida in order to evade service of process. Two months later, Wife prepared a complaint for divorce from Husband, but neither she nor the sheriff’s office was able to find him to serve him with the divorce complaint. The district court granted a motion for service of the divorce complaint by alternate means, allowing Wife to effect service by publishing notice of the complaint in the Lewiston Sun Journal. When Father failed to appear at the divorce hearing, the district court entered a judgment of divorce defaulting Husband. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Me. R. Civ. P. 4 did not impose a requirement that a copy of the order granting alternate service be personally delivered to Husband; and (2) the district court’s decision not to require Wife to send an email to Husband’s possible email address or notify Husband’s attorney of the order for service by publication did not result in a failure of due process. View "Schulz v. Doeppe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court denying Father’s Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment after the court granted Mother’s motion to modify a parental rights and responsibilities order regarding the parties’ son. On appeal, Father argued that the court erred in denying his motion because (1) after another state assumed jurisdiction over the child custody matter, Maine necessarily lost jurisdiction over that matter; and (2) the court erred by not allowing him to present facts and legal arguments to the court before a decision on jurisdiction was made. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) Maine maintained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody matter pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 1746(1); and (2) the court acted within the confines of section 1740(2), and because Father on two occasions had already presented facts and legal arguments regarding jurisdiction, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father a third opportunity to address the matter. View "Fitzpatrick v. McCrary" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court denying Father’s Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment after the court granted Mother’s motion to modify a parental rights and responsibilities order regarding the parties’ son. On appeal, Father argued that the court erred in denying his motion because (1) after another state assumed jurisdiction over the child custody matter, Maine necessarily lost jurisdiction over that matter; and (2) the court erred by not allowing him to present facts and legal arguments to the court before a decision on jurisdiction was made. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) Maine maintained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody matter pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 1746(1); and (2) the court acted within the confines of section 1740(2), and because Father on two occasions had already presented facts and legal arguments regarding jurisdiction, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father a third opportunity to address the matter. View "Fitzpatrick v. McCrary" on Justia Law

Gene Grasser appealed an amended judgment entered from March 2017, awarding primary residential responsibility to Stephanie Grasser and distributing marital property and debts. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gene's request for recusal or by finding Gene in contempt and awarding sanctions which it did not reimburse. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not clearly err by awarding Stephanie primary residential responsibility of the parties' child or by distributing the parties' marital property and debts. View "Grasser v. Grasser" on Justia Law