Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In a discretionary appeal, at issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the high income child support guidelines found at Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-3.1 inherently accounted for the reasonable needs of the children such that any discrete analysis of those needs by a fact-finder was improper. The Court also examined whether a voluntary contribution to an irrevocable non-grantor trust for the benefit of the children was an appropriate factor for a court to consider for purposes of deviating from the guidelines amount of child support under Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b). Furthermore, the Court considered the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees to the obligee in this case. The Court concluded: (1) Rule 1910.16-3.1 did not render independent examination of the reasonable needs of the children by the fact-finder improper in high income cases; (2) a voluntary contribution to an irrevocable non-grantor trust for the benefit of the children was an inappropriate factor to consider for deviation purposes under Rule 1910.16-5(b); and (3) the obligee is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees in this case. View "Hanrahan v. Bakker" on Justia Law

C.T. and D.A. appealed a juvenile court order terminating C.T.'s parental rights to her minor daughter, C.A., and earlier orders finding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply to C.A.'s presumed father, D.A., or C.A.'s biological father, D.R. The Court of Appeal rejected these challenges and affirmed the orders. View "In re C.A." on Justia Law

In issuing a divorce decree between Terrace Solomon and Wendy Barnes (formerly Solomon), the issue of custody was reserved to be decided at a later trial. Before the custody trial could be held, Terrace was arrested and held in a United States Army prison outside Alaska. The superior court repeatedly continued the custody trial to allow Terrace’s counsel to get in contact with Terrace and arrange for his telephonic appearance at trial. But after about a year had passed, the court refused to further continue the matter. A short custody trial was held; Terrace was absent but represented by counsel. The court awarded sole legal custody and sole physical custody to Wendy. The court determined, among other things, that Terrace had a history of perpetrating domestic violence, triggering a presumption against awarding him custody. On appeal Terrace claimed the superior court abused its discretion when it refused to further continue the custody trial. Terrace also claimed the court erred in concluding he had a history of domestic violence: he contended the record was inadequate to support that conclusion and the court did not make the requisite findings to support it. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed the superior court’s domestic violence findings were insufficient and thus vacated the court’s determination concerning the domestic violence presumption. The Court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Solomon v. Solomon" on Justia Law

Natasha Reiger appealed a district court judgment granting primary residential responsibility of J.Z. to Matthew Zuraff. Social services first became involved with the family because of a positive methamphetamine screening when J.Z. was born. Both Zuraff and Reiger had a history of methamphetamine use, although Reiger testified to being sober for approximately ten months and Zuraff testified he was sober for over three years. Both parents had criminal histories related to drug use, and Zuraff was incarcerated for approximately seven months after J.Z. was born. The North Dakota social worker assigned to J.Z. declined to recommend who should be awarded primary residential responsibility, but noted Zuraff was previously the more appropriate and stable option. After review of the district court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion granting primary residential responsibility to Zuraff. View "Zuraff v. Reiger" on Justia Law

Jennifer Dickson appealed a district court order denying her motion to modify residential responsibility of the parties' minor children. An original determination to award primary residential responsibility is necessary when the parents have joint or equal residential responsibility or when the earlier residential responsibility determination is based on the parties' stipulation. A court may consider, but is not bound by a finding of domestic violence in another proceeding under N.D.C.C. ch. 14-07.1. If the court finds credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred, and there exists one incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding, this combination creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded residential responsibility for the child. After careful consideration of the facts entered in the district court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court failed to correctly apply the law and make necessary findings regarding the best interest factors, including the factor on domestic violence. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dickson v. Dickson" on Justia Law

Wife Rachelle Spector filed a request for a temporary order for spousal support and professional fees. The parties filed their respective briefs with supporting declarations and evidence in advance of a February 17, 2017, hearing. The court issued its ruling on February 21, and served the order on the parties via e-mail the next day. The court ordered, among other things, husband to pay wife temporary spousal support and certain professional fees. The first temporary spousal support payment was due on March 1, 2017. Shortly after receiving the 2/21 Order on February 22, husband Phillip Spector sent an email to the judge with a copy to wife, stating “there appears to be an error in your arithmetic” regarding the monthly temporary spousal support figure. Husband, wife, and the judge engaged in several e-mail exchanges regarding the calculations and the effect of the monetary awards and requirements in the 2/21 Order. Husband suggested “that the court relabel it’s [sic] ruling to instead be a Tentative Ruling and let us each argue before making it final.” On February 23, the judge responded, “[q]uite frankly I have the authority to modify the orders and am considering doing so.” She further stated “[w]e can call the notice and orders tentative,” and invited the parties to argue the issues but indicated she “prefer[red] a 5 page written argument from each of [them].” The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal’s review was whether the trial court had the inherent authority to reconsider its own orders and make them effective retroactively. Wife argued the trial court was precluded from doing so pursuant to Family Code sections 3603, 3651(c), and 3653(a), and the various cases interpreting those statutes. The Court of Appeal concluded the court had inherent authority to reconsider its prior order and to apply its modified decision retroactively. Finding no merit in wife’s argument that the court violated her due process rights when it exercised this authority, the appellate court affirmed. View "Marriage of Spector" on Justia Law

While the parties in this child custody dispute asked the Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of Nev. Rev. Stat. 1.310, the Court declined to do so because the issues between the parties had been resolved, and therefore, the case was moot.David Degraw filed a motion for a continuance of a custody hearing pursuant to Nevada’s legislative continuance statute, section 1.310 because his attorney was a member of the Nevada State Assembly and the 2017 legislative session was about to begin. Misty Degraw opposed David’s request, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The district court (1) granted David’s motion for a continuance, (2) ordered an evidentiary hearing for a date during the legislative session, and (3) concluded that section 1.310 was unconstitutional. David then filed this writ petition arguing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied. The Supreme Court denied the petition as moot because the custody dispute in the underlying proceeding was resolved, and this case did not fall into the exception to mootness for cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review. View "Degraw v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

A husband and wife divorced after 40 years of marriage. The wife appealed the superior court’s decision to equally divide their marital property, which consisted primarily of retirement benefits and debt. The superior court declined to consider how the couple’s Social Security benefits affected a fair distribution, believing that Alaska Supreme Court case law precluded it from doing so. But the Supreme Court held that although federal law prohibited any allocation of the parties’ Social Security benefits, the court could consider them as evidence of the parties’ financial condition in crafting an equitable division of the marital property. The wife raised a number of other challenges to the property division, but the Supreme Court concluded they lacked merit. The Court vacated the order dividing the marital property and remanded for further consideration in light of the parties’ Social Security benefits. View "Dunmore v. Dunmore" on Justia Law

A couple divorced after nearly 30 years of marriage. The husband appealed the superior court’s valuation of his corporate stock and its characterization of the wife’s retirement health benefits as non-marital property. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the court’s stock valuation, but reversed its characterization of the retirement health benefits as non-marital. The Court therefore remanded for valuation of the health benefits and reconsideration of the equitable distribution of the marital estate. View "Wiegers v. Richards-Wiegers" on Justia Law

R.W. appeals a judgment of dissolution of his marriage with his former husband, respondent, G.C. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed two of many claims R.W. raised. In particular, R.W. claimed the trial court erred in determining that the parties' date of union was in 2009 when the parties married, rather than in 2004, when they entered into a domestic partnership under New Jersey law. R.W. contended the parties' New Jersey domestic partnership was "substantially equivalent" (Fam. Code, sec. 299.2) to a California domestic partnership such that it could be dissolved pursuant to section 299, and thus, that the court should have considered the date of the parties' domestic partnership to be the date of union for purposes of the dissolution. After interpreting the meaning of "substantially equivalent" in section 299.2 as a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal concluded that in light of the limited nature of the rights and obligations that the parties obtained in entering into a domestic partnership under New Jersey law, the trial court properly determined that the parties' 2004 New Jersey domestic partnership was not "substantially equivalent" to a California domestic partnership under section 299.2 so as to permit its dissolution under California law. Second, R.W. claimed the trial court erred in failing to divide equally the appreciation of the value of certain real property that the parties acquired as joint tenants during their marriage, as a community asset. Specifically, R.W. argued the trial court erred in applying a formula for apportioning separate and community property interests in the value of the appreciation because the joint title community property presumption contained in section 2581 applied to the property, and the appreciation therefore belonged entirely to the community. To this point, the Court of Appeal agreed with R.W. and concluded the trial court erred in failing to divide the appreciation in value of the marital residence equally. The Court rejected the remainder of R.W.'s claims in the unpublished portions of the opinion. View "Marriage of G.C. and R.W." on Justia Law