Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not oppose termination of the dependency of N.O., rather, the Agency recommended it. N.O.'s counsel opposed termination of dependency jurisdiction over the objection of N.O.'s parents. Mexico declined to exercise jurisdiction over Minor, who was detained in California when Minor's mother A.R. (Mother) was arrested at the international border for transporting a large amount of marijuana. Minor was ultimately placed by a California juvenile court with maternal grandmother in Mexico. A few months after her arrest, Mother was released from custody and returned to Mexico, where she participated in services through the agency Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF), which services were ordered and overseen by the juvenile court and Agency. Because Mother made substantial progress in services under her Agency care plan, Minor was returned to Mother's care. After a domestic violence (DV) incident between Mother and Minor's father S.G. (Father) in late December 2016 came to light in February 2017, Agency recommended Mother receive DV services, which were to be administered through DIF because Mother could no longer cross the border into the United States. When the court terminated jurisdiction in May 2018 it was unclear whether Mother had participated in such DV services. However, perhaps more important for purposes of this appeal, it also was unclear whether DIF had offered Mother such services, or believed they were even necessary. After multiple continuances of the section 364 review hearing, the juvenile court on March 8, 2018, granted Minor's counsel one last continuance, noting that it was "comfortable" closing the case based on the information then available to it and that it did not appear additional information regarding Minor would be forthcoming from DIF. On appeal, Minor contends the juvenile court's finding that conditions no longer existed in May 2018 that would justify the initial assumption of dependency over Minor in August 2015 was not supported by substantial evidence; that the court abused its discretion in not continuing the family maintenance review hearing until Minor was found and assessed; and that the juvenile court violated Minor's statutory right to counsel. The Court of Appeal determined Minor did not meet her burden of showing conditions still existed to justify the Agency's jurisdiction over her, and affirmed termination. View "In re N.O." on Justia Law

This case began as a highly contentious divorce proceeding between vexatious litigant-appellant Ronald Van Hook and his then-wife Dawn Cannon, in which Van Hook lost custody of his children (hereinafter the Canyon County divorce case). Van Hook was represented by legal counsel only for portions of the divorce proceeding as each of his attorneys withdrew from the case. Following each attorney’s departure, Van Hook filed a new series of pro se motions and objections to the court, which were similar and repetitive. Van Hook filed numerous motions to amend the magistrate court’s temporary custody and visitation orders, disqualify the magistrate judge assigned to the case, change venue, and find Cannon in criminal contempt. He also filed multiple petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. His pro se motions and petitions were continuously denied and largely found to be frivolous. When Van Hook appealed the Canyon County divorce case, the district court found Van Hook’s motion to recuse the magistrate judge frivolous, and that his appeal was also without foundation. The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review arose from an administrative order declaring Van Hook a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59. The Idaho Supreme Court determined Van Hook: met I.C.A.R. 59 (d)(1) because he commenced more than three pro se litigations that were adversely determined against him; met I.C.A.R. 59 (d)(2) because he repeatedly attempted to relitigate the final divorce and custody determinations by the magistrate court; and met I.C.A.R. 59 (d)(3) because he repeatedly filed frivolous motions and pleadings. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the prefiling order declaring Van Hook a vexatious litigant. View "Order Re: Vexatious Litigant (Van Hook)" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s action on the grounds that the lawsuit was, in essence, an appeal from a state-court judgment, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear it under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that the district court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims.This appeal arose from Plaintiff’s legal challenge seeking to void two Massachusetts Superior Court conditions of probation imposed on the adult male who was convicted of statutory rape after impregnating Plaintiff when she was a minor. One of those conditions ordered the defendant to acknowledge paternity of the child. The district court decided that it did not have jurisdiction over the claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because the relief Plaintiff sought was based on her claim that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court erred in the adjudication of her case, the district court properly dismissed this case for want of jurisdiction. View "Tyler v. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts" on Justia Law

The case arose from the trial court’s dismissal of a child custody modification action, filed by Christopher Plummer (Father), on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the matter, because neither Father, nor Elia Plummer (Mother), nor the child was living in Georgia at the time of the court’s dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted Father’s petition for certiorari on whether the trial court properly dismiss the custody modification action for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA 19-9-62(a)(2). After review of the statute and the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in dismissing the action on this ground, and therefore reversed. View "Plummer v. Plummer" on Justia Law

S.E.L. appealed dismissal of his action seeking to adjudicate the paternity of the child, J.J.M. The child was born to biological mother J.A.P. Shortly after the child's birth, J.A.P. and J.M. executed an acknowledgment of paternity, claiming J.M. was the child's father. S.E.L. filed a complaint challenging paternity, alleging the paternity acknowledgment was executed based on fraud and deceit, and requesting the court order genetic testing and declare he was the child's father. S.E.L. filed an affidavit in support of his complaint, stating he was in a sexual relationship with J.A.P. in Montana during the period of conception, J.A.P. moved to North Dakota after the child was conceived and entered into a relationship with J.M., J.A.P. never informed S.E.L. she was pregnant, and he learned about the child in the fall of 2015. He stated he attempted to establish paternity by filing paperwork with the Child Support Enforcement Division in Montana, but he learned that J.M. signed an acknowledgment of paternity in 2014. S.E.L. admitted it had been more than two years since the acknowledgment of paternity was signed, but he claimed the acknowledgment was based on fraud and deceit and should be declared void. S.E.L. also alleged the child had been removed from J.A.P. and J.M.'s care and placed in a foster home in February 2016, J.A.P. was to be released from jail in Nevada in August 2016, and J.M. was currently incarcerated in North Dakota. After a hearing, the district court ordered S.E.L.'s action be dismissed. The court found J.A.P. and J.M. were in default. The court held S.E.L. commenced the proceeding more than two years after the effective date of the paternity acknowledgment, challenges to an acknowledgment of paternity had to be commenced within two years after the effective date of the acknowledgment under N.D.C.C. 14-20-44(2), and S.E.L. was not permitted to challenge the acknowledgment because his action was untimely. The court ruled all other issues pending before the court were moot and required no further adjudication because the matter was dismissed. Judgment was entered. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. View "S.E.L. v. J.A.P." on Justia Law

Lee Cody appealed a divorce judgment that distributed the parties' property and debts. District courts have broad discretion in deciding evidentiary matters, including whether to admit telephonic testimony. Interlocutory orders generally are not appealable and may be revised or reconsidered any time before the final order or judgment is entered. Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel have not been extended to civil actions for divorce. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trial court record supported the district court's denial of his request to appear telephonically at trial and the court did not err when it clarified its opinion before the final judgment. Furthermore, the Court concluded his issue claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel was without merit because this type of claim did not extend to divorce actions. View "Cody v. Cody" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the Department) was ordered to take custody of D.Z.B. and house him in a particular facility pending his delinquency adjudication. Believing that the district court order imposed a duty on it that was in violation of statutory requirements, the Department appealed that order. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Department, as a non-party to the delinquency proceedings, lacked standing to appeal the order. In reaching that conclusion, the Colorado Supreme Court determined the district court conflated the test to evaluate whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a lawsuit with the test to determine whether a non-party has standing to appeal a decision of a lower court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the division to apply the correct standing analysis and to consider any other remaining arguments. View "Colorado in Interest of D.Z.B." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Riverside County Department of Child Support Services (the County) filed a complaint against defendant-respondent Michael Lee Estabrook (Father), seeking $288 per month in child support, as well as any healthcare expenses, for J.L., Father’s alleged daughter, whose mother, J.L. (Mother), was receiving public assistance. Father requested and received a judgment of non-paternity, and dismissed the County’s complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the County argued: (1) the family court erred by not ordering genetic testing; (2) the family court’s decision to apply the marital presumption was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the family court erred by permitting Father to assert the marital presumption because the presumption may only be raised by the spouses who are in the marriage; and (4) the family court’s finding of non-paternity was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal determined the family court erred by not ordering genetic testing; the family court’s decision to apply the marital presumption was not supported by substantial evidence; and the family court’s judgment of non-paternity was not supported by substantial evidence. View "County of Riverside v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

Petitioner Yaron Lief and real party in interest Pnina Nissan met in Israel in 2010. Nissan moved to San Diego and married Lief in 2011. They had a son in 2014. Lief filed a marital dissolution action against Nissan in 2017. The family court bifurcated the issue of custody and visitation, held a trial on Nissan's request to move with the child to Israel, and tentatively granted the request. The court ultimately entered a judgment granting Nissan's move-away request on November 7, 2018. After receiving notice from Nissan that she intended to depart for Israel with the child on November 22, Lief filed an ex parte application with the family court for an order preventing the move-away until after December 7, when the 30-day stay of the judgment granting the move-away request would have expired. The court ruled its August 10, 2018 order tentatively granting Nissan's move-away request started the stay period running, denied Lief's application on November 21, and ordered Lief to turn over the child to Nissan that evening. Lief petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and requested an immediate stay of the ex parte order purporting to allow Nissan to move to Israel with the child on November 22, 2018. The Court of Appeal found the family court erred when it ruled the 30-day statutory stay commenced with its August 10 decision, tentatively granting Nissan's move-away request: the court's oral statement of its decision at the end of the August 10 hearing was not a judgment or order. The period began to run when the family court filed the judgment granting Nissan's move-away request on November 7. "To correct the family court's error in ruling the stay began to run on August 10, 2018, issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate." View "Lief v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

An Alaskan superior court denied a father’s motion to modify custody because it did not believe it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to modify an Oregon custody order. The father appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, arguing arguing that the superior court erred in failing to consider the controlling statute that governs the court’s jurisdiction to modify an out-of-state order. The father also appeals an order imposing sanctions, including costs and attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court agreed that the controlling statute, AS 25.30.320, allowed the superior court to modify an out-of-state custody order if it “determines that neither the child, nor a parent, nor a person acting as a parent presently resides in the other state.” It did not appear from the record that the superior court considered this subsection of the statute. The Court therefore vacated the superior court’s order denying the motion to modify for lack of jurisdiction. And because the sanctions order was premised on the court’s jurisdictional ruling, it too was vacated. View "Fox v. Grace" on Justia Law