Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Juvenile G.B., born in June 2017, appealed a trial court’s order denying his petition to terminate mother’s parental rights and directing the Department for Children and Families (DCF) to prepare a new disposition plan for mother. The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. In October 2017, the court held a merits hearing in G.B.’s case. The court found that G.B. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) based on parents’ mental-health issues, substance abuse, failure to consistently engage in parent-child contact, and father’s criminal history. Father did not appear at the hearing; mother was briefly present. The court considered the best-interests factors as to each parent, then granted the petition to terminate father’s rights, concluding that he had not developed a relationship with G.B. and would not be able to assume parental duties within a reasonable period of time. As to mother, the court acknowledged that mother’s relapse resulted in her not being able to play a constructive role in G.B.’s life for seventeen months. The court concluded, however, that mother was ready, willing, and able to resume a constructive role in G.B.’s life and that she “should be given the opportunity over the next six months to reunify with G.B.” Therefore, the court denied the petition to terminate mother’s rights. The court explained that the case was “still at disposition” and directed DCF to prepare a new disposition plan in light of the court’s decision. G.B. appealed the denial to terminate mother’s rights. To the Supreme Court, G.B. argued the trial court failed to view the question of whether mother would be able to parent within a reasonable period of time from the perspective of the juvenile. The Supreme Court determined the order G.B. sought to appeal in this case—the denial of the petition to terminate mother’s rights—was not final because it was neither a final judgment nor a disposition order. The order denying termination of mother’s rights did not finally resolve the status of mother’s parental rights and therefore was not a final judgment. View "In re G.B., Juvenile" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the district court accepting and exercising jurisdiction in these five cases involving the continuation of child in need of care (CINC) proceedings, holding that the Kansas court properly exercised jurisdiction and did not violate Mother's due process rights.The proceedings in this case involved five of Mother's six children. Acting under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, a California court transferred these five cases to a Kansas court to continue child in need of care proceedings. The district court ultimately found Mother unfit and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Kansas district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over the CINC proceedings; and (2) the district court did not violate Mother's constitutional procedural due process rights when it failed to conduct a permanency hearing within thirty days of finding that reintegration of the family with Mother did not remain a viable alternative. View "In re A.A.-F." on Justia Law

In these separate but consolidated appeals, the issue common to both cases presented to the Alaska Supreme Court for review centered on whether new federal regulations materially changed the qualifications required of an expert testifying in a child in need of aid (CINA) case involving children subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). To support the termination of parental rights, ICWA required the “testimony of qualified expert witnesses . . . that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” Under the new federal regulations, experts who formerly could be presumptively qualified, based on their ability to testify about prevailing cultural and social standards in the child’s tribe, for example, had to also be qualified to testify about the “causal relationship between the particular conditions in the home and the likelihood that continued custody of the child will result in serious emotional or physical damage to the particular child who is the subject of the child-custody proceeding.” The Supreme Court concluded the federal regulations had materially changed an expert’s qualifications, and in these two cases, the challenged expert witnesses failed to satisfy this higher standard imposed by controlling federal law. For this reason the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the orders terminating the parents’ parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "L.B. (Mother) v Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

W.C. appealed a district court order denying his petition to adjudicate paternity and seeking a determination of residential responsibility, decision making responsibility, parenting time, and child support. W.C. alleges he was the father of a child born to J.H. In November 2013. W.C. and J.H. began a romantic relationship in late 2012 while J.H was married to T.H. The couple divorced in June 2013. Because J.H. gave birth to the child within 300 days of the divorce, T.H. was the presumed father under North Dakota law. The child’s birth certificate did not list a father. In 2018, after the statute of limitations for challenging a presumed father expired, W.C. commenced an action to adjudicate paternity of the child, seeking a determination of residential responsibility, decision making responsibility, parenting time, and child support. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Before the hearing, J.H. filed a motion to quash discovery, arguing W.C.’s requests for financial and medical records were not relevant, onerous, grossly invasive, and even if provided could not establish facts to support the relief sought in the petition. The district court granted the motion to quash discovery, finding medical and financial records were not relevant. The court thereafter held a hearing on the paternity claim, hearing testimony from W.C., J.H., and T.H. Based on testimony and interrogatory answers from T.H. the district court found W.C. failed to disprove the parent-child relationship. The district court also found W.C. failed to establish T.H. and J.H. did not cohabitate nor engage in a sexual relationship during the probable time of conception. The district court denied W.C.’s petition. W.C. argued on appeal of the district court order that the court abused its discretion in granting a motion quashing discovery. Finding no error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "W.C. v. J.H., et al." on Justia Law

Mother and her four minor children were undocumented immigrants from Angola living in Vermont. Mother is married to the children’s father. At one time, father indicated that he would join the family in North America but he had not. Mother alleged that father had not contacted or supported the family since 2013. She also testified that there was no place for the children in Angola. In February 2018, mother sought relief under 15 V.S.A. 291, seeking award of sole legal and physical parental-rights-and-responsibilities (PRR) based on father’s abandonment of the family. Mother also asked the court to make special findings that would allow the children to apply for “special immigrant juvenile” (SIJ) status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Father was served by publication in Angola. The trial court concluded that it was in the children’s best interests that mother have sole PRR, both legal and physical. It did not order any parent-child contact with father. The court denied mother’s request for SIJ findings, concluding it lacked authority to make SIJ findings because they were not necessary to its parental-rights-and-responsibilities (PRR) decision. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that given the primacy of a child’s best interests in cases like this and the court’s broad discretion in determining those interests, the trial court did have the authority to make such findings. “It should make such findings when it is in a child’s best interests to do so and where such findings are supported by the evidence.” The Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision to allow it to engage in this analysis. Because one of the juveniles would turn eighteen on July 13, 2019, the Supreme Court issued the mandate immediately and directed the court to issue its findings forthwith. View "Kitoko v. Salomao" on Justia Law

Manish and Priyanka married in 2014. Manish filed a petition for nullity of marriage in December 2015, alleging that the marriage was voidable based on fraud. Priyanka filed a response, denying the allegations but requesting a dissolution of the marriage due to irreconcilable differences. In May 2016, Priyanka filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). In September 2016, the trial court denied both Manish’s petition and Priyanka's request for a DVRO. In February 2017, Priyanka filed a new DVRO request, which was granted with a five-year duration. The next day, Manish sought a DVRO against Priyanka. Priyanka denied the allegations but did not file a separate request for another DVRO against Manish. Manish denied committing any acts of domestic violence but admitted sending a letter to Priyanka’s employer. Priyanka denied ever hitting Manish but admitted that on two occasions she pushed him away because he was too close to her. The court made a finding under Family Code Section 6305 that each party has committed acts of domestic violence and entered a mutual restraining order. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court lacked authority to impose a mutual restraining order because Priyanka had not filed a separate written request for such an order as required by section 6305(a)(1). View "Marriage of Ankola" on Justia Law

Mary Orwig appealed three district court orders finding her in contempt of court and an order denying her motion to vacate the contempt orders. The charges stemmed from divorce and business proceedings. In September 2016, Steven Orwig sued Mary for divorce. The Orwigs co-owned Orwig’s Livestock Supplements, Inc.; Orwigs Tubs International, Inc.; and MVP Transport, Inc. (“Corporations”). Before the divorce lawsuit, the Corporations sued Mary, alleging she made unauthorized transactions on the Corporations’ behalf, including opening credit card accounts in the Corporations’ names and using them for personal use. The Corporations also alleged Mary wrongfully detained and controlled their property. The Corporations requested the district court to enjoin Mary from transacting business on behalf of the Corporations and to remove her as an officer and director of the Corporations. In December 2016, the court ordered her to return corporate property in her possession. In February 2017, the Corporations moved for contempt against Mary, alleging she violated the preliminary injunction and order to return corporate property and continued taking actions adverse to the Corporations. In May 2017, Steven moved for an order to sell the parties’ Arizona real property, claiming its sale would resolve the parties’ financial problems. Mary opposed the sale, claiming that since 2014 she spent a majority of her time residing on the property. After a June 2017 hearing on the parties’ motions, the district court issued a July 31, 2017, order finding Mary in contempt of the December 2016 order to return corporate property. The court ordered her to return certain corporate property, including credit card and tax information. The court also ordered the sale of the Arizona property. At a September 28, 2017, hearing, the district court found Mary in contempt for impeding the sale of the Arizona property. The October 9, 2017, order required Mary to allow the parties’ realtor on the property within two weeks. The order also stated another hearing would be scheduled within three weeks to address Mary's compliance with the court’s earlier orders. The district court found Mary in contempt of the October 9, 2017, order at a October 19, 2017, hearing. Steven's attorney informed the court Mary continued to deny access to the Arizona realtor. The court issued its contempt order on November 13, 2017, ordering Mary to pay the other parties’ attorney’s fees and stated Mary “shall be imprisoned for a period of six (6) months, or until compliance with the aforementioned Order is achieved, whichever is shorter.” After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Mary failed to timely appeal two of the contempt orders, and dismissed her appeal of those orders. The Court reversed and remanded the remaining contempt order. The Court affirmed the order denying the motion to vacate. View "Orwig v. Orwig" on Justia Law

Mari Bindas appealed an order terminating Michael Bindas’ spousal support obligation. The parties filed a marital termination agreement, agreeing to spousal support and distribution of the marital estate. The parties agreed Michael Bindas would pay spousal support to Mari Bindas in the amount of $3,200 per month until she was 62 years old. The parties further agreed the spousal support would continue until the death of either party, Mari Bindas remarried, or the payment on February 1, 2023, had been made. The district court approved and adopted the parties’ termination agreement in its order. In November 2009, a judgment was entered incorporating the parties’ entire agreement. In January 2018, Michael moved to modify his spousal support obligation, arguing the spousal support should be terminated under N.D.C.C. 14-05- 24.1(3) because Mari had been habitually cohabiting with her boyfriend for more than one year. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the parties’ written agreement satisfied the “[u]nless otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing” exception to N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1(3); the statute did not require termination of Mari’s spousal support upon a finding of cohabitation. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting Michael Bindas’ motion to modify spousal support, and misapplied the law by concluding it was required to terminate the spousal support under N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1(3). View "Bindas v. Bindas" on Justia Law

Eric Smith appealed district court orders and judgment related to child custody, dismissal of motions for contempt and the court finding him a vexatious litigant. In November 2015, Smith commenced an action to determine primary residential responsibility, decision-making authority and child support. The first judgment was entered on January 8, 2016. Smith has represented himself since the district court entered the initial order. From January 2016 to date, over four-hundred docket entries appeared, including seven motions for contempt by Smith against Emily Erickson or her attorney, two requests for review by the district court, and several letters and communications from Smith to the referees or judges assigned to the matter. On January 5, 2018, a referee issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order for amended judgment granting Erickson primary residential responsibility and decisionmaking authority over the child. Smith requested review by a district court judge. On February 28, 2018, the district court found Smith in contempt for nonpayment of child support and issued an order with amended findings. On March 29, 2018, Smith filed a notice of appeal from the “final judgment issued on March 16, 2018.” No orders or judgments exist for that date. On April 23, 2018, the district court issued an order finding Smith a vexatious litigant and prohibiting him from filing new documents in the case without leave of court. Smith filed three additional notices of appeal, in total citing to seven separate orders and judgments. Smith submitted a one-page brief in support of the multiple notices of appeal. Smith did not file transcripts. The North Dakota Supreme Court held oral argument on November 21, 2018, and Smith did not appear. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders and judgment regarding parenting responsibility, contempt and finding Smith a vexatious litigant. View "Smith v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Michael Easterday (“Decedent”) and Colleen Easterday (“Easterday”) married in 2004. Prior to marriage, Decedent worked for Federal Express and became a participant in a pension plan established by this former employer. He also purchased a $250,000 life insurance policy. Decedent designated Easterday the beneficiary of both during their marriage. The parties separated in 2013, and ultimately filed for divorce under section 3301(c) of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, which provided for a divorce by mutual consent of the parties. She and Decedent subsequently settled their economic claims in a property settlement agreement (“PSA”) executed December, 2013. Pertinent here, the PSA provided that the parties would each retain "100% of their respective stocks, pensions, retirement benefits, profit sharing plans, deferred compensation plans, etc. and shall execute whatever documents necessary to effectuate this agreement." The issue this case presented was one of first impression for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, namely, the interplay between provisions of the Divorce Code, the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, and the Rules of Civil Procedure. An ancillary issue centered on whether ERISA preempted a state law claim to enforce a contractual waiver to receive pension benefits by a named beneficiary. It was determined Decedent’s affidavit of consent was executed more than thirty days prior to the date it was submitted for filing (and rejected). The Superior Court ruled that because the local Prothonotary rejected the filing of Decedent’s affidavit of consent due to a lack of compliance with Rule 1920.42(b)(2)’s thirty-day validity requirement, grounds for divorce had not been established in accordance with section 3323(g)(2) of the Divorce Code at the time of Decedent’s death. Because the Decedent’s affidavit of consent was not filed, section 6111.2 of the PEF Code did not invalidate Easterday’s designation as the beneficiary of Decedent’s life insurance policy. Furthermore, the Superior Court determined ERISA did not preempt the state law breach of contract claim to recover funds paid pursuant to an ERISA-qualified employee benefit plan. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "In Re: Estate of Easterday" on Justia Law