Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed a circuit court order denying her petition to modify or terminate the guardianship of respondents over her minor biological daughter, K.B. The guardianship was granted by a court of the State of Connecticut in 2010. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over this petition to modify another state’s child-custody determination, it vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "In re Guardianship of K.B." on Justia Law

Mother filed a contribution petition under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/513(a), requesting that Father be ordered to pay an equitable share of their daughter's college costs. The two were never married; although their 1997 agreed order addressed child-related issues, it was silent on college expenses. Father had the financial ability to pay but objected to paying because he had not been involved in the college selection process. The court stated: “People that are married ... have no obligation at all to pay for their children’s college education. Because of that, people who are married have input into where their children go to school. … The legislature has taken away that choice from people who are not married. The court ordered the parties each to pay 40% of their daughter’s college expenses. Father then challenged section 513 on equal protection grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court had upheld section 513 against an equal protection challenge in its 1978 “Kujawinski” decision. The trial court ultimately declared section 513 unconstitutional as applied, reasoning that Kujawinski's conclusion that section 513 satisfied the rational basis test because children of unmarried parents faced more disadvantages and were less likely to receive financial help with college from their parents than children of married parents was no longer viable. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated. Regardless of the impact of any societal evolution since the Kujawinski decision, that holding remains directly on point; the trial court lacked authority to declare that precedent invalid. View "Yakich v. Aulds" on Justia Law

Over the past eight years, the Hudson County family court has required Malhan to pay $300,000 in child and spousal support to his putative ex-wife, Myronova. Malhan claims that New Jersey officials violated his federal rights when they failed to reduce his support obligations after he was awarded custody of their two children and Myronova obtained a job that pays more than his own. The district court dismissed Malhan’s second amended complaint, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that to the extent it had jurisdiction, it declined to exercise it under Younger v. Harris. The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Malhan does not complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment; none of the interlocutory orders in Malhan’s state case are “judgments.” Rooker-Feldman does not apply when state proceedings have neither ended nor led to orders reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court. With respect to “Younger abstention,” the court noted that Malhan’s wife, not the state, began the family court case. The case has not sought to sanction Malhan for wrongdoing, enforce a parallel criminal statute, or impose a quasi-criminal investigation. Malhan is not trying to “annul the results” of a past garnishment. View "Malhan v. Secretary United States Department of State" on Justia Law

Kate K. and Jaime S. were the de facto parents of L.M., who was placed in their foster care soon after birth. They challenged a juvenile court's order, made when L.M. was 10-months old, removing her from their care and placing her with Rita and John E. (the E.'s), who had previously adopted L.M.'s sister, V.E. The juvenile court had "an immensely difficult decision" to make in this case. As the court recognized, Kate and Jaime had provided L.M. excellent care for essentially her entire 10-month life. Yet, the E.'s are also "good people and excellent parents as well" and have adopted L.M.'s sister. L.M. thrives in both environments. The tipping point was the relationship between L.M. and V.E., who "hit it off immediately" and "simply love each other." The court found that it is in L.M.'s best interest to be removed from Kate and Jaime's care so that she may be placed with the E.'s. On appeal, Kate and Jaime claimed the juvenile court erred by applying the "wrong" legal standard: the court first had to determine if it was in L.M.'s best interest to be removed from their care, without regard to whether it was in L.M.'s best interest to be placed with the E.'s. Kate and Jaime further claimed that under this standard, focusing only on grounds for removal, the order had to be reversed because the juvenile court recognized that they provided excellent care and did nothing wrong. The Court of Appeal determined that, even assuming that Kate and Jaime were entitled to rights afforded to prospective adoptive parents, the juvenile court applied the correct legal standard, and it affirmed because the court's findings were supported by substantial evidence. View "In re L.M." on Justia Law

B.F. (father) purported to appeal a juvenile court order denying his petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, in which he requested family reunification services and increased visitation with his twin sons, J.F. and C.F. Although the order denying father’s petition was appealable, and father filed his notice of appeal within the time to appeal from that order, the notice of appeal expressly stated father was only appealing the order terminating his parental rights to the boys that was entered 44 days after denial of his petition. Because father’s notice of appeal was clear and unambiguous about what he meant to appeal, the Court of Appeal felt it could not liberally construe it to embrace the omitted order denying the section 388 petition. Therefore, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review that order. And, because father presented no reasoned argument why the juvenile court erred by terminating his parental rights, father waived his challenge to the sole order properly before the Court. View "In re J.F." on Justia Law

A father appealed a superior court’s denial of his motion to modify child support, arguing his house arrest while awaiting trial on federal charges should have been considered involuntary unemployment for purposes of calculating child support. He also argued remand is necessary for an evidentiary hearing and for the superior court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the Alaska Supreme Court concluded the father made a prima facie showing of a substantial change in circumstances that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing, the case was remanded to the superior court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. View "Schwier v. Schwier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's divorce action against Appellee on the grounds of improper venue and/or forum non conveniens, holding that the district court erred by dismissing the action for improper venue and did not apply the correct test when it dismissed for forum non conveniens.The parties married in North Carolina in 1989. In 2018, Appellant filed a complaint for divorce in the district court in Fremont County, Wyoming, where he lived. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the Wyoming action pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), claiming that Wyoming was an improper venue for the divorce and/or forum non conveniens. The district court granted Appellee's motion. In doing so, the court followed the Supreme Court's decision in West Texas Utilities Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc. 807 P.2d 932 (Wyo. 1991). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's analysis was inadequate. Consequently, the Court adopted the two-stage test for forum non conveniens from Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), and directed the district court to apply that test on remand. View "Saunders v. Saunders" on Justia Law

Alden and his ex-wife shared custody of their children. Alden’s ex-wife complained that Alden was trying to turn the children against her. The court-appointed psychologist, Gardner, evaluated the children, concluded that Alden was using “severe alienation tactics,” and recommended that the court limit Alden to supervised visitation and give full custody of the children to their mother. The court terminated Alden’s custody and ordered all of Alden’s visitation to be supervised. The Appellate Court affirmed. After three unsuccessful attempts to change the decision in state court, Alden filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Gardner, challenging the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act as permitting state courts to take parents’ constitutionally-protected speech into consideration when deciding the best interests of the child and treating parents differently based on whether they are divorced. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Alden could challenge the Act in his state custody proceedings. The court stated: “This is abusive litigation. Alden, a lawyer representing himself, seems determined to continue the child-custody litigation in another forum even if that means exposing an innocent person such as Gardner to travail and expense. He concedes—indeed, he trumpets—that he has sued someone who he knows is not responsible for enforcing the state’s child-custody laws” and referred the matter to Illinois authorities for determination of whether Alden’s misuse of the legal process calls into question his fitness to practice law. View "E.A. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Juvenile G.B., born in June 2017, appealed a trial court’s order denying his petition to terminate mother’s parental rights and directing the Department for Children and Families (DCF) to prepare a new disposition plan for mother. The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. In October 2017, the court held a merits hearing in G.B.’s case. The court found that G.B. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) based on parents’ mental-health issues, substance abuse, failure to consistently engage in parent-child contact, and father’s criminal history. Father did not appear at the hearing; mother was briefly present. The court considered the best-interests factors as to each parent, then granted the petition to terminate father’s rights, concluding that he had not developed a relationship with G.B. and would not be able to assume parental duties within a reasonable period of time. As to mother, the court acknowledged that mother’s relapse resulted in her not being able to play a constructive role in G.B.’s life for seventeen months. The court concluded, however, that mother was ready, willing, and able to resume a constructive role in G.B.’s life and that she “should be given the opportunity over the next six months to reunify with G.B.” Therefore, the court denied the petition to terminate mother’s rights. The court explained that the case was “still at disposition” and directed DCF to prepare a new disposition plan in light of the court’s decision. G.B. appealed the denial to terminate mother’s rights. To the Supreme Court, G.B. argued the trial court failed to view the question of whether mother would be able to parent within a reasonable period of time from the perspective of the juvenile. The Supreme Court determined the order G.B. sought to appeal in this case—the denial of the petition to terminate mother’s rights—was not final because it was neither a final judgment nor a disposition order. The order denying termination of mother’s rights did not finally resolve the status of mother’s parental rights and therefore was not a final judgment. View "In re G.B., Juvenile" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the district court accepting and exercising jurisdiction in these five cases involving the continuation of child in need of care (CINC) proceedings, holding that the Kansas court properly exercised jurisdiction and did not violate Mother's due process rights.The proceedings in this case involved five of Mother's six children. Acting under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, a California court transferred these five cases to a Kansas court to continue child in need of care proceedings. The district court ultimately found Mother unfit and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Kansas district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over the CINC proceedings; and (2) the district court did not violate Mother's constitutional procedural due process rights when it failed to conduct a permanency hearing within thirty days of finding that reintegration of the family with Mother did not remain a viable alternative. View "In re A.A.-F." on Justia Law