Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved the enforceability of a premarital agreement between Julie Neustadt and Mark Colafranceschi. Before the two were married, they entered into a premarital agreement that required Neustadt to obtain a two-million-dollar life insurance policy naming Colafranceschi as the beneficiary. The agreement required Neustadt to keep the policy in force after termination of the marriage. During the divorce proceedings, Neustadt challenged the enforceability of this provision, arguing that the insurance clause was void as against public policy to the extent it applied after divorce. The magistrate court agreed that the contractual provision was void as against public policy. However, on appeal, the district court reversed, concluding the insurance clause did not violate any public policy in Idaho. Neustadt appealrf, arguing that the district court erred in finding the insurance clause valid and enforceable because, following the parties’ divorce, Colafranceschi had no insurable interest in Neustadt’s life. Colafranceschi also filed a cross-appeal, arguing: (1) the magistrate court erred in denying certain discovery requests; (2) the lower court erred by failing to address his objection to Neustadt’s motion in limine; and (3) the lower courts’ erred in their findings that Colafranceschi failed to prove he was fraudulently induced to sign the premarital agreement to get him to return to the couple’s marital home. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision in its entirety: (1) the Insurance Clause was not void as against public policy; (2) any error regarding discovery was forfeited; (3) there was no evidence that the magistrate court coerced Colafranceschi into withdrawing his extreme cruelty claim; and (4) substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s conclusions that Colafranceschi was not fraudulently induced regarding equity in the Osprey home. View "Neustadt v. Colafranceschi" on Justia Law

Kathleen and Thomas Varty divorced in 2011. In August 2017, Thomas moved to terminate spousal support to Kathleen. The district court reduced his obligation and Kathleen appealed. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. Kathleen moved under Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure for relief from judgment, alleging that during the marriage Thomas obtained shares in a “phantom” stock plan from a former employer. She claimed she was entitled to half of the $72,400 sale proceeds received by Thomas in February 2016. Thomas opposed the motion, arguing the stock had no value on the date of the divorce and did not become vested until after the divorce. After a hearing, the district court granted Kathleen relief from judgment and awarded her half of the net proceeds Thomas received. On appeal, Thomas argued the district court abused its discretion when considering Kathleen's untimely filed reply brief, when it granted Kathleen's untimely request for oral arguments, and when it found it was unconscionable for Thomas to exclusively enjoy the benefits from the stock accrued during the marriage. Further, he claimed it was clearly erroneous for the court to order Thomas to pay Kathleen one-half of the net proceeds from the stock, and the court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it did not set aside the entire 2011 judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the district court concluded the agreement was free from fraud and that it would be unconscionable not to give Kathleen half of the stock. The Supreme Court found the district court did not explain the terms of the marital termination agreement and how not receiving 50% of the stock made the stipulation and resulting judgment as a whole so one-sided and created such hardship that it was unconscionable. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by misinterpreting or misapplying the law; judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Varty v. Varty" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, a Pennsylvania superior court held that anti-alienation provisions governing municipal pensions found in various statutes protected assets from attachment and other legal process (including a contract claim) only while those assets remained in the possession of the pension fund administrator. Specifically, the court determined that a spouse’s promise to waive her right to her husband’s pension benefits, including agreeing to transfer such benefits after receiving them from the administrator, was legally enforceable. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that because the superior court’s interpretation was consistent with the plain language of the statutes, the context in which the provisions appear, and Pennsylvania precedent interpreting similar statutory language, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court. View "Estate of M&J Benyo v. Breidenbach" on Justia Law

Petitioner Matthew Kamil (Husband), appealed, and respondent Robin Kamil (Wife) cross-appealed various circuit court orders in their divorce action. The parties were married in September 2007 and had two children. Husband filed for divorce in 2015, and Wife cross-petitioned. Husband was awarded temporary primary residential responsibility for the children and Wife was awarded supervised visitation. The court also appointed a parenting coordinator. By March 31, 2017, “the parenting evidence was that [Wife] was not allowing the therapeutic reunification plan to succeed.” The court nevertheless continued to order supervised visitation for Wife at a visitation center, and, in January 2018, the court “appointed Tracey Tucker to serve in an evaluative, structured, scripted reunification capacity, focusing on the children’s needs to have safe and appropriate contact with their mother.” After only four sessions, Tucker cancelled the reunification work “when [Wife] made some impulsive and inappropriate comments to [her].” At that point, Wife’s supervised contact with the children ended. Meanwhile, the court held a series of hearings to determine the authenticity and enforceability of a prenuptial agreement executed by the parties approximately one month prior to their wedding. The court ultimately found the prenuptial agreement unenforceable. In October 2018, the circuit court issued a final divorce decree. After choosing a February 2015 asset valuation date, the court awarded Husband the marital residence, awarded Wife the entirety of her Roth IRA, and equitably divided the remaining assets between them. To effectuate the equitable division, Husband was ordered to pay Wife $1,011,359.88. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded Husband failed to meet his appellate burden of demonstrating reversible error with respect to all the issues he raised on appeal. The Court concurred with Wife that with respect to the supervised parenting time visits with Ms. Tucker: while the the trial court had already ordered a plan, it also gave Tucker the sole discretion to determine when and if the parties would resume following that plan. This constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority, and the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the final decree. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Matthew & Robin Kamil" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that it does not have jurisdiction to review a district court order denying a request for a joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.517 in a family law matter because no court rule or statute permits an appeal of a district court order denying a request for a joint preliminary injunction.After Husband filed for divorce, the clerk of court issued a joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.85 prohibiting the parties from disposing of any property subject to any community interest claim. After the district court issued a divorce decree the Supreme Court remanded the case to conduct proper tracing to determine community interests. On remand, Wife moved for the district court to reaffirm its prior joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.517. The district court issued a preliminary injunction for two assets subject to community property claims but declined to extend the injunction to other assets in a spendthrift trust. Wife appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that joint preliminary injunctions under EDCR 5.517 are not subject to Nev. R. Civ. P. 65, and therefore, orders denying or granting injunctions under EDCR 5.517 are not appealable under Nev. R. App. P. 3A(b)(3). View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Nathanael Brown appealed the issuance of a domestic violence protection order which enjoined him from having contact with Flavia Brown and restricted his right to possess firearms. In late September 2019, Flavia Brown petitioned the district court for a protection order against Nathanael. The court issued a temporary protection order and an order for hearing procedure which set a hearing for October 9, 2019. The order for hearing procedure stated evidence would be taken by affidavit only and a party seeking to cross-examine an affiant must notify the opposing party at least twenty-four hours before the hearing. On the day before the hearing, Nathanael Brown filed notice of appearance and a request to continue the hearing. On the day of the hearing, he filed notice of cross-examination. At the time scheduled for the hearing, the district court denied Nathanael's requests for continuance and cross-examination because they were untimely under the order for hearing procedure. At the outset of the hearing, Nathanael objected to the district court’s affidavit procedure, arguing that it would deny him due process and a “full hearing” under N.D.C.C. 14-07.1-02. The district court denied Nathanael permission to cross-examine Flavia about her affidavit or to present any of his own evidence. The court accepted Flavia's affidavit and granted the domestic violence protection order preventing Nathanael from having contact with Flavia Brown for two years. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Nathanael was denied a full hearing under N.D.C.C. 14-07.1-02(4), the protection order was reversed and the matter remanded for a full hearing. View "Brown v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner M.A.B. applied for a Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) protective order against respondent on October 9, 2017. Respondent and petitioner were married in 2014. Together, they had a son, J, who was born in 2015. During the marriage, respondent suffered from depression, for which he took medication. He sometimes also drank to excess. Petitioner testified that respondent raped her twice: once in March 2017 and once in May 2017. The incident in May included respondent dragging petitioner away from J while petitioner was breast feeding. In June 2017, petitioner expressed her unhappiness with the marriage. Respondent replied that, if petitioner left or divorced him, he would kill her and take J. In July 2017, petitioner took J, moved in with her parents, and filed for dissolution. After the separation, respondent made frequent attempts to contact petitioner by phone, email, and text message. At prearranged meetings, respondent regularly exhibited anger toward petitioner. After a hearing, the trial court continued the protective order in its entirety. On appeal, respondent conceded that the trial court’s findings were sufficient to establish that he had abused petitioner within 180 days of petitioner seeking the protective order. Respondent argued, however, that the evidence was insufficient to establish the two other elements: that petitioner was in imminent danger of further abuse from respondent and that respondent presented a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the evidence was insufficient to show that petitioner was in imminent danger of further abuse from respondent. The court, as a result, reversed the trial court’s order without considering whether respondent represented a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety. Because the appellate court did not consider whether respondent represented a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the appeals court to determine that issue in the first instance. View "M. A. B. v. Buell" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the superior court erred in its application of Pennsylvania law to find that L.B., a Colorado resident, was foreclosed from challenging the validity of his consent to permit the adoption of his minor children under the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, but not the requirements of the corresponding Colorado statute. After review, the Court concluded the superior court did not err, and affirmed the termination of L.B.'s parental rights to his children. View "In Re: J.W.B. & R.D.B." on Justia Law

The Orange County Department of Child Support Services (Department) has withdrawn money from Daniel Lak’s (Father) Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (SSDI) to pay for child/spousal support arrears since 2015. Father disputed the Department's authority to withdraw money, and at a hearing, sought reimbursement for overpayments and maintained the Department violated Family Code section 5246 (d)(3) by collecting more than five percent from his SSDI. The court denied Father’s requests and determined the Department could continue withdrawing money from SSDI for support arrears. On appeal, Father maintaned the court misinterpreted the law and failed to properly consider his motion for sanctions. Finding his contentions lack merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s order the Department did not overdraw money for arrears, Father failed to demonstrate he qualified for section 5246(d)(3)’s five percent rule, and sanctions were not warranted. View "Lak v. Lak" on Justia Law

This was an appeal stemming from a divorce action commenced in 2017. The only issue was division of the parties’ marital property. Included as part of the parties’ marital property was Myron Axtman’s Hess pension. The pension benefits commenced on February 1, 2015, at which time Axtman began receiving $2,891.60 per month. Myron Axtman appealed an amended judgment distributing the parties’ marital property. Axtman argued the district court abused its discretion in amending the judgment, and the court amended judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) without providing proper notice. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined Rule 60(a) was a proper mechanism for the court to amend the judgment to correct the mistake resulting from its oversight and omission, but the court did not provide notice to the parties it was considering amending judgment pursuant to Rule 60(a). However, the court’s error was considered harmless because, after the court amended the judgment, Axtman brought a “Motion to Vacate Order on Motion for Relief from Judgment.” In his motion, Axtman argued the district court erred in amending the judgment under Rule 60(a) because the original judgment’s failure to divide the pension payments received by Axtman during the pendency of the divorce was not a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission, which was the argument he raised on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court determined Axtman was aware the district court recognized it failed to take into consideration the payments Axtman received during the pendency of the divorce in the original judgment, and that Amy Axtman was attempting to amend the judgment to account for the payments Axtman received during the pendency of the divorce. The court’s error in not providing notice did not require reversal. Thus, the Court affirmed judgment. View "Axtman v. Axtman" on Justia Law