Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

M.G. (Mother) appealed the termination of her parental rights to her 11-year-old daughter, A.R., and her 10-year-old son, C.R., and placing them in a permanent plan of adoption by their paternal grandparents. M.G. did not challenge the merits of the order; instead, she argued it had to be reversed because the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to conduct an inquiry into whether the children had Native American ancestry, as required by the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Court of Appeal found an ICWA inquiry should be conducted in every case. "The tribes have a compelling, legally protected interest in the inquiry itself. It is only by ensuring that the issue of Native American ancestry is addressed in every case that we can ensure the collective interests of the Native American tribes will be protected. Thus, the failure to conduct the inquiry in each case constitutes a miscarriage of justice." In the interest of limiting any further delay, the Court conditionally reversed and remanded the case with instructions that SSA conduct the inquiry immediately, and that the trial court likewise resolve the issue as soon as possible. If the initial inquiry revealed no Native American heritage, then the judgment would be reinstated forthwith. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Deborah Foster sought to hold defendant Ray Foster, in contempt of court for failing to abide by a provision in their consent judgment of divorce. The judgment stated that defendant would pay plaintiff 50% of his military disposable retired pay accrued during the marriage or, if defendant waived a portion of his military retirement benefits in order to receive military disability benefits, that he would continue to pay plaintiff an amount equal to what she would have received had defendant not elected to receive such disability benefits. Defendant subsequently elected to receive increased disability benefits, including Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) under 10 USC 1413a. That election reduced the amount of retirement pay defendant received, which, in turn, reduced plaintiff’s share of the retirement benefits from approximately $800 a month to approximately $200 a month. Defendant did not comply with the offset provision by paying plaintiff the difference. The trial court denied plaintiff’s request to hold defendant in contempt, but ordered him to comply with the consent judgment. Defendant failed to do so, and plaintiff again petitioned for defendant to be held in contempt. Defendant did not appear at the hearing, but argued in a written response that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the issue. The court found defendant in contempt, granted a money judgment in favor of plaintiff, and issued a bench warrant for defendant’s arrest because of his failure to appear at the hearing. At a show-cause hearing in June 2014, defendant argued that 10 USC 1408 and 38 USC 5301 prohibited him from assigning his disability benefits and that the trial court had erred by not complying with federal law. The court found defendant in contempt and ordered him to pay the arrearage and attorney fees. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the type of federal preemption at issue in this case did not deprive state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. As a result, the Supreme Court concluded defendant’s challenge to enforcement of the provision at issue was an improper collateral attack on a final judgment. View "Foster v. Foster" on Justia Law

At birth, Appellants’ son tested positive for methadone and marijuana. Appellant A.S., the child’s mother, admitted to using marijuana days before giving birth. The juvenile court detained J.C. and placed him with Appellant J.C.’s mother.Based on Appellants’ criminal histories and substance abuse issues, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“the Department”), the couple’s son was declared a dependent of the court. At a 12-month hearing, appellants had not made substantial progress towards alleviating or mitigating the causes that led to their son’s placement. The court terminated Appellants’ parental rights. In doing so, the court relied on appellants’ statements that they had no known Indian ancestry.On appeal, appellants argued that the Department failed to conduct an adequate investigation into whether either parent was of Indian ancestry and that the trial court failed to ensure that the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) applied. The court held that the Department did not fulfill its duty under the ICWA because it did not speak to extended family members who were available. Additionally, the trial court failed to ensure that the Department fulfilled its duties by neglecting to ask the Department what efforts it made to ensure the ICWA did not apply.The court conditionally affirmed the trial court’s order, remanding the case to the trial court to ensure that the Department conducts the necessary inquiries, including speaking with extended family members. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

In California, the practice of “splitting” jurisdiction and/or disposition hearings, by purporting to hold them separately “as to mother” and “as to father,” was unauthorized and erroneous. The Court of Appeal concluded that jurisdiction splitting occurred in this case, and it "complicated the entire record ... caused confusion, unnecessary procedural difficulties and delays." S.J., father of minor A.J., appealed a juvenile court bypassing reunification services. He argued the juvenile court erred by denying his request for a continuance and proceeding with a disposition hearing without transporting him from his place of incarceration to the hearing. Although the Court of Appeal found error in the manner in which these proceedings were conducted, but it did not find error in denying father a continuance of the hearing. The juvenile court's orders were affirmed, but the Court reiterated that jurisdiction splitting was "unauthorized and erroneous," and in this case, " resulted in the (likely unintentional) forfeiture of appellant’s claim on appeal." View "In re A.J." on Justia Law

Father J.R. appealed a juvenile court order finding his child, M.R., to be deprived; removing M.R. from the care, custody, and control of the parents; and placing M.R. with North Star Human Service Zone (“North Star”). Because M.R. was no longer a minor child and the order on appeal had expired, the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Interest of M.R." on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal of the termination of parental rights was whether San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) conducted further inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) applied if there was “reason to believe” an Indian child was involved in the dependency proceedings involving nine-year-old K.T. and his two-year-old sister, D. Early on in the case, the children’s mother and K.T.’s father (father) reported they had possible Cherokee, Choctaw, and Blackfeet ancestry and gave CFS contact information for family members who might be able to provide more detail. CFS never followed up, and the juvenile court found ICWA didn’t apply without first ensuring CFS had pursued these leads. About two years into the proceedings, after the parents failed to reunify with the children, the court determined they were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. On appeal, mother and father argued that despite having reason to believe K.T. and D. were Indian children, CFS failed to conduct adequate further inquiry to determine whether ICWA applies. CFS conceded their error. As a result, the record did not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply, and the Court of Appeal reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law

Procedurally, after an initial determination of child support and custody, Appellee Kirsten Friend (Mother) sought to modify the child support order and applied to find Appellant Brian Friend (Father) in contempt, claiming he had not paid child support for several months. The district court granted Mother's motions. The trial court found Father in indirect contempt and increased the child support payment. Mother asked for attorney fees and costs, dividing the request into fees incurred for the request to modify child support and fees incurred for the contempt request. Father objected but conceded the only issue was whether Mother was legally entitled to the fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that, where a prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees below, they are also entitled to appellate attorney fees; where an award of attorney fees is within the trial court's discretion, a prevailing party may be granted appellate attorney fees. View "Friend v. Friend" on Justia Law

ason Canerdy appealed a district court order denying his motion for contempt and his motion to modify primary residential responsibility without an evidentiary hearing. Jason and Samantha Canerdy were divorced in June 2020. The parties had two minor children. The judgment awarded Samantha primary residential responsibility and Jason reasonable parenting time. In April 2021, Jason filed a motion to modify the judgment to be awarded primary residential responsibility of the minor children, or in the alternative, be awarded equal residential responsibility. Jason also filed a motion for contempt for Samantha's interference with his parenting time. The district court denied Jason's motion for contempt and his motion to modify the judgment for primary residential responsibility without an evidentiary hearing. The court found that there was no evidence that Samantha disobeyed the judgment, and that she had not committed contempt of court. Further, the court found no persistent and willful denial of parenting time, no evidence that the children were in any danger, and no evidence that primary residential responsibility changed. The court stated that Jason did not take responsibility for his own inaction in regard to not spending as much time with his minor children because he did not regularly attend or participate in their dance activities. The court noted that Jason would seek to make up his parenting time when the dance activities occur on his scheduled weekend. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Jason established a prima facie case for modification and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Canerdy v. Canerdy, et al." on Justia Law

Thomas Kaspari appealed an amended judgment awarding spousal support to Jean Kaspari entered after the first appeal in this case. The district court ordered Thomas to pay $7,000 per month in spousal support to Jean until he turned 65 years old. Thomas argued the district court erred in the amount of spousal support it awarded, claiming: (1) the court failed to properly consider the distribution of the parties’ assets and debts; (2) the evidence did not support a finding of a need for support; and (3) the court improperly attempted to equalize the parties’ incomes. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that although the district court made findings about the Ruff-Fischer factors and considered Jean's need for spousal support and Thomas' ability to pay, the court failed to adequately explain its reason for awarding spousal support of $7,000 per month when Jean did not show a need for that amount. "The court was not required to provide a detailed calculation of Jean Kaspari’s need for spousal support, but it was required to make sufficient findings to provide a discernible basis for its decision. Without further explanation from the district court, the amount appears to be arbitrary or an attempt to equalize the parties’ incomes." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s spousal support decision and remanded for that court to make further findings explaining its decision or to reconsider the amount of support. View "Kaspari v. Kaspari" on Justia Law

J.O. and M.B. married in 2007 and for more than 15 years also have been in what they describe as a committed, polyamorous relationship with appellant. In 2018, appellant, J.O., and M.B. decided to have a child together. They agreed J.O. and M.B. would be the child’s biological parents, appellant would adopt the child, and J.O. and M.B. would maintain their parental rights. Together, the three of them would share equally in parenting rights and responsibilities. After E.B. was born, appellant began adoption proceedings. Consistent with the requirements for an independent adoption, California’s State Department of Social Services (CDSS) conducted an investigation and concluded the adoption was in E.B.’s best interest. Accordingly, CDSS recommended the uncontested adoption be granted. Rejecting CDSS’s recommendation, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to adopt E.B. Relying on Family Code section 7612, the trial court found appellant had not yet fulfilled E.B.’s needs for a substantial period of time, and there was no likelihood that E.B. would be taken from appellant, resulting in detriment to the child. Appellant moved the court to vacate its order. The trial court denied that motion too. To the Court of Appeals, appellant and CDSS argued the trial court applied the incorrect law to appellant’s adoption petition and, under the correct law, section 8617, the petition to adopt E.B. should have been granted. The Court agreed the trial court applied the incorrect law and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the applicable statute. View "Adoption of E.B." on Justia Law