Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The sole issue in this appeal of the termination of parental rights was whether San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) conducted further inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) applied if there was “reason to believe” an Indian child was involved in the dependency proceedings involving nine-year-old K.T. and his two-year-old sister, D. Early on in the case, the children’s mother and K.T.’s father (father) reported they had possible Cherokee, Choctaw, and Blackfeet ancestry and gave CFS contact information for family members who might be able to provide more detail. CFS never followed up, and the juvenile court found ICWA didn’t apply without first ensuring CFS had pursued these leads. About two years into the proceedings, after the parents failed to reunify with the children, the court determined they were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. On appeal, mother and father argued that despite having reason to believe K.T. and D. were Indian children, CFS failed to conduct adequate further inquiry to determine whether ICWA applies. CFS conceded their error. As a result, the record did not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply, and the Court of Appeal reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law

Procedurally, after an initial determination of child support and custody, Appellee Kirsten Friend (Mother) sought to modify the child support order and applied to find Appellant Brian Friend (Father) in contempt, claiming he had not paid child support for several months. The district court granted Mother's motions. The trial court found Father in indirect contempt and increased the child support payment. Mother asked for attorney fees and costs, dividing the request into fees incurred for the request to modify child support and fees incurred for the contempt request. Father objected but conceded the only issue was whether Mother was legally entitled to the fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that, where a prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees below, they are also entitled to appellate attorney fees; where an award of attorney fees is within the trial court's discretion, a prevailing party may be granted appellate attorney fees. View "Friend v. Friend" on Justia Law

ason Canerdy appealed a district court order denying his motion for contempt and his motion to modify primary residential responsibility without an evidentiary hearing. Jason and Samantha Canerdy were divorced in June 2020. The parties had two minor children. The judgment awarded Samantha primary residential responsibility and Jason reasonable parenting time. In April 2021, Jason filed a motion to modify the judgment to be awarded primary residential responsibility of the minor children, or in the alternative, be awarded equal residential responsibility. Jason also filed a motion for contempt for Samantha's interference with his parenting time. The district court denied Jason's motion for contempt and his motion to modify the judgment for primary residential responsibility without an evidentiary hearing. The court found that there was no evidence that Samantha disobeyed the judgment, and that she had not committed contempt of court. Further, the court found no persistent and willful denial of parenting time, no evidence that the children were in any danger, and no evidence that primary residential responsibility changed. The court stated that Jason did not take responsibility for his own inaction in regard to not spending as much time with his minor children because he did not regularly attend or participate in their dance activities. The court noted that Jason would seek to make up his parenting time when the dance activities occur on his scheduled weekend. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Jason established a prima facie case for modification and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Canerdy v. Canerdy, et al." on Justia Law

Thomas Kaspari appealed an amended judgment awarding spousal support to Jean Kaspari entered after the first appeal in this case. The district court ordered Thomas to pay $7,000 per month in spousal support to Jean until he turned 65 years old. Thomas argued the district court erred in the amount of spousal support it awarded, claiming: (1) the court failed to properly consider the distribution of the parties’ assets and debts; (2) the evidence did not support a finding of a need for support; and (3) the court improperly attempted to equalize the parties’ incomes. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that although the district court made findings about the Ruff-Fischer factors and considered Jean's need for spousal support and Thomas' ability to pay, the court failed to adequately explain its reason for awarding spousal support of $7,000 per month when Jean did not show a need for that amount. "The court was not required to provide a detailed calculation of Jean Kaspari’s need for spousal support, but it was required to make sufficient findings to provide a discernible basis for its decision. Without further explanation from the district court, the amount appears to be arbitrary or an attempt to equalize the parties’ incomes." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s spousal support decision and remanded for that court to make further findings explaining its decision or to reconsider the amount of support. View "Kaspari v. Kaspari" on Justia Law

J.O. and M.B. married in 2007 and for more than 15 years also have been in what they describe as a committed, polyamorous relationship with appellant. In 2018, appellant, J.O., and M.B. decided to have a child together. They agreed J.O. and M.B. would be the child’s biological parents, appellant would adopt the child, and J.O. and M.B. would maintain their parental rights. Together, the three of them would share equally in parenting rights and responsibilities. After E.B. was born, appellant began adoption proceedings. Consistent with the requirements for an independent adoption, California’s State Department of Social Services (CDSS) conducted an investigation and concluded the adoption was in E.B.’s best interest. Accordingly, CDSS recommended the uncontested adoption be granted. Rejecting CDSS’s recommendation, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to adopt E.B. Relying on Family Code section 7612, the trial court found appellant had not yet fulfilled E.B.’s needs for a substantial period of time, and there was no likelihood that E.B. would be taken from appellant, resulting in detriment to the child. Appellant moved the court to vacate its order. The trial court denied that motion too. To the Court of Appeals, appellant and CDSS argued the trial court applied the incorrect law to appellant’s adoption petition and, under the correct law, section 8617, the petition to adopt E.B. should have been granted. The Court agreed the trial court applied the incorrect law and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the applicable statute. View "Adoption of E.B." on Justia Law

K.P. (mother) and D.P. (father) appealed juvenile court orders denying mother’s petitions to change the court’s order terminating her reunification services and thereafter terminating both of their parental rights, freeing the minors for adoption. The petition for termination involved the parents' five children, and recounted the parents’ past abuse of the minors, the parents’ history of drug abuse, three of the children having been born with drugs in their system, the parents’ history with the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency), and the parents’ criminal history. A 2020 disposition report recommended the parents be bypassed for services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(13), due to the physical abuse of the minors and the parents’ extensive drug abuse. Later that year, father and mother filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to change the court’s order denying them reunification services. The court summarily denied the parents’ section 388 petitions by written orders, finding for each: “[T]he request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstance” and “the proposed change of order . . . does not promote the best interest of the child.” After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying mother’s section 388 petitions, but reversed its orders terminating parents’ parental rights. The Appellate Court found some evidentiary support for each element of the beneficial parental relationship exception, therefore the juvenile court's ruling there was inadequate evidence to support the exception was an abuse of discretion under the controlling caselaw. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to weigh the evidence presented under the applicable standard and, in its discretion, consider additional evidence. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Hebah Abdelqader appealed an order following a bifurcated trial wherein the superior court denied Hebah’s request for a restraining order against her ex-husband, Abdo Abraham, and granted joint physical custody of the couple’s children, A.A. and G.A. Hebah claimed the court made multiple errors when determining she had not met her burden of proving domestic violence. In addition, Hebah claimed the court erred in failing to articulate, on the record or in writing, the reasons it found the presumption under Family Code section 3044 had been rebutted. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hebah’s request for a restraining order. However, in the published portion of the opinion, the Court agreed the trial court erred in failing to state the reasons, on the record or in writing, it found the presumption under section 3044 had been rebutted. As such, the judgment was reversed as to that issue only and the matter remanded for further consideration. View "Abdelqader v. Abraham" on Justia Law

This case was one of many "disagreements" about the control of the multi-million-dollar estate of Thomas Tedesco. Plaintiff-respondent Laura White was one of Thomas’s three biological daughters and a cotrustee of his living trust. Defendant-appellant Debra Wear (aka Debbie Basara Wear) was one of Thomas’s stepdaughters. In 2013, Thomas suffered serious health issues, which resulted in significant cognitive impairment, leaving him susceptible to being unduly influenced by anyone close to him. Gloria Tedesco, Thomas’s second wife, began denying White and her sisters access to their father, causing him to believe that they were stealing from him. Wear assisted Gloria, her mother, in unduly influencing Thomas via contacting, or facilitating access to, attorneys in order to change Thomas’s estate plan to disinherit his biological family in favor of Gloria and her family. In 2015, a permanent conservator of Thomas’s estate was appointed. Despite the existence of the conservatorship, Wear continued to assist Gloria in taking actions to unduly influence Thomas to change his 30-plus-year estate plan. Consequently, upon White’s petition, the superior court issued an elder abuse restraining order (EARO), restraining Wear for three years from, among other things, financially abusing Thomas, contacting him (either directly or indirectly), facilitating any change to his estate plan, coming within 100 yards of him, and possessing any guns, other firearms, and ammunition. Wear contended the EARO was void because: (1) the judge was disqualified; and (2) he violated due process by substantially amending the allegations in the petition and prohibiting her from possessing firearms and ammunition. She further claimed the petition failed to state a cause of action for elder financial abuse. The Court of Appeal agreed the court erred in including a firearms and ammunition restriction in the EARO and directed the trial court to strike it. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "White v. Wear" on Justia Law

Mark Shenefield filed a request for order (RFO) seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child he shared with Jennifer Shenefield. In his declaration, Mark quoted from and referenced the contents of a confidential, court-ordered psychological evaluation undertaken during Jennifer’s previous marital dissolution. Mark’s attorney Karolyn Kovtun filed the paperwork. Jennifer opposed Mark’s request and sought sanctions for violations of Family Code sections 3111(d) and 3025.5, for unwarranted disclosure of the confidential custody evaluation. The trial court ordered the sanctions issue be heard at trial. Jennifer’s trial brief detailed her arguments for why the court should impose sanctions on both Mark and Kovtun. Mark did not file a trial brief. Following trial, the court issued sanctions against Mark in the amount of $10,000 and Kovtun in the amount of $15,000. Kovtun challenged the sanctions, filing a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d). A different court heard Kovtun’s request to vacate the sanctions imposed against her and denied the request. On appeal, Kovtun argued the court improperly sanctioned her because: (1) attorneys could not be sanctioned under section 3111; (2) the notice she received did not comply with due process standards; (3) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her; (4) the court failed to enforce the safe harbor provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7; and (5) the court improperly admitted and relied on a transcript of a meeting between Kovtun, Mark, and Jennifer. The Court found Kovtun’s arguments meritless, and affirmed the sanctions. View "Shenefield v. Shenefield" on Justia Law

In a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between Som, her husband, Joshua, and Joshua's mother, Sharon, the trial court ruled in favor of Sharon. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended Sharon's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. The court reversed the judgment on the claims for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. The court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about Som's financial circumstances in 2009 and did not deprive Som of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly.The court of appeal subsequently modified its opinion to read: the judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Sharon is reversed with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Joshua, per the July 29, 2010 deed and the July 18, 2011 deed. The judgment is also reversed as to the causes of action for slander of title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law