Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought suit against the Estate of her ex-husband and against his widow individually and as administratrix of the Estate, claiming that her ex-husband misrepresented the value of his real estate investments during divorce proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the ground that the discovery rule did not apply to Plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the claims as time-barred; the district court did not consider whether Plaintiff’s claims should be tolled.   On appeal, Plaintiff invoked the discovery rule and equitable estoppel to argue that this suit, initiated more than thirteen years later, is nevertheless timely. The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court further remanded for consideration the doctrine of equitable estoppel as to one of the contested investments.   The court reasoned that the discovery rule is not a tool to aid speculation or to validate a hunch. As Plaintiff has not shown that she had any “knowledge of facts” supporting the fraud within two years prior to initiating suit, she cannot invoke the discovery rule to save her claims. Further, Plaintiff failed to investigate her ex-husband’s assurances that his real estate investments were worth nothing, notwithstanding warning signs and ample opportunity to do so during the divorce proceedings. View "Koral v. Alsou Saunders, Est. of Gregg Saunders" on Justia Law

C.M., mother of four minors (mother), appealed juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. Her sole contention on appeal was that the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services and juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and remanded for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the ICWA. View "In re M.E." on Justia Law

C.O. (mother) appealed a court order terminating her parental rights to her daughter Z.O. The juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for mother without providing grounds or explanation in the record, as it was required to do. The Court of Appeal agreed with mother that this error deprived her not only of the ability to participate at critical stages in the proceedings, but also the ability to effectively appeal and challenge the juvenile court’s reasoning for the appointment of the GAL (i.e., that mother lacked competence to understand the nature or consequences of the proceedings and to assist counsel regarding the underlying litigation). The Court concluded the trial court record did not give it "sufficient confidence" that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. And as a result, the Court reverse the termination and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Z.O." on Justia Law

In 2019 a woman sued her former husband’s medical provider, alleging that from 2003 to 2010 the provider negligently prescribed the husband opioid medications, leading to his addiction, damage to the couple’s business and marital estate, the couple’s divorce in 2011, and ultimately the husband's death in 2017. The superior court ruled the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and rejected the woman’s argument that the provider should have been estopped from relying on a limitations defense. Because the undisputed evidence shows that by 2010 the woman had knowledge of her alleged injuries, the provider’s alleged role in causing those injuries, and the provider’s alleged negligence, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the claims accrued at that time and were no longer timely when filed in 2019. And because the record did not show that the woman’s failure to timely file her claims stemmed from reasonable reliance on fraudulent conduct by the provider, the Supreme Court concluded that equitable estoppel did not apply. View "Park v. Spayd" on Justia Law

After declaring them dependents of the court, a California juvenile court removed M.V. and I.V. (together, Children) from the physical custody of their parents, J.V. (Father) and M.Z. (Mother), and placed them with a relative caregiver pending reunification efforts. Father, Mother, and the Children appealed those dispositional orders, arguing substantial evidence did not support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was substantial danger to the Children if they were returned home and that there were no reasonable means to protect them without removing them from their parents’ custody. After review of the juvenile court record, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the dispositional orders as to both Father and Mother. View "In re M.V." on Justia Law

Bryon Updike appealed a divorce judgment, arguing the district court erred when it calculated child support and when it distributed the parties’ assets and debts. April Updike cross appealed, arguing the court erred when it failed to include a commencement date for the child support obligation. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court did not err when it imputed income to Bryon for purposes of child support, and the court’s property and debt distribution was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court modified the judgment to include a child support commencement date that the parties agreed to on appeal, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Updike v. Updike, et al." on Justia Law

Chase Eikom appealed a second amended judgment entered after he moved to amend parenting time. He argued the district court erred in denying his request for parenting time on all major holidays and to extend time during the summer. Eikom also argued the court erred in establishing the requirement his parenting time be reduced if he misses four or more weekends in a year. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court could “discern the rationale behind the district court’s findings, and the findings are supported by the evidence, the court did not err.” Judgment was affirmed. View "Eikom v. Eikom" on Justia Law

Plaintiff S.C. appealed a circuit court order denying her request for a domestic violence protective order against defendant G.C. The trial court concluded plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving a credible present threat to her safety based upon her admitted presence in defendant’s home during the timeframe of the alleged abuse. On appeal, plaintiff argued the court erred as a matter of law when it relied on her in-person contact with defendant as the sole basis for its decision. She also contended that the court erred when it made certain evidentiary, trial management, and other rulings that deprived her of a fair hearing and violated her due process rights. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed it was legal error for the circuit court to rely solely on plaintiff’s contact with defendant in denying her petition, and therefore vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "S.C. v. G.C." on Justia Law

When members of the Public Employees’ Retirement Association (“PERA”) apply for retirement, they can choose between three options for benefit distribution. Generally, a retiree’s option choice is final. Pursuant to section 24-51-802(3.8), C.R.S. (2021), if a retiree chose either option 2 or 3 at retirement and the retiree’s then-spouse was named cobeneficiary, “the court shall have the jurisdiction to order or allow [the] retiree . . . to remove the spouse that was named cobeneficiary . . . in which case an option 1 benefit shall become payable.” In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether section 24-51-802(3.8) empowered a divorcing retiree to unilaterally remove a former spouse as named cobeneficiary and convert to option 1 retirement benefits. Assuming without deciding that this issue was adequately preserved for appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. Instead, applying the statute’s plain language, the Court held that section 24-51-802(3.8) vested the trial court, not the retiree, with the authority to remove the former spouse as cobeneficiary and facilitate a conversion to option 1. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on different grounds. View "In re Marriage of Mack" on Justia Law

In dividing the divorcing parties’ assets, a Massachusetts court ordered a special master to sell the Vermont property. After the sale, plaintiff filed an action in a Vermont superior court to rescind the sale and quiet title to the property. Applying the doctrine of comity, the civil division dismissed his action, deferring to the ongoing proceeding in Massachusetts. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Vermont court should not have dismissed his suit on comity grounds because the Massachusetts court lacked jurisdiction to order the special master to sell the property. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the Vermont court acted within its discretion and affirmed. View "Nijensohn v. Ring" on Justia Law