Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Elouise Harber and Delores Williams filed cross-petitions to be appointed as guardians of two children. The trial court ordered them to exchange lists of the witnesses they intended to call, specifically including party witnesses; it also specifically ordered that they would not be permitted to call a witness who was not on their lists. Harber failed to exchange a witness list. When the case was called for trial, her counsel explained that her only witness was Harber herself, and that counsel mistakenly believed that the pretrial order did not require her to list party witnesses. Pursuant to its pretrial order, the trial court dismissed Harber’s petition and granted Williams’s petition. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a terminating sanction View "Guardianship of A.H." on Justia Law

Appellant made a request for pendente lite attorney fees was made early in the marriage dissolution proceedings and had been pending for over a year when the trial started. By that time, Appellant was unemployed and representing herself. Nonetheless, her request for pendente lite attorney fees was never ruled on by the family court. Instead, the court waited until after the trial to address attorney fees in its final judgment of reserved issues.   The Fifth Appellate District explained that Appellant has demonstrated the family court’s failures to comply with its obligations under section 2030 were prejudicial. To remedy this prejudicial error, the court explained it must reverse the judgment (which places all reserved issues at large) and remand the case for further proceedings. Those proceedings shall include a hearing on Appellant’s request for pendente lite attorney fees and a decision on that request before the new trial is started. Because over four years have passed since Appellant filed her May 2018 request for an order awarding pendente lite attorney fees and costs, the court shall allow Appellant to file a new request for order and shall allow Blair to file a response before hearing the request for pendente lite attorney fees and costs. View "Marriage of Knox" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether a non-resident plaintiff could obtain a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order under Vermont’s Abuse Prevention Act. Mother and father were married in Massachusetts in 2015. Together, they had a daughter, age six, and a son, age five. The family’s relationship had been affected at times by father’s violent behavior and by mother’s substance abuse. Since 2019, father has lived in Dummerston, Vermont, while mother has maintained residency in Massachusetts. The couple remained married. After a November 2017 incident, mother reported father's abuse to police, and he was prosecuted for felony domestic violence. His contact with mother and the children was limited by a Massachusetts court. In June 2018, father sought emergency custody of the children in Massachusetts. He alleged that the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families had investigated mother for child neglect and that mother had been arraigned on a DUI, second offense, in early July 2018. A Massachusetts court held that despite father’s history of domestic violence, mother’s substance abuse impaired her ability to parent, and awarded custody to father and ordered that mother’s time with the children be restricted to supervised visits. The order also allowed father to move with the children to Vermont. Mother visited the children in Vermont, and on several occasions, father drove the children to Massachusetts to visit mother. When mother and father were getting along, mother had father’s permission to spend the night at his house. Mother’s time with the children was often unsupervised by father. They often spent time with the children together. Between January and April 2021, mother and father reconciled their relationship. By May 2021, this reconciliation had ended. Father told mother she could no longer see the children during unsupervised periods. However, mother still apparently spent considerably more time with the children than the Massachusetts court order allowed. Father subjected the children to corporal punishment and inappropriate outbursts of anger, some of which was witnessed by mother. In August 2021, she filed a complaint for an emergency RFA in Vermont; a Vermont court issued a temporary RFA order the same day. Father moved to dismiss the RFA order, contending that because mother was a resident of Massachusetts, she could not proceed under the Abuse Prevention Act. The family division concluded that mother could obtain both an emergency and final RFA order against father. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family division's order. View "Bacigalupo v. Bacigalupo" on Justia Law

Shelby Finnson appealed a judgment awarding primary residential responsibility of the parties’ minor child to Jacob Kershaw. She claimed the district court’s findings were unsupported by the record; the court’s parenting time decision was unreasoned; the court erred when it allowed Kershaw to call an undisclosed witness for purposes of rebuttal; and the presiding judge erred because he failed to certify himself as familiar with the record. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Kershaw v. Finnson, et al." on Justia Law

T.T. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s finding that the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply to the dependency proceedings concerning her son, Dominick D. She argued the juvenile court failed to ensure that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) discharged its duty of initial inquiry into Dominick’s possible Indian ancestry under California Welfare & Institutions Code section 224.2(b). To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, but declined to address the parties’ arguments concerning harmlessness, because ICWA inquiry and notice errors did not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders other than the finding that ICWA did not apply. The Court accordingly vacated that finding and remanded for compliance with ICWA and related California law, but otherwise affirmed. View "In re Dominick D." on Justia Law

The Georgia Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was the temporary custodian of Appellants John and Brittani Chandler’s three children. The Chandlers sought a determination they had constitutional and statutory rights to object on religious grounds to DFCS’s immunization of their children. Because the juvenile court applied the wrong standard in finding that the Chandlers’ religious objection was insincere, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded this case for application of the correct standard. View "In the Interest of C.C. et al., children" on Justia Law

Angela Hansen appealed orders denying her motion for an order to show cause and her demand for a change of judge. Hansen was subject to a standing order prohibiting her from filing new motions without permission of court. Hansen and Shannon Dieterle married in 2009 and have one child. The parties divorced in 2012. Following the parties’ divorce, Hansen filed several motions primarily related to the district court’s decisions on residential responsibility and parenting time. The court entered a standing order in April 2016 prohibiting Hansen from “filing any claim, motion, or document in Sheridan County, or in any other county, related to the issues of primary residential responsibility and/or parenting time regarding [the child], without first obtaining permission from the district court of the county in which she is attempting to file.” The court entered the order due to the frivolous and duplicative nature of Hansen’s motions. The North Dakota Supreme Court treated the district court’s orders as ones denying Hansen permission to file new motions. The Court found orders denying permission to file were not appealable; therefore, that part of the appeal was dismissed. Hansen also appealed the award of sanctions for violation of the standing order, and rejecting her demand for change of judge. On those issues, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dieterle v. Dieterle n/k/a Hansen, et al." on Justia Law

The juvenile court bypassed family reunification services for appellant S.Z. (Mother) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 (b)(5) and (c)(3). Mother contended the court’s ruling was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded Mother’s argument lacked merit, but published its opinion in this case to clarify the relationship between subdivisions (b)(5) and (c)(3) of section 361.5 and the resulting burden on an appellant challenging the bypass of reunification services under those provisions. Because Mother did not make a showing under subsection (c)(3), and could not do so on this record, the Court affirmed. View "In re Raul V." on Justia Law

The HuffingtonPost.com, Inc. ("HuffPost"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order denying HuffPost's motion for a summary judgment based on the immunity provided in the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, and to enter a summary judgment in its favor pursuant to the immunity provided in 47 U.S.C. § 230. K.G.S. petitioned to adopt Baby Doe; the birth mother contested the adoption. The birth mother contacted Mirah Ruben, a contributor to HuffPost, and shared her version of events leading to her contesting the adoption. HuffPost published two online articles about Baby Doe’s adoption, including the full name of the birth mother, K.G.S. and included images of Baby Doe. After the articles were published, Claudia D’Arcy, a resident of New York, created a Facebook page dedicated to reuniting the birth mother and Baby Doe, which attached the HuffPost articles. The Facebook page also identified the birth mother and K.G.S. by name, and images of Baby Doe. After the creation of the Facebook page, K.G.S. stated she was “inundated with appallingly malicious and persistent cyber-bullying.” K.G.S.’ attorney compelled Facebook to take down the page because it violated Alabama’s Adoption Code. Then K.G.S. sued HuffPost, Mirah Riben, and a number of other defendants alleging that the defendants had made statements relating to the adoption that subjected them to civil liability and had unlawfully disclosed confidential information about the adoption "to create a sensationalized, salacious, and scandal-driven trial in the court of public opinion to pressure K.G.S. into relinquishing her custody of Baby Doe." After review of the circumstances of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded HuffPost demonstrated a clear legal right to mandamus relief, and its petition was granted. View "Ex parte The HuffingtonPost.com" on Justia Law

Orville Jenkins appealed a superior court’s division of property following his divorce. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected his arguments that the superior court: (1) improperly denied his motion to continue trial; (2) incorrectly allocated marital debt to him; (3) improperly authorized sale of the marital home before finalizing the property division; and (4) showed bias against him. But the Supreme Court agreed with his arguments that it was error to: (1) decline to consider whether his wife’s separate property was transmuted to marital property through contract; and (2) find that no portion of earnings on the wife’s separate investments was marital when the taxes on those earnings were paid with marital funds. The judgment was thus reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Layton v. Dea" on Justia Law