Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

T.K. (mother) appealed an order denying her petition to terminate D.D.G.’s, parental rights to the children J.J.G., M.K.G., and O.J.G and from an order denying her motion for a new trial. T.K. and D.D.G., the father, had three children together: J.J.G. born in 2008; M.K.G. born in 2009; and O.J.G. born in 2014. In September 2021, the mother petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights, alleging the father abandoned the children. She alleged the father has a history of drug use, he abused her in front of the children, he has not seen or communicated with the two younger children for three years, he had one visit with the oldest child in 2019 and another visit in 2020, and he has not provided any financial support for the children. An evidentiary hearing was held; and the mother, father, and other relatives testified. The district court denied the mother’s petition, concluding there was not clear and convincing evidence the father abandoned the children. The mother moved for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59. T.K. argued the district court erred by failing to terminate D.D.G.’s parental rights, there was clear and convincing evidence he abandoned the children, and the court erred by denying her motion for a new trial. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial. View "Interest of J.J.G., M.K.G. & O.J.G." on Justia Law

This is an appeal from a family court’s self-described sua sponte sanctions order under Family Code section 271.1 The family court judge ordered Appellants (Mother) and her attorney, to each pay $10,000 to Respondent (Father) and partly justified the sanctions on its finding that Appellants unjustifiably accused the judge of being biased (or appearing to be biased).   The Second Appellate District considered whether the sanctions order represents an abuse of the family court’s discretion and reversed the family court’s order. The court explained that as to the attorney, the family court’s sanctions award is obviously wrong: Section 271 permits imposing sanctions only on a party, not a party’s attorney, and the sanctions award against the attorney is, therefore, improper. As against Mother, the sanctions award is an error, too, even if a marginally less obvious one. There is a question as to whether section 271 even authorizes a family court to issue sanctions on its own motion, but the court explained it need not decide that issue because the conduct relied on by the family court to impose sanctions here, even considered in the aggregate, does not rise to the level of meriting sanctions. The family court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. View "Featherstone v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant violated her joint custody agreement with Petitioner by traveling from Switzerland to the United States with their then-12- year-old daughter, M.D., in July 2020. Petitioner filed a petition seeking M.D.’s return to Switzerland, pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague Convention). After an evidentiary hearing on the merits, the district court denied the petition based on the mature child defense, finding that M.D. was of sufficient age and maturity such that the court should take account of her views and that she objected to returning to Switzerland. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with directions to grant the petition for the return of M.D. under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that M.D. is an “innocent party” in this acrimonious dispute. But because M.D. did not express a particularized objection to returning to Switzerland, instead describing a preference—for a variety of understandable reasons—to remain in the United States, the district court’s finding that M.D.’s statements constituted an objection within the meaning of the mature child defense was clearly erroneous. View "Vladyslav Dubikovskyy v. Elena Goun" on Justia Law

Timothy W. and Julie W. were in the midst of a dissolution of their marriage. The underlying dispute here relates to Julie’s disclosure of certain facts about Timothy’s past (the sensitive information) that Julie revealed to her codefendant and private investigator, Ronnie Echavarria, Sr. (Echavarria), in connection with the dissolution case. Echavarria revealed the sensitive information to at least one other person, which resulted in several other individuals learning the information. Timothy filed a civil case against Julie and Echavarria (defendants), alleging 12 separate causes of action, many of which were duplicative or not properly pleaded as separate claims. Defendants moved pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) to dismiss. The trial court granted the motions as to 10 of the 12 causes of action, all based in tort, and denied the motion as to two contract-based claims. Timothy appealed, arguing the court erred by granting the motion. Julie cross-appealed, arguing the remaining two causes of action should also have been dismissed. The Court of Appeal concluded that Timothy’s claims directly arose from the dissolution case, and that all of the claims were barred by the litigation privilege. His contract claims were barred on several additional grounds. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court properly granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the tort claims and incorrectly denied it as to the two breach of contract claims. View "Timothy W. v. Julie W." on Justia Law

In this case, which orginated from a marital dissolution action, the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees based on one of the party's frivolous motions to disqualify the other's attorney. The appellate court determined that the fact that the underlying action was voluntarily dismissed did not divest the court of jurisdiction to issue the award of attorney's fees. View "Marriage of Blake & Langer" on Justia Law

Kristen Overboe appealed a divorce judgment, an order striking a declaration, an order denying a motion to amend the findings of fact, and an order striking additional filings and granting a protection order. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the divorce judgment but remanded for the district court to specify in the order for judgment whether either or both of the parties would be permitted to marry, and if so, when. The Court affirmed the court’s order denying Overboe’s motion to amend findings of fact but vacated the April 25, 2022 order granting Jonathan Buchholz’s motion to strike and granting a protection order. The Supreme Court also granted Buchholz’s motion for attorney’s fees and awarded double costs. View "Buchholz v. Overboe" on Justia Law

Tuwanda Williams and John Williams, Jr., filed a “Joint Motion to Dismiss Fault Grounds and Consent to Divorce on Grounds of Irreconcilable Differences” and submitted for review a judgment of divorce based on irreconcilable differences and a divorce agreement. Shortly thereafter, Tuwanda changed her mind. She withdrew her consent to the divorce agreement and also withdrew her consent to the divorce based on irreconcilable differences. John moved to enforce the divorce agreement. The chancellor found that Tuwanda timely withdrew her consent to the irreconcilable-differences divorce but that the divorce agreement was an enforceable contract binding on both Tuwanda and John. The chancellor granted John’s motion to enforce the divorce agreement and entered what he called a “final judgment” incorporating the agreement. Tuwanda appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that because the order entitled “final judgment” was not a final, appealable judgment, it lacked jurisdiction to review. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Kimberlyn Seals and her counsels of record, Felecia Perkins, Jessica Ayers, and Derek D. Hopson, Sr., appealed a chancery court's: (1) Contempt Order entered on April 8, 2020; (2) the Temporary Order entered on April 28, 2020; (3) the Jurisdictional Final Judgment entered on June 16, 2020; (4) the Final Judgment on Motion for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on June 18, 2020; and (5) the Amended Final Judgment entered on June 18, 2020. Seals argued the chancellor lacked jurisdiction and erroneously found them to be in contempt of court. These orders arose out of a paternity suit filed by the father of Seals' child, born 2017. A hearing was set for April 7, 2020, but Seals sought a continuance. The motion was deemed untimely, and that the court expected Seals and her counsel to appear at the April 7 hearing. When Seals and her counsel failed to appear, the court entered the contempt orders at issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the chancellor’s finding that Perkins and Ayers were in direct criminal contempt for their failure to appear at a scheduled April 7 hearing; (2) vacated the $3,000 sanction because it exceeded the penalties prescribed by statute; (3) affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees to opposing counsel; (4) found the chancellor erred in finding Hopson to be in direct criminal contempt for failing to appear - "Constructive criminal contempt charges require procedural safeguards of notice and a hearing;" and (5) found the chancellor erroneously found the attorneys to be in direct criminal contempt for violation of the September 2019 Temporary Order. "If proved, such acts are civil contempt." The matter was remanded for a determination of whether an indirect civil contempt proceeding should be commenced. View "Seals, et al. v. Stanton" on Justia Law

Appellee Andrea Milne dated Appellant Howard Hudson. During an argument, Hudson became violent with Milne. Milne sought a civil protection order from the McIntosh County district court, as the couple dated in in Eufaula, Oklahoma. She stated in her application, and testified at a hearing, that Hudson first attacked her in a car, slamming her head into the dashboard. When they got to her house, he hit her and threw her across her yard. Finally, he pushed his way into her house, grabbed some of his belongings, and struck her in front of her children. When the children came to her aid, he absconded, but returned later and threatened to burn the house down. Milne testified that after the afternoon of violent acts, he stalked her at home, around town, and at her workplace. This application and testimony, though not tested by investigation or cross-examination, "were certainly enough to justify an order of protection." Hudson objected, claiming that the district court had no jurisdiction to enter the eventual order. Hudson argued that because McIntosh County was within the boundaries of the Muscogee Reservation, Milne was a member of the Muscogee Nation, and Hudson was a member of the Cherokee Nation, the McIntosh District Court had no jurisdiction to enter a civil protective order against him. The trial court denied the objection and entered the civil protection order. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Milne v. Hudson" on Justia Law

In September 2019, the Department filed a dependency petition after taking six-year-old A.H. and her younger half-siblings into emergency protective custody and placing them in foster care. The petition alleged that the children’s mother had allowed A.H. to have unsupervised contact with an older relative suspected of having sexually molested the child. A.H.’s alleged father, J.H., had failed to provide care, support, or supervision for more than a year and it was indicated that his whereabouts were unknown, although the Department did have an address.The court of appeal reversed an order terminating J.H.'s parental rights. From the outset of the dependency proceedings through the jurisdiction and dispositional hearing, the Department’s efforts to locate J.H. and provide him notice requirements fell far short of the statutory requirements and left him in the dark about his parental status, how to assert his parental rights and how to participate in the proceedings. While its efforts may have improved later in the case, the Department never rectified its earlier failures by advising J.H. of his right to request counsel and his need to elevate his status to "presumed parent" to assert his parental rights. The Department violated his right to due process. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law