Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Wife Connie Stockton challenged a superior court’s order denying relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). She sought to overturn a default judgment entered against her in 2013, that divided marital property upon divorce from her husband Veral Stockton. Asserting that she suffered from severe depression during the divorce proceedings and that her husband improperly served the notice of default, she argued the judgment was void for lack of due process and, alternatively, should have been vacated due to extraordinary circumstances. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s factual finding that she was not incompetent at the time of divorce and its legal rulings that the judgment was not void and extraordinary circumstances warranting relief were not shown. View "Stockton v. Stockton" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a partition action by Plaintiff against her former significant other, Defendant.  The trial court entered default and a default judgment against Defendant. Nearly two years later, Defendant moved to vacate the default and resulting judgment, alleging he was never effectively served with the summons and complaint. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the trial court should not have granted Defendant set aside relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). She argued her personal service of the summons and complaint on Defendant was proper, and section 473, subdivision (b) applies instead, rendering Defendant’s motion “untimely.” Plaintiff also argued the trial court abused its discretion in not considering the estoppel doctrine when making its ruling.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendant’s motion to set aside the default and default judgment. On the record, the trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Defendant due to improper service of the summons and complaint. Defendant was “under no duty to act upon a defectively served summons.” (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.) Because the court had no jurisdiction in light of defective service, the court did not address Plaintiff’s remaining argument regarding equitable estoppel. View "Braugh v. Dow" on Justia Law

D.P., C.A. and E.A. (the adoptive parents of D.P.’s two older brothers) appealed an order denying a petition made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 for placement of D.P. in the siblings’ adoptive parents’ home. The siblings’ adoptive parents and D.P. (Appellants) contended the court erred by failing to apply the “relative placement preference” articulated in section 361.3. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Appellants forfeited this claim by failing to raise the issue at the trial court. But even if it were to consider it, the Court determined the siblings’ adoptive parents did not qualify as relatives for consideration under section 361.3. The Court further concluded the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition after finding it would be in D.P.’s best interest to remain with de facto parents A.G. and K.P. The Court, therefore, affirmed the order. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a Missouri judge for putting his kids in jail twice, once after a custody hearing and again after ordering law enforcement to pick them up in Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Defendant’s action of placing Plaintiff’s children in jail and then later in a juvenile-detention facility violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant argued that he should receive absolute immunity, but the district court disagreed and ruled that the case could proceed. At issue on appeal is whether judicial immunity shields these acts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Defendant’s decision to personally escort the kids to jail took what would otherwise be a judicial act too far. Judges have the authority to order an officer or a bailiff to escort an unruly litigant to jail. The court wrote that Defendant crossed the line; however, when he personally escorted the kids to jail, stood there while they removed their clothes and belongings, and personally came back an hour later to release them. Further, the court explained that here, even if Defendant had no “express authority” to issue the pick-up order, he is immune because he had jurisdiction to issue one. He cannot be sued, in other words, no matter how erroneous his interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act may be. View "D. Bart Rockett v. The Honorable Eric Eighmy" on Justia Law

Jay Wright appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his ex-wife, Kristie Parish. Wright and Parish were married in 2002 and divorced in 2019. Before they were married, Wright and Parish, as single persons, purchased two adjacent parcels of real property in Island Park, and their ownership of the property did not change following their marriage. A magistrate court presided over their divorce proceedings and the distribution of their community property. The magistrate court classified as community property certain loan payments and improvements that had been made for the benefit of the Island Park Properties but specifically declined to divide the properties because the court concluded the properties were separate property and that it “lack[ed] authority to divide the property.” The magistrate court concluded that Wright and Parish “apparently” owned the properties as tenants-in-common, each with a fifty percent interest, though it never made a definitive ruling on each party’s interest, concluding only that they were “joint owners[.]” Roughly one year after the magistrate court entered its final judgment for the divorce, Wright filed suit seeking a partition of the Island Park Properties and for Parish to deed them to him, arguing in part that his ownership interest in the properties exceeded the fifty percent determination that the magistrate court had ostensibly made. In response, Parish moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wright’s claim that he was entitled to a greater ownership interest was precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court granted Parish’s motion for summary judgment after determining that the issues in Wright’s complaint had already been litigated in the prior divorce proceedings. As a result, the district court concluded that the proceeds from the sale of the properties should be equally divided between Wright and Parish. Wright appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Parish, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether Wright could produce evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption of equal ownership in the properties. View "Wright v. Parish" on Justia Law

Audrey Charlton appealed a magistrate court’s judgment modifying the residential custody of the parties’ minor children to give their father, Russell Pottenger, primary physical custody and awarding Charlton physical custody on alternating weekends during the school year and one-half of each summer vacation. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the magistrate court erred when it failed to address Charlton’s primary ground for modification in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, the Court vacated the magistrate court’s judgment modifying custody and its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pottenger v. Charlton" on Justia Law

Robin J. appealed the denial of her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Michael M., the father of their two children. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court misapplied the law in denying Robin’s renewal request, and that Robin established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant the renewal request and decide whether the DVRO should be renewed for five or more years, or permanently. View "Michael M. v. Robin J." on Justia Law

removed an Alaska Native child from his mother and placed him with a relative, the child experienced suicidal ideation and checked himself into a psychiatric facility. Following a period of seemingly voluntary care, OCS requested a hearing to place the child at an out-of-state secure residential psychiatric treatment facility. The child’s Tribe intervened and challenged the constitutionality of AS 47.10.087, the manner in which evidence was received, and alleged due process violations. The child joined in some of these objections. The superior court ordered the child placed at a secure residential psychiatric treatment facility per AS 47.10.087. The Tribe, but not the child, appealed the placement decision, contending primarily that the superior court erred in proceeding under AS 47.10.087 and in making its substantive findings, and plainly erred in authorizing placement pursuant to AS 47.10.087 without addressing the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) placement preferences. The Alaska Supreme Court found no error in the court’s application of AS 47.10.087 or its substantive findings, and thus affirmed the superior court’s placement determination. The Court expressed concern that the trial court failed to make required inquiries and findings related to ICWA’s placement preferences. However, this did not amount to plain error. The Supreme Court did not reach the Tribe’s other arguments as the Tribe has either waived them or lacked standing to raise them. View "Tuluksak Native Community v. Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvs." on Justia Law

A.C. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s dispositional finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 did not apply to the dependency proceedings to her five children. Mother contended that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 (b). After review of the juvenile court record, the Court of Appeal concluded that Mother’s argument lacked merit and therefore affirmed. View "In re Ja.O." on Justia Law

C.E. (mother) appealed an order terminating her parental rights to I.E. (the child) and freeing the child for adoption. Mother’s sole claim on appeal was that the juvenile court erred by ruling the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. The Court of Appeal found the record, especially the child’s consistent and compelling statements that she wished to be adopted, "amply supported" the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to the child. Because the Court found no abuse of discretion, judgment was affirmed. View "In re I.E." on Justia Law