Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal of Christopher Lamm against a disorderly conduct restraining order issued by the District Court, preventing him from having contact with Amanda Anderson, the mother of his child. Anderson claimed that Lamm had threatened her, made false child abuse allegations, and exhibited other threatening behavior. The District Court issued the order based on Lamm's visit to the town where Anderson resided, which it deemed as disorderly conduct. Lamm appealed the decision, and even though the restraining order had expired by the time of the appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged potential adverse collateral consequences for Lamm and considered the appeal on its merits. The Supreme Court determined that the evidence provided was insufficient to prove that Lamm's presence in the town where Anderson lived constituted disorderly conduct. The court clarified that mere subjective fear of the petitioner or the respondent's unwanted presence was not enough to qualify as disorderly conduct or to justify a restraining order. The court found that Anderson failed to demonstrate how Lamm's actions adversely affected her safety, security, or privacy, and therefore, the District Court's decision to issue the restraining order was deemed as an abuse of discretion. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the District Court's disorderly conduct restraining order against Lamm. View "Anderson v. Lamm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio examined the appropriate standard of review for cases involving a juvenile court’s decision to award permanent custody of a child and to terminate parental rights. The case stemmed from a dispute surrounding the custody of a minor child, Z.C., with the Ashtabula County Children Services Board (ACCSB) granted permanent custody. The father, D.C., appealed this decision, resulting in a conflict between the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and other appellate districts regarding the correct standard of review. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to its review, while other courts applied a sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the correct appellate standards of review in these cases are the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, depending on the arguments presented by the parties. The Court found that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals erred in applying an abuse-of-discretion standard and remanded the case for review under the correct standard. View "In re Z.C." on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Douglas Shane Thompson was convicted for domestic violence, and a no-contact order was put in place prohibiting him from contacting his minor son. Thompson appealed against the decision, arguing that there was no evidence that he posed a threat to his son and that the no-contact order violated his fundamental right to parent his son.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho found that the lower court failed to provide adequate reasons for amending the no-contact order to prohibit all contact between Thompson and his son. The court concluded that the lower court did not exercise reason since it did not articulate any evidence that demonstrated a change in circumstances that justified the amendment of the no-contact order. It was also noted that the court did not explain what circumstances would need to change before Thompson could seek to reinitiate contact with his son.The court also observed that Thompson's argument that the no-contact order effectively terminated his parental rights was not sufficiently preserved for appeal. The court acknowledged the complexities when a judge not regularly dealing with family law issues has to analyze often competing interests involved.Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the lower court to amend the no-contact order and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the procedural issue of whether a notice of appeal could be filed electronically in a termination of parental rights (TPR) case that had been sealed. The court had to interpret the relevant statutes and rules, which stated that TPR cases should be sealed upon the entry of the final order and that sealed cases were not eligible for electronic filing. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the appellant had complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the rules were ambiguous about whether a TPR case could be electronically filed after it had been sealed.However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed with the lower court. It held that the statutory law and administrative rule, read together, effectively prohibited a notice of appeal from being electronically filed in a TPR case. The Court found no ambiguity in this interpretation. It pointed out that the rules clearly stated that TPR cases were always confidential but would only be sealed upon the entry of the trial court’s final order. Once sealed, these cases were no longer subject to mandatory electronic filing.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that the appellant had not complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the notice should have been filed conventionally. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s termination of the appellant's parental rights. View "CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. D.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was presented with a case involving the mental health of the respondent, D.E. In the case, the Circuit Court had denied D.E.'s motion to dismiss and granted New Hampshire Hospital’s (NHH) petition for guardianship. It also granted NHH’s petition for involuntary admission. D.E. appealed these decisions, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the simultaneous hearing of both the guardianship and involuntary admission petitions, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions as he was not a resident of New Hampshire nor was he lawfully detained there.The Supreme Court held that D.E.'s due process argument regarding simultaneous hearings was not preserved as it was not raised in the trial court and was therefore not eligible for review. However, the court found that at the time the non-emergency involuntary admission petition was filed, D.E. was not lawfully detained and thus the trial court did not have jurisdiction on this basis. The question of whether D.E. resided in New Hampshire, giving the court jurisdiction, was remanded to the trial court for determination.In relation to the guardianship order, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's findings that D.E. was incapacitated and that a guardianship was the least restrictive form of intervention were supported by the evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court's appointment of D.E.'s brother as guardian, despite D.E.'s preference for an independent, professional guardian. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on guardianship, vacated the decision on involuntary admission, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of D.E." on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Mr. James Baker, contested the decree entered by a successor district judge after the original district judge who presided over the trial retired. Mr. Baker argued that the successor judge violated his right to due process by making findings of fact and conclusions of law without a formal certification under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 63.The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that Mr. Baker had waived his right to object to the successor judge's procedure. During a status conference, in which the successor judge proposed to proceed with determining the case based on the trial transcripts, Mr. Baker's counsel affirmed this approach and requested the court to make a ruling based on the existing record. Therefore, the court ruled that Mr. Baker intentionally relinquished his right to object to the successor judge's procedure, constituting a waiver.The court also clarified that the language in W.R.C.P. 63 does not necessitate the successor judge to advise the parties of their rights under the rule. The court found no authority supporting an affirmative duty for the successor judge to do so. Hence, the court affirmed the decree of divorce entered by the successor district court judge. View "Baker v. Baker" on Justia Law

In the child protection case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Dominique Desiree Sciacca (Mother), contested the termination of her parental rights to her minor child, JDD. The Department of Family Services had filed a petition for termination based on Mother's neglect of the child and her failure to comply with a reunification plan. The District Court of Goshen County granted the Department's petition. On appeal, Mother did not dispute the grounds for termination but argued that her due process rights were violated because she was not physically present in court for the termination hearing, although she was allowed to participate by phone. She also contended that the court violated procedural rules by allowing her to testify by phone from the same location as the child's father, without adequate safeguards to protect her from his influence. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no violation of due process or procedural rules. The court ruled that Mother was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that the lower court had implemented sufficient safeguards during her phone testimony. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: JJD v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

In this case, Veronica Louise Hudson and Daniel Lee Hudson, a married couple in Alaska, divorced. The major points of contention revolved around the division of marital property and the classification of a severance and bonus package received by Daniel from his former employer, BP. Veronica argued that the severance and bonus pay were marital property, while Daniel contended that they were his separate property. The trial court ruled that the severance and bonus pay were separate property, and divided the remaining marital property equally between the parties. Veronica also challenged the court's order allowing Daniel to make an equalization payment over five years rather than in a lump sum and the court's denial of her request for attorney fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska concluded that the lower court erred in classifying the severance and bonus pay without sufficient information, and in its findings related to economic misconduct and the financial condition of the parties. The court also held that the lower court abused its discretion in ordering a schedule of equalization payments over multiple years. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the purpose of the severance and bonus pay, and whether a different division of property is warranted. The court also required the lower court to reconsider the terms of any equalization payment. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of attorney's fees. View "Hudson v. Hudson" on Justia Law

In the State of North Dakota, Joshua Holm appealed from a district court's decision to issue a disorderly conduct restraining order preventing him from contacting Heidi Holm for six months. The couple's marriage had deteriorated and they agreed to separate; however, Heidi alleged that Joshua had taken money from her safe and joint checking accounts, attempted to force her into sex, and had weapons, causing her to fear him. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the decision, stating that the district court had abused its discretion by issuing the restraining order without finding that Joshua intended to adversely affect Heidi's safety, security, or privacy. The court noted that while Joshua had admittedly visited the marital home against Heidi’s wishes, this alone did not establish reasonable grounds for a restraining order. The court concluded that Heidi, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving Joshua acted with adverse intent, which she failed to do. The restraining order was, therefore, reversed. View "Holm v. Holm" on Justia Law

In the State of North Dakota, the Supreme Court was asked to review a lower court's decision to grant a disorderly conduct restraining order. The petitioner, Hattie Albertson, had filed for this restraining order against the respondent, Trent Albertson. The District Court of Bottineau County had granted the restraining order in favor of Hattie Albertson and their minor child, C.W.A., for a period of one year. This decision was appealed by Trent Albertson, and the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case to the lower court for more detailed findings. Upon review of these additional findings, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to maintain the restraining order.The lower court had found that Trent Albertson had made multiple threatening phone calls over two days, including threats of violence against a friend of the minor child and towards the child as well. These threats and the respondent's actions, including attempting to forcefully enter Hattie Albertson's home, led her to leave the home out of fear. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's decision, finding the evidence and testimony presented sufficient to believe that acts constituting disorderly conduct had been committed.Trent Albertson had argued on appeal that the restraining order effectively modified a residential responsibility schedule without necessary hearings and considerations. However, the Supreme Court declined to address this argument as it was raised for the first time on appeal, and had not been presented to the lower court for consideration. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the disorderly conduct restraining order and affirmed the decision. View "Albertson v. Albertson" on Justia Law