Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Scott and Traci Musland, married in 1997, separated in 2022, and Scott filed for divorce. The couple resolved several interim issues through mediation, including exclusive use of the marital and lake homes. A bench trial was held in July 2023, where both parties provided testimony and exhibits. The district court found the Musland marital estate to be valued at just over eight million dollars. Traci Musland was awarded sections of land, a lake home, all of the couple’s retirement funds, miscellaneous equipment, and personal property. She also received an “equity payment” of $700,000 and was allocated responsibility for the debt associated with her credit cards and appraisal fee, leaving her a net estate of $3,224,357. Scott Musland was awarded a net estate of $4,961,915, which included the marital home, farmland, and debt, totaling $2,388,931.Traci Musland appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the property division was clearly erroneous, that the court erred in setting a land rent value, and failing to award her rent for the 2023 tax year, and that the right of first refusal granted to Scott Musland was not appropriate. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s distribution of marital property under a clearly erroneous standard. The court found that the district court provided a thorough analysis of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and applied the law properly. The court concluded that the division of the marital estate was not clearly erroneous.However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Traci Musland that the language of the right of first refusal as written was not appropriate. The court remanded that issue to the district court to modify the right of first refusal to provide that it is triggered by the acceptance of an offer by Traci Musland, subject to the right of first refusal. The court affirmed the district court’s distribution of the marital estate in all other respects. View "Musland v. Musland" on Justia Law

The case involves Katrina Danforth and Ryan Hansen, who share a child, SLD. Hansen filed a petition to terminate Danforth's parental rights to SLD, which Danforth answered pro se, requesting the appointment of a guardian ad litem for SLD and the termination of Hansen's parental rights. The district court ordered the termination of Danforth's parental rights but did not address her request to terminate Hansen's parental rights. Danforth appealed the decision.Previously, an Idaho court had established Hansen's paternity and awarded joint legal and physical custody of SLD to both parents, with Danforth as the primary caregiver. However, after discovering Danforth's involvement in the adult entertainment industry and her inappropriate use of SLD in her work, Hansen filed for custody modification. The court awarded temporary sole legal and physical custody to Hansen. Later, Danforth was sentenced to 10 years in prison for hiring a hitman to kill Hansen. After relocating to Wyoming with SLD, Hansen filed a petition to terminate Danforth's parental rights.In the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Danforth argued that the district court erred by disregarding her counterclaim to terminate Hansen's parental rights. The Supreme Court construed her request as a counterclaim, which remained unresolved. The court found that the district court's order terminating Danforth's parental rights did not satisfy the criteria for an appealable order as it did not resolve all outstanding issues, specifically Danforth's counterclaim. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "In the Matter of SLD" on Justia Law

A German citizen, Asli Baz, filed a suit under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) to compel Anthony Patterson, a U.S. citizen, to return their six-year-old son, A.P., from Illinois to Germany. The couple had previously lived together in Chicago, but after their relationship ended, they continued to cohabit and share custody of their son. Baz later moved to Germany with A.P., with Patterson's consent. However, Patterson later took A.P. from his school in Germany and brought him back to the U.S., refusing to return him to Germany.The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that A.P.’s habitual residence at the time he was retained was in Germany, where he had lived with Baz for over a year, and that the retention in Illinois violated Baz’s rights of custody under German law. It thus granted Baz’s petition and ordered the child’s return. Patterson appealed, challenging both the jurisdiction of the district court and its rulings on the merits of the petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court rejected Patterson's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to a provision in the Illinois Allocation Judgment, which stated that the Circuit Court of the State of Illinois had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also found that the district court did not err in determining that A.P.'s habitual residence was Germany, and that Baz was exercising her rights of custody at the time of the retention. The court emphasized that its decision did not touch on any matters of custody, which should be resolved by the courts of the child's habitual residence. View "Baz v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The case involves Carl Michael Seibert who appealed a summary judgment by the Madison Circuit Court in favor of Lorri Stricklen and Zoe Aldige. Seibert had filed claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process against Stricklen and Aldige. The case originated from a divorce proceeding between Seibert and Stricklen. Seibert believed Stricklen was having an affair and began gathering evidence. Stricklen filed a criminal complaint against Seibert for stalking, leading to his arrest and indictment. The criminal case ended in a mistrial, and Seibert subsequently filed his complaint alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The Madison Circuit Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Stricklen and Aldige, noting that Seibert's case had effectively languished due to his failure to conduct meaningful discovery or prosecute the case. The court found that if Seibert could not defeat a motion for a summary judgment after 58 months, a trial on his claims would be useless. Stricklen and Aldige also filed a motion for an award of attorney fees and costs under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act ("the ALAA"), which the court granted in part.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of Stricklen on the malicious-prosecution claim and in favor of Stricklen and Aldige on the abuse-of-process claim. However, it reversed the trial court's implicit determination that Seibert's lawsuit was filed without substantial justification, remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to set forth its reasoning as to why Stricklen and Aldige are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under the ALAA. View "Seibert v. Stricklen" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff, referred to as "Clara," who alleged that she was sexually assaulted by the defendant, referred to as "Martin," in June 2018. Following the incident, Clara applied for a temporary protective order (TPO) and then a final protective order (FPO) under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA). The trial court found that Clara had been subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact due to her extreme intoxication and that there was a possibility of future risk to Clara’s safety or well-being. The court issued an FPO directing Martin to have no contact with Clara.The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision based on the test used to assess consent. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the affirmative consent standard is the correct standard to be applied in determining whether sexual activity was consensual under SASPA. The case was remanded for reconsideration.On remand, Clara testified about her ongoing trauma from the assault. The court found Clara’s testimony credible and Martin’s testimony not credible. The court held that consent to sexual contact was not affirmatively and freely given and found a significant risk to Clara’s psychological well-being should the order not remain in effect. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification limited to the interpretation of the statute regarding the possibility of future risk to the victim's safety or well-being.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the plain language of the statute creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. The court found that Clara's testimony about her ongoing trauma and fear for her safety was sufficient to demonstrate a "possibility of future risk" to her "safety or well-being." View "C.R. v. M. T." on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal against a county court's decision to appoint a permanent guardian for Patrick W., an individual deemed incapacitated due to a stroke. The appellant, Patrick W., argued that the court erred in admitting a neuropsychological report as evidence over his hearsay objection and that without this report, the evidence was insufficient to prove his incapacitation.Previously, Adult Protective Services (APS) had opened an investigation into Patrick's medical needs and financial management. Concerned about Patrick's vulnerability to financial exploitation, self-neglect, and undue influence, APS contacted an attorney to inquire about establishing a guardianship. Becky Stamp was identified as a potential guardian. The county court appointed Stamp as Patrick's temporary guardian, and later, Patrick's cousin, Terry Crandall, was substituted as the temporary guardian. The court also ordered Patrick to undergo a neuropsychological evaluation.At the guardianship hearing, the county court received several exhibits into evidence and heard testimony from six witnesses, including Patrick. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Patrick was incapacitated and appointed Crandall as his permanent guardian.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the county court's decision. It held that the neuropsychological report was admissible in evidence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 30-4204, as it was a medical report obtained by the guardian ad litem regarding the person for whom she was appointed. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the county court's finding that Patrick was incapacitated and that a full guardianship was the least restrictive alternative to provide for his continuing care. View "In re Guardianship of Patrick W." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a married couple, identified as Br. C. and Be. C., who have three-year-old twins. The dispute centers around a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) that Br. C. obtained against Be. C. The DVRO was granted after several incidents of verbal and physical abuse, including Be. C. yelling at Br. C., throwing objects, and using derogatory language. The court also admitted into evidence three audio recordings of Be. C.'s abusive behavior, which Br. C. had made prior to filing for the DVRO.The Superior Court of Placer County granted the DVRO, which protects Br. C., their two children, and their two dogs from Be. C. for a three-year period. Be. C. appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting the three recordings into evidence and that substantial evidence does not support the DVRO.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reviewed the case. Be. C. challenged the admissibility of the three audio recordings, arguing that he did not know he was being recorded at the time. The court found that the recordings were admissible under section 633.6, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code, which allows a victim of domestic violence to record a confidential communication if they reasonably believe it may contain evidence relevant to a restraining order. The court also found that substantial evidence of domestic violence supported the trial court's ruling. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Placer County, upholding the DVRO against Be. C. View "Br. C. v. Be. C." on Justia Law

The case involves S.Y.C., who appealed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissing her petition for writs of procedendo and mandamus against Judge Alison L. Floyd of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. S.Y.C. sought to compel rulings on motions pending before Judge Floyd, who was overseeing the child-custody cases involving S.Y.C., her former partner, and their two children. The Eighth District dismissed S.Y.C.’s petition as moot, finding that Judge Floyd had disposed of the motions.The case originated in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and was transferred to Cuyahoga County in 2016. It involved multiple appeals, petitions for extraordinary writs, and affidavits of disqualification. S.Y.C. filed a petition for writs of procedendo and mandamus in the Eighth District, alleging that Judge Floyd had failed to rule on “at least seven” pending motions filed between April 2021 and August 2022. Judge Floyd filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that S.Y.C.’s petition was moot as the motions identified in S.Y.C.’s petition had been ruled on or withdrawn or were not a motion and therefore did not require a decision from the court.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing S.Y.C.’s petition for writs of procedendo and mandamus as moot. The court found that Judge Floyd had ruled on all the motions that were the subject of the petition, rendering moot S.Y.C.’s petition. The court also rejected S.Y.C.’s other arguments about Judge Floyd’s rulings, noting that S.Y.C. was essentially seeking an appellate review of Judge Floyd’s judgments, which is not the purpose of either procedendo or mandamus. View "State ex rel. S.Y.C. v. Floyd" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce proceeding initiated by Jolene K. Makuch against John Makuch III in the Geauga County Common Pleas Court. Jolene represented herself, stating she could not afford representation. After the trial, the magistrate noted that Jolene had failed to provide evidence regarding the division of marital property, spousal or child support, or attorney fees. The magistrate ordered a hearing for the parties to present additional evidence on these matters. John objected to the magistrate's decision, challenging the order for a hearing to present additional evidence.The Common Pleas Court, presided over by Judge Carolyn J. Paschke, overruled John's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision. The court noted that the parties had failed to present sufficient evidence at trial regarding the nature, extent, and value of the marital property, their income, and debts. The court set a future hearing date for the parties to present complete evidence on these matters. John appealed this decision to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals dismissed John's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, determining that Judge Paschke's entry was not a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B). The court explained that in a divorce action, no final appealable order exists until all issues relating to property division, support, and parental rights and responsibilities have been addressed. John then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to accept jurisdiction in this discretionary appeal filed on behalf of John. The court found the appeal to be frivolous, as it was neither warranted by existing law nor supported by a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. The court denied John's motions for clarification and for leave to file a supplemental brief. The court also declined to impose sanctions on John's counsel, who had previously been declared to be vexatious litigators. View "Makuch v. Makuch" on Justia Law

The case involves Laura Cote and Adam Cote, who were divorced in November 2022. The divorce agreement prohibited exposing their children to felons and known sex offenders. However, Laura Cote began dating Steven Alexander, a convicted sex offender, in August 2022. In April 2023, Adam Cote filed a motion to modify residential responsibility and sought a contempt sanction against Laura Cote for violating the terms of the judgment by allowing Alexander to be around the children. He also filed a motion to compel discovery seeking communications between Laura Cote and Alexander and Laura Cote’s bank statements.The District Court of Ward County found Laura Cote in contempt of court for allowing and encouraging contact between the children and Alexander. However, the court denied Adam Cote’s motion for primary residential responsibility, deeming it an "extreme remedy." Instead, the court ordered that the children have no contact with Alexander and warned Laura Cote of significant consequences for non-compliance. The court also denied Adam Cote’s motion to compel discovery.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Adam Cote appealed the district court's orders denying his motion to modify residential responsibility and motion to compel discovery. Laura Cote cross-appealed the order finding her in contempt of court. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in part, agreeing that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Adam Cote’s motion to compel discovery or in finding Laura Cote in contempt of court. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court failed to make necessary findings regarding the best interest factors for the Supreme Court to provide a meaningful review of the district court’s denial of a modification of primary residential responsibility. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case with instructions to provide findings on the best interests of the children. View "Cote v. Cote" on Justia Law