Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between the plaintiff, K, and the defendant, R, with the intervenor, B, also involved due to a related New Jersey litigation. The key marital asset was the couple's home in Greenwich, Connecticut, valued at approximately $11 million, and several investment accounts. The defendant had previously pledged these assets as security in a New Jersey court case, which resulted in a $24.7 million judgment against him and his father. The New Jersey court ordered the forfeiture of the Greenwich property and imposed a constructive trust on the investment accounts due to the defendant's misconduct, including transferring $3 million to Slovakia.The Connecticut trial court found that the defendant had dissipated marital assets by pledging and forfeiting the Greenwich property and investment accounts. The court included these assets in the marital estate and ordered their sale, with proceeds to be divided among the plaintiff, the defendant, and the intervenor. The court also found the defendant's annual earning capacity to be $400,000 and ordered him to pay $749 per week in child support, based on his earning capacity rather than actual income. Additionally, the court allowed the plaintiff to relocate with the children to the Czech Republic and granted her motion for contempt against the defendant for failing to support the family during the pendency of the dissolution action.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in failing to afford full faith and credit to the New Jersey court orders, which had removed the Greenwich property and investment accounts from the marital estate. The Supreme Court also found that the trial court improperly calculated child support by not first determining the presumptive amount based on the defendant's actual income. The court's granting of the plaintiff's motion for contempt was reversed due to a lack of clear and unambiguous orders requiring the defendant to provide the support he allegedly withheld. The case was remanded for a new hearing on all financial issues, including the division of the marital assets, giving full faith and credit to the New Jersey court orders. View "K. S. v. R. S." on Justia Law

Amanda Mitchell filed for a civil protection order against Nicholas Ramlow in October 2020, alleging that he was stalking her by tracking her movements and placing a tracking device on her car. The magistrate court issued a temporary ex parte protection order and scheduled a hearing. Due to COVID-19 mask mandates, Ramlow was denied entry to the courthouse for refusing to wear a mask, leading to the hearing being rescheduled. At the rescheduled hearing, Ramlow was again absent, and the magistrate court issued a one-year protection order requiring him to attend a 52-week domestic violence course and review hearings.Ramlow filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then appealed to the district court. The protection order was extended but expired before the district court heard the appeal. The district court requested supplemental briefing on mootness and ultimately dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no applicable exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Ramlow appealed the district court's decision, arguing that his appeal still presented justiciable issues and fell within exceptions to the mootness doctrine.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the appeal was moot because the protection order had expired, and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. The court found that the issues were too fact-specific to be capable of repetition yet evading review, there were no collateral legal consequences, and the case did not raise issues of substantial public interest. The court also declined to vacate the expired protection order and denied attorney fees to both parties, awarding costs to Mitchell as the prevailing party. View "Mitchell v. Ramlow" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action. The Superior Court of Orange County granted Wolf's request and later compelled Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request for a vocational evaluation and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado opposed the request, arguing it was improper under the relevant statutes and that child support issues were being handled by the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court noted that section 3558 does not authorize vocational evaluations, section 4331 applies only to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, and section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf did not provide. The court also found that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Jason Bott and Suzanne Bott married in 2008 and have two minor children. In November 2022, Suzanne initiated a divorce action. They entered into a stipulated settlement agreement, and a judgment reflecting the terms was entered in June 2023. Jason was awarded all real estate, including the marital home and a rental property, and was required to pay Suzanne $425,000 in two installments. Shortly after the judgment, Jason asked Suzanne to alter the terms due to financial difficulties. They signed a handwritten document without their attorneys' knowledge, agreeing that Suzanne would retain the marital home and Jason would not have to make the cash payment. Suzanne later rescinded the agreement, moved out, and filed a motion for contempt against Jason for not making the first payment.The District Court of Cavalier County denied Jason's motion to amend the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), finding that the parties intended to cancel the agreement. The court ordered Jason to make the cash payments as originally stipulated. Jason appealed, arguing the agreement was a valid contract and Suzanne failed to prove its rescission.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Jason's motion. The court noted that Jason did not argue the original stipulation was the result of mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, nor did he argue it was unconscionable. The court found that Jason did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying relief from the judgment. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Jason failed to show the court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in denying his motion. View "Bott v. Bott" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Aaron W., appealed an order from the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA) that dismissed his appeal of a family court order. The family court had disqualified Aaron W.'s attorney from representing him in a divorce proceeding due to a conflict of interest, as the attorney had previously represented both parties in a related personal injury case. The family court's order included language indicating it was a final, appealable order.Initially, Aaron W. sought a writ of prohibition from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to prevent the family court from ruling on the disqualification motion, arguing that the family court lacked jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the writ, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, holding that family courts have the authority to disqualify attorneys in cases of conflict of interest.Aaron W. then appealed the family court's disqualification order to the ICA, which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the order was interlocutory and that it lacked jurisdiction over such appeals. Aaron W. subsequently appealed the ICA's dismissal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the ICA's dismissal, holding that the family court's disqualification order was not a final order because it did not terminate the litigation on the merits. The court explained that the ICA generally does not have appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, as specified by West Virginia Code § 51-11-4(d)(8). The court also noted that the family court's inclusion of finality language in its order did not transform the interlocutory order into a final, appealable order. Consequently, the ICA correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Aaron W. v. Evelyn W." on Justia Law

Bruce Johnson and Caroline Settino were engaged to be married, with Johnson giving Settino a $70,000 diamond engagement ring and two wedding bands. Johnson also paid for various expenses, including part of Settino's dental implant surgery. However, Johnson ended the engagement after discovering messages on Settino's phone that led him to believe she was unfaithful, although the trial judge found no evidence of an affair. Settino kept the engagement ring and wedding bands, and Johnson did not pay for the second part of Settino's dental procedure.Johnson sued to recover the engagement ring and wedding bands, and Settino counterclaimed for the cost of the dental procedure. The Superior Court judge ruled in favor of Settino, allowing her to keep the engagement ring and one wedding band, and awarded her damages for the dental procedure, including prejudgment interest from the date of Johnson's complaint. The judge found Johnson at fault for ending the engagement based on his mistaken belief of infidelity.The Appeals Court reversed the decision, ruling that Johnson was not at fault and should recover the engagement ring and wedding band. The court also found that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date of Settino's counterclaim, not Johnson's complaint. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the concept of fault should not determine the return of engagement rings. The court adopted a no-fault approach, requiring the return of the engagement ring and wedding bands to the donor if the marriage does not occur, regardless of fault. The court also affirmed the need to recalculate prejudgment interest from the date of Settino's counterclaim. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest. View "Johnson v. Settino" on Justia Law

The petitioner, G.M., appealed the Circuit Court of Wyoming County's decision to terminate his parental rights to his daughter, S.M. The case began in September 2021 when the Department of Human Services (DHS) received a referral alleging drug use by S.M.'s mother, T.M. Despite a safety plan, T.M. continued to test positive for drugs, and the family was often not home during DHS visits. In March 2022, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition after finding the home without electricity and a used needle on the counter. The petitioner waived his right to a preliminary hearing and later stipulated to the allegations without his attorney present, leading to his adjudication as an abusing and neglecting parent.The petitioner was granted an improvement period requiring him to undergo various treatments and services. However, he failed multiple drug tests and did not comply with the case plan, leading to the revocation of his improvement period in October 2022. Despite being given another chance to enter in-patient rehabilitation, the petitioner continued to test positive for drugs and was arrested for DUI in January 2023. At the final disposition hearing in March 2023, the court found no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be corrected and terminated the petitioner's parental rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court found that the petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel at the adjudicatory hearing and that the circuit court did not err in accepting his stipulation. The court also upheld the termination of parental rights, citing the petitioner's failure to comply with the improvement period and continued substance abuse, which indicated no reasonable likelihood of correcting the conditions of abuse and neglect. View "In re S.M." on Justia Law

Susan Diamond appealed an order denying her request to set aside a judgment in her marital dissolution proceeding. Susan argued that the judgment should be vacated due to duress and mental incapacity during the dissolution process. The Family Code does not define mental incapacity or duress, but the court found guidance in the Probate Code and Code of Civil Procedure, which address an individual's ability to make decisions regarding assets, medical options, and ongoing legal actions.In the lower court, Susan and Troy Diamond were married in 1992 and separated in 2008. Susan filed for dissolution in 2013. Susan's attorney withdrew due to her lack of communication, and she represented herself thereafter. Susan did not appear at the trial in May 2015, leading to an uncontested trial where the court awarded Troy custody of their daughter, child support, and a significant monetary judgment. Susan later sought to set aside the judgment, claiming she was unaware of the trial and was incapacitated due to health issues. Her initial request was denied based on the disentitlement doctrine and lack of evidence of mistake.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Susan did not meet her burden to show she was mentally incapacitated or under duress during the dissolution proceedings. The court found that Susan's actions during the relevant period, such as selling her home and handling financial transactions, indicated she understood the nature and consequences of her actions. The court also found no evidence that Troy used threats or pressure to induce Susan not to participate in the proceedings. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Susan did not establish grounds for relief under Family Code section 2122. View "Marriage of Diamond" on Justia Law

Maile Soon and Jeannine Kammann were married when Soon conceived twins through assisted reproduction. Kammann was actively involved in the prenatal care and visited the twins after birth. However, the relationship deteriorated, and Soon moved out and filed for divorce. Despite the separation, Kammann continued to support the twins. Soon later sought to dismiss Kammann’s parentage claim, arguing that Kammann lacked standing because she was not genetically related to the twins.The district court ruled in favor of Soon, concluding that Kammann’s admission of not being the genetic parent rebutted the presumption of parentage. Kammann appealed, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, holding that Kammann’s statements alone were insufficient to rebut the presumption of parentage.The New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that under the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), the presumption of parentage for a spouse when a child is born during a marriage can only be rebutted by admissible genetic testing results. The court emphasized that the best interest of the child is paramount and that genetic testing must be conducted with the consent of both parties or by court order. Since no genetic testing was conducted or admitted, Kammann’s presumption of parentage remained unrebutted. Therefore, Kammann was declared a legal parent of the twins. View "Soon v. Kammann" on Justia Law

Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. The child support obligation ended in 2001 when their daughter turned 18 and graduated high school, but wage garnishments continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously acted to terminate spousal support but did not do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois for failing to comply with court orders.On appeal, David argued that reimbursement of overpaid child support is mandatory under Family Code section 4007 and that laches should not apply. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands but disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007. The court noted that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of the child support obligation, and it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage garnishment order. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying David's request for reimbursement due to the significant delay and resulting prejudice to Lois. View "In re Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law