Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The California Constitution provided that litigating parties could stipulate that the matter may be heard and decided by a temporary judge. Without qualifying a commissioner to act and without such a stipulation, any ruling by or judgment of the commissioner is void. In this case, the parties appeared in propria persona. Marc Djulus (Marc) appealed the judgment of dissolution entered in December 2015. Among other contentions, Marc asserted the commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the cause because the record contained insufficient evidence to support the commissioner's finding in June 2014 that Marc consented to the commissioner hearing the cause as a result of his participation as a pro se litigant in the initial hearing of the parties in March 2014, when the commissioner made several rulings ostensibly not in Marc's favor. The commissioner made this finding at the outset of a June hearing after realizing the parties had not yet been provided with and signed a form ("Stipulation for Court Commissioner to Act as Temporary Judge for All Purposes" (D-204 form)). Although Kelli McClintock (Kelli) and her counsel then signed the D-204 form, Marc refused. Rather than taking the simple step of stopping the proceedings and sending the cause back for reassignment, the commissioner instead ruled the tantamount stipulation doctrine applied, despite the absence of any evidence that Marc knew, or should have known, at the outset of the March 2014 hearing that the judicial officer was a commissioner, and despite the evidence in the record, summarized ante, that this judicial officer was initially referred to as the "court" and as a "judge" but, unfortunately, not as a "commissioner." Because on this record there was insufficient evidence to support the application of the tantamount stipulation doctrine, the Court of Appeal agreed with Marc's contention. As such, the Court felt "constrained" to reverse not only the judgment of dissolution, but all orders made by the commissioner leading up to the judgment (including any restraining order(s)). View "In re Marriage of Djulus" on Justia Law

K.B. appealed a judgment terminating her parental rights to her two children, Jc.L. and Ja.L. K.B. contended the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because the court failed to comply with "the inquiry/notice requirements" of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After review of the trial court record, the Court of appeals concluded the trial court properly determined that the Agency did not violate ICWA's inquiry and notice provisions. View "In re J.L." on Justia Law

R.C. appealed the juvenile court's denial of his petition to adjust his parental status from alleged to presumed father. The juvenile court had also terminated R.C.'s parental rights. The court concluded that, although R.C.'s right to proper notice may have been violated because he did not receive a form informing him of his right to seek presumed father status, any error was harmless. In this case, R.C. received notice of each hearing, as well as copies of the petition and various reports, throughout the dependency hearing; he waited more than 20 months to seek an adjustment of his parental status, well past the 18-month maximum period for reunification efforts; he appeared at the last moment before his rights were to be terminated; and the child's permanent plan was in place and schedule for approval. The court explained that the child's best interest lay in remaining in the only home she had ever known with the only parent she had ever known and her half-brother. Because there was no basis to find the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the petition, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Isabella M." on Justia Law