Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Notwithstanding the parties’ stipulated retroactivity provision, the California Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred in awarding Russell Stover a child care credit for any period before May 10, 2011, when he filed his motion to modify support, because any such credits effectively modified the support award and incurred arrearages retroactively in contravention of the Family Code statutes governing modification of support orders. Furthermore, the Court concluded that while Eileen Bruntz failed to timely challenge an April 2007 order containing the stipulated retroactivity provision, public policy considerations precluded the Court of Appeal from judicially estopping her from challenging the order now. Bruntz and respondent Stover shared two children and years of acrimony-fueled court contests following the demise of their romantic relationship. Bruntz challenged several orders related to Stover’s alleged failure over the ensuing years to fully pay $1,000 in monthly child support under an April 2007 support order, which contained a contested stipulated retroactivity provision. View "Stover v. Bruntz" on Justia Law

As part of their 2010 marital settlement agreement, respondent Misti Janes (Wife) was awarded $113,392 from the retirement account of appellant Tim Janes (Husband). In 2014, the money was still in the retirement account. Wife sought the amount of the award, plus and gains or losses resulting from that money sitting in the account. The family court granted Wife’s request for a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) reflecting Wife was entitled to $113,392 and the resulting gains or losses dating back to the date of separation. Husband appealed, arguing: (1) the family court lacked jurisdiction to modify the 2010 judgment of dissolution by awarding the gains and losses to Wife; and (2) the family court erred by dating the gains and losses back to the date of separation, rather than the date of the dissolution judgment. Finding that Husband failed to explain why he was entitled to gains earned on the$113,392, the Court of Appeal was unpersuaded by Husband's interpretation of the agreement. The trial court did not modify the agreement by its award, nor did it err by dating the gains or losses earned on the award back to the state of the 2010 judgment. View "Marriage of Janes" on Justia Law

In 2010, Stupp filed a petition for the dissolution of his marriage to Schilders. Since then, the parties have been involved in contentious legal proceedings. A stipulated judgment of dissolution was entered in 2014, but custody of the parties’ child, who was just a few months old when the original petition was filed, remains subject to temporary orders. Schilders appealed several family court orders: giving Stupp temporary sole legal custody of the child, requiring that only the parents transport the child to his therapy appointments, continuing a custody trial, requiring Schilders to undergo a vocational evaluation, and reserving jurisdiction over the allocation of the cost of the evaluation. The court of appeal concluded that the family court abused its discretion in ordering the vocational evaluation when there was no support motion pending, and dismissed the appeal as to the remaining orders because they are not appealable. View "Marriage of Stupp and Schilders" on Justia Law

As part of marital dissolution proceedings, appellant Valerie Grissom sought a domestic violence restraining order against her husband, respondent Louis Grissom. The trial court denied the request. On appeal, Valerie contended the court erred by concluding that because her injuries were suffered during and as a result of physical confrontations she instigated, they did not constitute " 'abuse' " within the meaning of Family Code section 6203. The Court of Appeal found that although section 6203 defined abuse to include an intentionally or recklessly caused bodily injury to the complainant, a finding of abuse was not mandated merely because the complainant shows he or she suffered an injury caused by the other party. The Court concluded the trial court properly recognized that a person who responded reasonably to an aggressor in this way did not commit abuse within the meaning of section 6203. View "Marriage of Grissom" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders because, even assuming Daughter was at substantial risk of harm, the juvenile court erred in asserting dependency over her. Substantial evidence does not support a finding that Father was somehow unfit to parent or neglectful with respect to caring for Daughter; despite Father's best efforts, Daughter's own behavior and mental health challenges resulted in her risk of harm; and Daughter does not fall within any of the categories of children the dependency system seeks to protect. View "In re Priscilla A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her three siblings, on behalf of her 88-year-old mother. Plaintiff claimed that her siblings' actions individually and while serving as trustees of her mother's revocable living trust constituted financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The siblings demurred. The mother, separately represented by counsel, intervened and joined the demurrer to the amended complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the elder abuse action on standing grounds. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the elder abuse action because she has not be personally aggrieved by her siblings' actions. The court rejected plaintiff's claims to the contrary and affirmed the judgment. View "Tepper v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-parents Gabrielle A. and Nicholas G., and John A. and Gregory A. (the children) appealed a judgment following the trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment by the County of Orange (the County) and several social workers. Plaintiffs’ claims related to the detention of the children for six months. Gabrielle went into early labor, and gave birth at Hoag Hospital to Gregory at 31 weeks. Three days later, Gabrielle was released, and she returned to her mother Barbara’s home. Gregory remained in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU). A few days later, Hoag employees filed a referral for an immediate response from the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA). Hoag staff reported to Villa that Gabrielle had appeared at Hoag with John and Barbara, wearing a trench coat with nothing on underneath, displaying “irrational and aggressive behavior,” including removing the trench coat and walking around unclothed. She had previously asked for Gregory to be placed back inside of her, and she asked a nurse to cut her ankles for blood letting. According to staff, she attempted to wheel Gregory’s isolette out of the NICU and became violent with them. Hospital employees informed Villa that Gabrielle had expressed thoughts of hurting her children and demonstrated paranoia. Gabrielle disputed this version of events, but did not dispute that she was placed on a hospital hold pending evaluation. The trial court found that exigent circumstances existed to detain the children without a warrant at Hoag, and that Nicholas’s arrival at Hoag after the children were detained did not alter matters; there was no evidence to show conduct by the social workers to establish a claim for deliberate indifference, or behavior that shocks the conscience; the social workers were entitled to immunity because there was no evidence of material false statements; numerous claims by the plaintiffs were barred by the parents’ pleas of no contest in dependency court. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the parents’ knowing and voluntary pleas of no contest to the jurisdictional allegations during dependency proceedings defeated their claims, and the social workers were entitled to immunity. “[E]ven if we were to disregard the no contest pleas and the relevant immunity doctrines, defendants correctly argue they met their burden to establish they were entitled to summary judgment on each cause of action, and plaintiffs failed to raise triable issues of material fact. Accordingly, we affirm.” View "Gabrielle A. v. Co. of Orange" on Justia Law

The juvenile court terminated defendants-appellants, J.K.’s (Mother) and J.S.’s (Father; collectively Parents), parental rights as to J.S. (born in June 2014). On appeal, Mother argued: (1) the appeal must be construed to include the order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 petition; (2) court erred by denying her an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition; (3) the court violated her due process rights by preventing her from testifying regarding Minor’s relationship with his sibling; and (4) the court erred by finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights inapplicable. Father joined Mother’s arguments insofar as a resolution in her favor would benefit him. The Court of Appeal found the juvenile court’s prohibition against further questioning regarding Minor’s bond with his sibling eliminated any evidentiary basis for Mother to argue the sibling relationship exception applied. Indeed, the Court found no other evidence in the record to suggest Mother had custody of any of her other children and that they had any relationship with Minor. In fact, the evidence in the record suggests the contrary, that Mother no longer had custody of any of her other children. Thus, if Mother testified that she had regained custody of one of her children this would have placed the sibling relationship exception at issue because Mother had also regained custody of Minor for nearly a year during the juvenile court proceedings. The error cannot be deemed harmless because we cannot say how long Minor and his sibling may have lived with one another, what the degree of their bond might have been, and what credibility the juvenile court would have given Mother’s testimony on the issue. Therefore, the matter must be reversed and remanded for a hearing on the degree, if any, of any relationship between Minor and his siblings. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

Deanna Huntley challenged the trial court's denial of her motion to divide unadjudicated community property. Deanna filed her motion more than two years after entry of a default judgment that dissolved her marriage to Frank Huntley. The trial court denied the motion on grounds Deanna had not first moved to set aside the default judgment. On appeal, Deanna argued: (1) Family Code section 2556 conferred the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate omitted community property without having to first move to set aside the judgment; (2) the dissolution judgment's silence as to the division of any property meant all of the community property remained to be divided; and (3) the trial court's error should have been reversed for proper division of the parties' community property. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded section 2556 provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to divide omitted or unadjudicated community property. The default judgment's silence as to any division of property required reversal and the Court remanded for further proceedings under Family Code sections 2550 and 2556. View "In re Marriage of Huntley" on Justia Law

The California Constitution provided that litigating parties could stipulate that the matter may be heard and decided by a temporary judge. Without qualifying a commissioner to act and without such a stipulation, any ruling by or judgment of the commissioner is void. In this case, the parties appeared in propria persona. Marc Djulus (Marc) appealed the judgment of dissolution entered in December 2015. Among other contentions, Marc asserted the commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the cause because the record contained insufficient evidence to support the commissioner's finding in June 2014 that Marc consented to the commissioner hearing the cause as a result of his participation as a pro se litigant in the initial hearing of the parties in March 2014, when the commissioner made several rulings ostensibly not in Marc's favor. The commissioner made this finding at the outset of a June hearing after realizing the parties had not yet been provided with and signed a form ("Stipulation for Court Commissioner to Act as Temporary Judge for All Purposes" (D-204 form)). Although Kelli McClintock (Kelli) and her counsel then signed the D-204 form, Marc refused. Rather than taking the simple step of stopping the proceedings and sending the cause back for reassignment, the commissioner instead ruled the tantamount stipulation doctrine applied, despite the absence of any evidence that Marc knew, or should have known, at the outset of the March 2014 hearing that the judicial officer was a commissioner, and despite the evidence in the record, summarized ante, that this judicial officer was initially referred to as the "court" and as a "judge" but, unfortunately, not as a "commissioner." Because on this record there was insufficient evidence to support the application of the tantamount stipulation doctrine, the Court of Appeal agreed with Marc's contention. As such, the Court felt "constrained" to reverse not only the judgment of dissolution, but all orders made by the commissioner leading up to the judgment (including any restraining order(s)). View "In re Marriage of Djulus" on Justia Law