Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A child who seeks a declaration of paternity after her putative father is deceased presents a justiciable controversy when the child requests no financial remuneration. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's paternity lawsuit, holding that plaintiff had standing to bring her suit. The court held that Family Code section 7630 contains no conditional requirement that the child express a pecuniary interest as a condition of the paternity suit. Nor does it contain an age limitation. The court reasoned that plaintiff's interest in identifying her father was independent of a claim for financial remuneration, afforded her standing, and demonstrated a justiciable controversy. View "Dent v. Wolf" on Justia Law

A child who seeks a declaration of paternity after her putative father is deceased presents a justiciable controversy when the child requests no financial remuneration. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's paternity lawsuit, holding that plaintiff had standing to bring her suit. The court held that Family Code section 7630 contains no conditional requirement that the child express a pecuniary interest as a condition of the paternity suit. Nor does it contain an age limitation. The court reasoned that plaintiff's interest in identifying her father was independent of a claim for financial remuneration, afforded her standing, and demonstrated a justiciable controversy. View "Dent v. Wolf" on Justia Law

The juvenile court possesses the statutory authority to terminate its jurisdiction at disposition in an appropriate case upon releasing the dependent child to a custodial parent. In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's declaration that Destiny was a dependent child of the court; decision to release Destiny to the custody of her mother, limiting father to monitored visitation with the child; and termination of its jurisdiction. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating its jurisdiction at the disposition hearing. Having dismissed the allegations concerning domestic abuse on the ground the restraining order obtained by mother eliminated any risk of harm, the juvenile court focused on the risks father's alcohol abuse posed for Destiny in connection with father's visitation rights and whether mother's insight into the effects of such alcohol abuse were too recent to adequately protect Destiny from harm. The juvenile court modified the superior court's visitation order to require monitored visitation for father and prohibited mother from serving as the monitor, thereby eliminating those risks and concluded that further supervision was unnecessary. View "In re Destiny D." on Justia Law

For over 20 years, Orlando was employed by Friendship House Association of American Indians, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program providing treatment services to Native Americans. The program’s CEO was also Orlando’s mother-in-law. While Orlando and his wife were experiencing marital difficulties, his wife informed the CEO that Orlando had a gun and was angry at Friendship House employees. The CEO first placed Orlando on leave; after his wife obtained a restraining order, the CEO terminated his employment. Orlando then filed suit under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code, 12940, for wrongful termination, claiming discrimination on the basis of his marital status and that Friendship House had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation before discharging him. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Orlando failed to establish a prima facie case of marital status discrimination and failed to demonstrate his employer had a duty to investigate. Orlando was an at-will employee and his claim was not predicated on alleged animus toward the married state, itself. View "Nakai v. Friendship House Association of American Indians, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a dependency petition filed on behalf of two minors under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. In this case, the juvenile court concluded that the evidence presented in support of the dependency petition was insufficient to establish that the minors were at substantial risk of harm under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The minors have argued that the evidence showed that Mother failed to protect and her boyfriend's sexual abuse of one of the minors' siblings placed them at substantial risk of harm, but the minors have not argued or demonstrated that the evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached, and of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding. View "In re Luis H." on Justia Law

Noemi Mendoza appealed after a trial court denied her request to make a permanent spousal support order retroactive to the filing date of her petition for marriage dissolution. The trial court based its denial on Mendoza’s failure to request temporary spousal support. The Court of Appeal agreed such failure was fatal to Mendoza’s retroactivity request. The Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment. View "In re Marriage of Mendoza & Cuellar" on Justia Law

Paternal great-grandparents Ed and Yvonne H. appealed an order denying their request for joinder and petition to seek visitation with their great-grandchildren. Ed and Yvonne's argued the court erred in finding they lacked standing to join as parties seeking visitation. Specifically, they argued the court erred by determining that Family Code sections 3103 and 3104, which allow a court to grant visitation rights to grandparents if certain conditions are met, did not permit great-grandparent visitation. Alternatively, Ed and Yvonne contend the court erred by not considering that their grandson, the father of the great-grandchildren, consented to and joined in their request for visitation, and by not considering whether they had standing as psychological or de facto parents. The Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature did not intend section 3104 of the grandparent visitation statutes to authorize great-grandparents to petition for visitation, and thus the court did not err by concluding Ed and Yvonne lacked legal standing to seek visitation. View "Ed H. v. Ashley C." on Justia Law

In 1990, appellant Matthew Albert Parker and respondent Mary Katherine Parker divorced. Mary and Matthew shared two children. In 2014, Matthew sought an order (1) requiring respondent San Bernardino County Department of Child Support Services (the Department) to prepare an accounting of the child support arrears owed by Matthew; and (2) discharging the child support arrears for the period in which the children resided with Matthew (Trainotti credits). The family court denied Matthew’s requested order. Matthew appealed, arguing: (1) res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar an award of Trainotti credits; and (2) the family court erred by not applying the doctrine of laches to discharge the arrears owed to the Department. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Marriage of Parker" on Justia Law

D.H. was removed from, and failed to reunify with, his paternal grandparents, who had been caring for him under a probate guardianship. The entire case, from the petition, to removal, to termination of services, focused on the grandparents, not the child’s father. In this dependency appeal, D.H., Sr. (father), the presumed father of D.H., argues on appeal of that decision, the juvenile court violated due process by terminating his parental rights without making an unfitness or detriment finding against him by clear and convincing evidence at any point in the proceedings. Respondent Riverside Department of Social Services (DPSS) urged the Court of Appeal to adopt, in the dependency context, the best interest of the child standard for terminating parental rights under Probate Code section 1516.5. The Court declined: Probate Code section 1516.5 applied when a legal guardian seeks to have the child declared free from the custody and control of one or both parents and was designed to “mak[e] it easier for children in probate guardianships to be adopted by their guardians.” That provision did not apply in a case like this, where the only reason the court was considering terminating parental rights was because the state brought a successful dependency action against the guardians. “Father’s entitlement to the constitutional safeguards articulated in Gladys L. does not vanish simply because D.H. was under a legal guardianship at the outset of the dependency.” View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

When a dependency court declares children dependent and removes them from a parent's custody, it is an abuse of discretion to order a reunification plan with which the parent indisputably cannot comply due to a language barrier. Determining that this case was not moot, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order effective reunification services. The court reversed the portion of the disposition order requiring father to participate in a full alcohol treatment program with aftercare, a 12-step program with court card and sponsor, and parenting. The court remanded to the dependency court to reconsider its order terminating jurisdiction and for further proceedings. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law