Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Wife appealed the trial court's judgment entered in a marriage dissolution proceeding. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeals held that wife has established the child support award in the June 2016 judgment was based on the erroneous exclusion of husband's income tax refunds from his net income available for child support; the exclusion of husband's voluntary contributions to a 401(k) retirement savings plan from his net income available for child support was error, unless on remand the trial court provides findings that justify the exclusion of all or part of those contributions from husband's income; the trial court erred in declining to award wife additional attorney fees at the conclusion of the proceeding; a trial court must make explicit findings on the issues listed in subdivision (a)(2) of Family Code section 2030; and the record clearly demonstrated a disparity in access and ability to pay and thus a further award of attorney fees and costs was mandatory. View "Marriage of Morton" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant, C.T. (Mother), appealed the dependency court’s dispositional judgment granting Mother reunification services in her absence, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5. Mother claimed that her whereabouts were unknown on the date of the dispositional hearing for purposes of subdivision (b)(1) of section 361.5, thus entitling her to set a six-month hearing rather than a selection and implementation hearing. If the court denied reunification services under section 361.5(b)(1) and if the whereabouts of the parent become known within the first six months, the court may then order reunification services. As a result, a parent could potentially gain six more months to reunify with the child up to the maximum 12-month period of reunification services from the date of entry into the dependency system. Relevant here, 361.5(b)(1) was found not applicable and reunification services were ordered in Mother's absence. Mother contended the dependency court abused its discretion by commencing reunification services rather than withholding services. The Court of Appeal reduced Mother's argument to one in which she sought to use this bypass provision (361.5 (b)(1)) as a sword by arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by granting her reunification services instead of denying them under section 361.5 (b)(1). Plaintiff-respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), argued Mother’s contention lacked merit. Finding that the dependency court did not misconstrue 361.5(b)(1) or act contrary to its intent, the Court of Appeal affirmed its judgment. View "In re Molly T." on Justia Law

Farima Kushesh-Kaviani (Wife) and Wishtasb Kushesh (Husband) were married in January 2010. The marriage did not last. Their only child was born in April 2011, and the couple separated within two weeks of his birth. Husband filed for dissolution in late August 2011. During the marriage the couple lived in Husband’s separate property condominium in Laguna Niguel; however, the property at issue in this appeal was one called “unit 13k” three doors down from the Laguna Niguel condo. It was acquired about four months into the marriage. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review centered on whether an intefspousal transfer grant deed (ITGD) met the requirements for a transmutation of the character of marital property under Family Code section 852. The trial court determined the ITGD in this case did not contain the requisite language to effectuate a transmutation. The Court of Appeal disagreed, however: the standard ITGD expresses an intent to transfer a property interest from one spouse to another. The document at issue here met all of the necessary features of an intefspousal transfer. The Court therefore reversed the trial court, and remanded this matter for further proceedings as to whether the beneficially-interested spouse here dispelled any presumption of undue influence that might have arisen giving rise to this ITGD. View "In re Marriage of Kushesh & Kushesh-Kaviani" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant, S.A. (Mother), appealed the termination of her parental rights to N.G., a boy born in 2005. She argued the juvenile court erroneously failed to ensure that plaintiff-respondent, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), fully investigated N.G.’s paternal lineal ancestry and gave adequate notices of the proceedings to all federally recognized Cherokee tribes and to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed Mother’s claim had merit and conditionally reversed the judgment. The Court also concluded that DPSS had to be ordered to further investigate N.G.’s paternal lineal ancestry, and include any newly discovered information concerning N.G.’s paternal lineal ancestry in the ICWA notices to all federally recognized Cherokee tribes, the BIA, and all previously noticed tribes. DPSS was also ordered to inquire whether N.G. may have maternal lineal ancestry and, if so, send additional ICWA notices, as appropriate. View "In re N.G." on Justia Law

Father appealed from domestic violence restraining orders that were granted under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by not making the factual findings required under Family code section 6305, but that substantial evidence supported a finding that father was a primary aggressor. In this case, there was no evidence to support a finding that mother acted as a primary aggressor and there was evidence of a long history of father perpetrating physical violence against mother. View "Melissa G. v. Raymond M." on Justia Law

Appellant, the noncustodial biological father of the minor K.L., appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional judgment, removing the minor from his mother and placing him with his presumed father, L.V. In August 2014, the Siskiyou County Health and Human Services Agency filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the two-year-old minor and his older half sibling, after mother was arrested for child cruelty and possession of a controlled substance. Shortly after the minor was born, L.V. took the minor into his home where he lived for several months. Initially, L.V. believed he was quite probably the minor’s father and treated him as such. A DNA test, requested by mother, confirmed L.V. was not the minor’s biological father. Nonetheless, L.V. continued to treat the minor as his own. The juvenile court found L.V. to be the minor’s presumed father. The Agency thereafter placed the minor and his half sibling with L.V. Shortly after these proceedings commenced, paternity test results revealed appellant to be the minor’s biological father. Appellant had never met the minor and had only recently learned of the minor’s existence. Appellant was an enrolled member of the federally recognized Karuk Indian Tribe . The Karuk Indian Tribe intervened on appeal, contending the juvenile court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 ("ICWA") in entering its dispositional judgment. The Court of Appeal found the provisions of ICWA did not apply in this case and affirmed the juvenile court's judgment. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

In 2017, the Public Guardian sought to establish a conservatorship of the person for Minor, age 16, who was admitted to John Muir Behavioral Health Center. Minor had been placed in the care of Alameda County’s Child Protective Services (CPS) over a year earlier and suffered multiple involuntary hospitalizations. She presented at John Muir “with suicidal ideation and poor impulse control.” The court appointed the Public Guardian as Minor’s temporary conservator. Trial testimony indicated that Minor suffered from PTSD, heard voices telling her she had no reason to live, had threatened to smother her roommate, engaged in “superficial self-injury,” and missed a lot of school. The court of appeal affirmed the order appointing the Public Guardian as the conservator of her person under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welf. & Inst. Code, 5000, rejecting arguments that the conservatorship investigator failed to conduct an investigation of all available alternatives to conservatorship; that the Public Guardian failed to prove she was gravely disabled; and that there was insufficient evidence to support her placement. There was sufficient evidence to support a finding of “grave disability” and that the placement was not more restrictive than necessary. View "Conservatorship of M.B." on Justia Law

Sally H. (Mother) appealed a judgment terminating her parental rights to her child, E.H. Mother's sole claim on appeal was that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because the court failed to ensure that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) fully complied with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and related law. Among other alleged errors, Mother contended the Agency failed to fulfill its duty to inquire of E.H.'s maternal great-grandmother, Sally Y.H., in order to obtain identifying information pertaining to Sally Y.H.'s father, and failed to provide notice of such information to an Indian tribe named the Tohono O'odham Nation. Mother further contended the failure to provide notice of Sally Y.H.'s father's identifying information to the Tohono O'odham Nation was prejudicial because he was likely the source of E.H.'s possible American Indian heritage. The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother that, considering Sally Y.H.'s statement to the Agency that her paternal family had Tohono O'odham Nation heritage, the Agency had a duty to attempt to obtain Sally Y.H.'s father's identifying information and to provide notice of any such information obtained to the Tohono O'odham Nation. If Bruno Y. was Sally Y.H.'s father, and E.H.'s great-great-grandfather, the Agency failed to properly describe his ancestral relationship to E.H. on the notice provided to the Tohono O'odham Nation. Finally, given that Sally Y.H. told the Agency that her paternal family had heritage from the Tohono O'odham Nation, the Court could not conclude the Agency's errors were harmless. Accordingly, the trial court judgment was reversed for the limited purpose of having the Agency provide the Tohono O'odham Nation with proper notice of the proceedings in this case. View "In re E.H." on Justia Law

D.Y. appealed the juvenile court's termination of dependency jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal relied on its independent review and rejected D.Y.'s contention that Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3(a) and In re Joshua S., (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1341, obligated the juvenile court to retain dependency jurisdiction in this case. The court held, however, that in the context of this long-running case, in which maintenance of the status quo had been the norm for 16 years and remained the recommendation of DCFS, it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to abruptly terminate jurisdiction without alerting all of the interested parties to that possibility. Accordingly, the court reversed the juvenile court's judgment. View "In re D.Y." on Justia Law

Nineteen-year-old M.W. was a nonminor dependent of the court until it terminated dependency jurisdiction over him in August 2017. One of the acceptable living arrangements for nonminor dependents was a “‘[s]upervised independent living placement’” (SILP). The court terminated dependency jurisdiction over M.W. because he had moved in with a former foster mother, and the court believed a former caregiver’s home could not qualify as a SILP. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred: "Nothing in the law disqualifies a former caregiver’s home as a SILP. Even the document on which plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), relied for its argument—a form developed by the California Department of Social Services—does not disqualify a former caregiver’s home." The Court determined the error was prejudicial to M.W. and therefore reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider whether to retain or terminate dependency jurisdiction. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law