Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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The case involves a minor, Andrew M., who tested positive for methadone at birth and was placed in foster care. His biological parents, S.M. and A.M., failed to reunify with him. Despite this, the juvenile court decided not to terminate the parents' parental rights, citing the parental-benefit exception, which applies if a parent shows that they maintained regular visitation with the child, the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents, and terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even considering the benefit of a new, adoptive home.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously ordered Andrew to be removed from parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services. However, the parents failed to reunify with Andrew and their services were terminated. The court then scheduled a permanency planning hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. Andrew's appointed appellate counsel argued that the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parents' parental rights was an abuse of discretion. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), although a respondent in this appeal, supported Andrew's counsel's position. The court agreed with Andrew's counsel and the SSA, concluding that the circumstances did not support the application of the parental-benefit exception. The court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the matter with instructions. View "In re Andrew M." on Justia Law

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In July 2023, the San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that three children were at risk due to the actions of their mother, M.S., and their alleged father, P.F. The Agency claimed that the children were at risk of suffering serious physical or emotional harm due to P.F.'s domestic violence towards M.S. and his substance abuse issues. The Agency also alleged that M.S. had allowed P.F. to stay in her home despite a restraining order against him. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in part, released the children to M.S., and ordered the family to participate in therapy. M.S. appealed this decision.The lower courts had previously reviewed this case and made several findings. The juvenile court found that the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical and/or emotional harm due to the domestic violence perpetrated by P.F. towards M.S. The court also found that P.F. had substance abuse issues which impeded his ability to care for the children. The court denied M.S.'s request to dismiss the case, declared the children dependents of the court, and ordered M.S. and the children to participate in family therapy.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court held that an alleged father constitutes a “parent” within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court also found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s declaration of dependency and that the court did not abuse its discretion by not granting M.S.'s request to dismiss the case and instead ordering family therapy. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law

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The case involves a woman who sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former intimate partner, alleging he sexually assaulted her after their relationship had ended. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) which barred the partner from possessing firearms and from attending the same church as the woman. At a later DVRO hearing, the trial court issued a DVRO, finding the man had sexually assaulted the petitioner and had committed subsequent acts of abuse by attending the same church as the petitioner and possessing a firearm, both in violation of the TRO.The man appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his procedural due process rights by conducting a direct examination of the petitioner, allowing her to testify about an incident of sexual assault not contained in the petition, admonishing his counsel about his method of questioning his client, and by depriving him of the opportunity to respond to a law enforcement firearms report that showed he owned a firearm.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court's procedures were adequate and did not violate the man's procedural due process rights. The court noted that the trial court had given the man several opportunities to respond to the report that he was the registered owner of a firearm, and he refused to respond fully. The court also found that the trial court acted appropriately in conducting questioning, restricting itself to eliciting material facts with general questions and clarifying confusing and incomplete testimony. The court affirmed the protective order. View "Bailey v. Murray" on Justia Law

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The case involves Ling Mueller and Paul Mueller, a married couple who separated in 2017. During their marriage, they cultivated cannabis and buried the proceeds on their property. They initially attempted to use a collaborative law process to dissolve their marriage. They signed an agreement that outlined the collaborative process, including a confidentiality clause. However, the agreement also explicitly stated that it did not create any legally enforceable rights or obligations. During the second collaborative session, Ling became angry and left the meeting abruptly when asked about investments she had made using the proceeds from the couple's marijuana operation. She subsequently initiated divorce proceedings in family court.In the family court, Paul subpoenaed both parties' collaborative attorneys to testify about statements Ling made during the second collaborative session. Ling argued that the confidentiality clause in the agreement shielded her statements from disclosure. However, the court found the agreement, including the confidentiality clause, to be unenforceable. It also found that Ling had waived the confidentiality provision. As a result, it allowed the parties' collaborative attorneys to testify about the second collaborative session. The court found Ling to be not credible and ordered her to make a $161,077 equalizing payment.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five, the sole issue on appeal was the admissibility of testimony about the second collaborative session. This depended on whether the confidentiality clause was enforceable despite the agreement's multiple statements that it created no enforceable rights or obligations. The court found that the agreement unequivocally stated that it did not give either party enforceable legal rights. Therefore, the court affirmed the family court's decision that the confidentiality clause was unenforceable. View "Mueller v. Mueller" on Justia Law

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The case involves an appellant, G.G., who sought renewal of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former partner, G.S. The original DVRO was issued based on stalking. The appellant and respondent were former romantic partners and parents of two young children. The appellant testified that the respondent had repeatedly attempted to control her during their relationship, including planting a listening device in their home, taking her phone, and following her to work. After the relationship ended, the respondent continued to stalk the appellant, appearing at her home uninvited at least 70 times. The appellant filed a request for a DVRO, which was granted for a two-year period.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially issued the DVRO. After the DVRO was issued, the appellant's unwanted contact with the respondent was reduced, but not entirely eliminated. The appellant filed a request to renew the DVRO two weeks before its expiration, asking that the order be made permanent. The trial court found no evidence that the respondent had intentionally violated the DVRO and concluded that the appellant's fear, while genuine, was not reasonable. The request to renew the DVRO was denied.The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four. The court found that the trial court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying the renewal of the DVRO. The court held that a DVRO can be renewed based on the original facts, regardless of whether they involved physical or non-physical abuse, and renewal is not conditioned on the presence or absence of "ongoing" events. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing, directing the trial court to reconsider the request for renewal consistent with the legal framework outlined in the decision. View "G.G. v. G.S." on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between Laleh Taghvaei Mohammadijoo and Ramin Dadashian, who were married in Iran and later settled in California. The couple separated after 12 years of marriage. The main contention revolves around two missing assets: approximately $150,000 in community funds that Mohammadijoo secured through a home equity line of credit (HELOC) and transferred to Iran for her brother to manage, and approximately $170,000 of separate property proceeds that Dadashian inherited from his father’s real estate investments in Iran. Dadashian argued that Mohammadijoo had exclusive management and control over these assets post-separation, and thus, the burden of proof should be shifted to her to account for these missing assets.The trial court declined to shift the burden of proof to Mohammadijoo. It found that there was no credible evidence as to what happened to the funds. The court also sanctioned Mohammadijoo for violating her statutory disclosure obligations but did not charge her with the value of the missing assets.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two reversed the judgment. The court held that the burden-shifting framework applies when one spouse solely controls and manages a relationship with a third party who directly oversees the management and investment of community funds post-separation. In such a case, the managing spouse must account for the missing assets. The court also extended this burden-shifting framework to missing separate property. Therefore, the trial court erred in declining to shift the burden of proof to Mohammadijoo regarding the missing assets. The case was remanded for a retrial of the community property issues. View "Marriage of Dadashian" on Justia Law

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This case involves a marital dissolution proceeding between Monique Covington Moore and Charles Moore. During the discovery process, Covington served deposition subpoenas for the production of business records on nonparties Rocket Lawyer, Inc. and Acendi Interactive Company, LLC. Both companies objected and refused to comply with most of the subpoenas’ demands. Covington then filed a motion to compel their compliance. The trial court granted the motion in substantial part and ordered each company to pay Covington $25,000 in monetary sanctions. The companies appealed, raising several claims of error regarding the trial court’s rulings.The trial court had found that Rocket Lawyer and Acendi did not act with the requisite substantial justification in resisting the subpoenas. The court ordered them to comply with most of the document demands, subject to a protective order, and imposed monetary sanctions. The companies appealed, arguing that Covington’s motion was untimely, that her attempts to meet and confer were insufficient, and that the monetary sanctions were unreasonable, among other issues.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court’s rulings in most respects. However, it agreed with the companies that the fees and costs Covington incurred in mediation as meet and confer attempts after her discovery motions were already filed were not compensable as discovery sanctions. The court reversed the orders in part and remanded for redetermination of the sanctions awards. View "In re Marriage of Moore" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the death of Skyler A. Womack (Skyler) at Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., a skilled nursing facility. Skyler's parents, Jonie A. Holland (Holland) and Wayne D. Womack (Wayne), filed a lawsuit against Silverscreen, alleging dependent adult abuse and negligence on behalf of Skyler, as well as their own claim for wrongful death. Silverscreen moved to compel arbitration of the entire complaint based on an arbitration agreement between Skyler and Silverscreen.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Silverscreen’s motion to compel arbitration for the survivor claims but denied the motion for the wrongful death cause of action. The court reasoned that the parents did not have an enforceable arbitration agreement with Silverscreen. The court's decision was heavily influenced by the case Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc.Silverscreen appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District. The appellant argued that, according to Ruiz v. Podolsky, the parents are bound by the arbitration agreement signed by Skyler, and therefore, the parents’ wrongful death claim should be subject to arbitration. The appellate court agreed with Silverscreen, stating that Ruiz governs this matter. Consequently, under Ruiz and Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, the parents’ wrongful death claim must go to arbitration along with Skyler’s survivor claims. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions. View "Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Robert Bassi and Susan Bassi. After their divorce, Susan sent a series of e-mails to Robert, which he claimed were harassing and disturbed his peace. These e-mails were related to Susan's intent to file a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against Robert and others. In response, Robert filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Susan. Susan then filed an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion, arguing that her e-mails were protected free speech and litigation correspondence. The trial court denied Susan's anti-SLAPP motion, finding that several of the e-mails were not privileged or protected speech, and that Robert had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his DVRO petition.The trial court's decision was based on the conclusion that several of Susan's e-mails were not protected activity as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also found that even if Susan did meet her burden at the first step, the motion would fail because Robert had met his burden of demonstrating a probability of success on the merits of his DVRO petition. The court noted that it had previously found, in granting the requested temporary personal conduct and stay-away order, that Robert’s petition was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for a permanent DVRO under the applicable Family Code provisions.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court found that while some of Susan's e-mails were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, others were not. The court also found that Robert had made a prima facie showing of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable result on his DVRO petition if the facts he alleges are substantiated. Therefore, Robert's claim under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act had at least the requisite minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. View "Bassi v. Bassi" on Justia Law

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A mother, Daisy M., appealed the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, D.M., arguing that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to conduct an adequate investigation under state law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). The mother claimed that DPSS did not fulfill its duty of initial inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), which requires an investigation into the child's potential Indian heritage.The Superior Court of Riverside County had previously found that DPSS had conducted a sufficient ICWA inquiry and that ICWA did not apply. The court ordered the mother to file a Parental Notification of Indian Status form, which she did, denying any Indian ancestry. The court subsequently terminated the mother's parental rights after she was arrested for battery and driving under the influence, and the child was taken into protective custody.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District affirmed the lower court's decision. The court agreed with previous rulings that the expanded duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2(b) applies only if the child was placed into temporary custody without a warrant. As D.M. was taken into custody pursuant to a protective custody warrant, the expanded duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2(b) was not triggered. Therefore, the mother's argument failed. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law