Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The wife in a married couple (defendants C.P. and J.P., wife and husband) conceived a child with a coworker (plaintiff C.A.), but hid that fact from wife’s employer and initially, from husband. The marriage remained intact and wife and husband parented the child. For the first three years of the child’s life, the couple allowed plaintiff to act in an alternate parenting role, and the child bonded with him and his close relatives. Defendants excluded plaintiff from the child’s life when he filed the underlying petition seeking legal confirmation of his paternal rights. The trial court found that wife misled the court at an interim custody hearing, prolonging what the court later viewed as an unwarranted separation. Despite this period of separation, the court found the child was still bonded to all three parents and found this to be a “rare” case where, pursuant to statutory authority, each of three parents should have been legally recognized as such, to prevent detriment to their child. Defendants appealed, but finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "C.A. v. C.P." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders declaring Father's children dependents of the court and detaining them from his custody. The court held that the children were indeed at risk of physical harm and, in any event, father's lengthy history of domestic violence against mother and the parents' frequent reconciliations justified the minors' inclusion in the restraining order. View "In re Bruno M." on Justia Law

Y.M. had four children who were dependents of the juvenile court: two daughters, Maria Q. and J.M., and two sons, W.Q. and J.Q. The girls were placed together in the foster care home of the Z.'s in August 2013; the boys had several foster care placements. Y.M. identified Aunt as a possible placement for the children. Shortly before the section 366.26 hearing, issues arose concerning the viability of the Z.'s foster care license and their ability to adopt the girls. In view of the boys' lack of stability and the uncertainty about the Z.'s ability to adopt the girls, the juvenile court continued the children's placement in foster care with the goal of finding a permanency plan including adoption, guardianship, placement with a fit and willing relative, or return home. V.C., the children's maternal great-aunt (Aunt), filed a section 388 petition asking the juvenile court to place the children in her care. The Agency supported Aunt's petition for the girls' placement but opposed placement of the boys, whose foster care parents wanted to adopt them. At a bifurcated hearing, the juvenile court declined to apply the relative placement preference under section 361.3, found that it was not in Maria's and J.M.'s best interests to be placed with Aunt, and continued their section 366.26 hearing. The court summarily denied Aunt's petition for placement of the boys. At a second section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court terminated parental rights to W.Q. and J.Q. and designated their foster parents as their prospective adoptive parents. In an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeal concluded that the directive under section 361.3 to give preferential consideration to a relative seeking placement did not apply to relatives seeking placement of a child in continued foster care pursuant to section 366.26(b)(7). Furthermore, the Court held that when a relative of a dependent child files a section 388 petition requesting permanent placement of a child in continued foster care, the juvenile court should determine whether the petition makes a prima facie showing that the relative is fit and willing to care for the child and if so, set a post-permanency review hearing under section 366.3. The juvenile court's findings were “amply” supported by the record. The Court therefore affirmed the orders denying Aunt's request for placement of the children. View "In re Maria Q." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's disposition orders and held that the juvenile court erred in establishing jurisdiction based on a factual and legal theory not raised in the original petition. In this case, the Department filed a dependency petition on G.B.'s behalf, alleging the child had been sexually abused by her mother's boyfriend, and that her mother had failed to protect her from the boyfriend's abuse. The juvenile court found the allegations untrue but, on its own motion, added three allegations against father based on facts and a legal theory not at issue in the original petition. View "In re G.B." on Justia Law

The presumption of parentage is rebuttable and a non-biological parent can be a presumed parent. After Brian Pickett died, his partner, two biological children, and his partner's child, A.G., filed a wrongful death action against defendants. The trial court held that A.G. lacked standing to sue, and entered judgment against him.The Court of Appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendants, holding that the record did not rebut the presumption that Brian Pickett was A.G.'s natural parent. In this case, from the time A.G. was one, Pickett was the only father he knew and unrebutted testimony established that Pickett held A.G. out as his child. View "A.G. v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from the juvenile court's selection of a tribal customary adoption as the permanent plan for minors A.S. and E.S. and the corresponding award of full faith and credit to the tribal customary adoption order. C.S. (Father) and T.F. (Mother) appeal the court's orders, contending that their due process rights were violated by the failure of the tribe to consider evidence from the parents in developing a tribal customary adoption order and by the court's exclusion of evidence at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. The Court of Appeal found the trial court stated it had reviewed the reports that it had received and had considered the testimony and arguments of the parties before arriving at a decision. The trial court noted that the parents had received more than 44 months of services and that neither parent had adequately addressed the protective issues raised by the case. The court found that A.S. and E.S. were specifically and generally adoptable Indian children and that the social worker had consulted with the Tribe, which had elected a permanent plan of tribal customary adoption for the children. The court received the Tribe's Tribal Customary Adoption Order and afforded it full faith and credit. Mother and Father separately appealed these orders from the section 366.26 hearing on various grounds. Finding no reason to disturb the trial court's orders, the Court of Appeal affirmed the orders in their entirety. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

R.B. (father) and D.R. (mother) were citizens of India who were married in India. They came to California, where they had their only child, a daughter, born in October 2013. In December 2016, the father allegedly slapped the child and hit the mother. In February 2017, the mother discovered that the father was involved with another woman. She immediately left for India with the child. In 2017, the mother obtained a restraining order in India giving her sole custody of the child. Shortly thereafter, the father obtained an ex parte order (later stayed) in California giving him sole custody of the child. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that it had jurisdiction, but that India was a more appropriate forum. It therefore stayed the California proceeding. The father appealed, contending the trial court erred by finding that India was a more appropriate forum, because: (1) India did not have concurrent jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA); and (2) the trial court misevaluated the statutorily relevant factors. In the published portion of its opinion, the California Court of Appeal held India could be an inconvenient forum even if it did not have concurrent jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. In the nonpublished portion, the Court found no other error. Hence, the Court affirmed. View "R.B. v. D.R." on Justia Law

Mother and Father appealed the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights to their children. The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) after a Nevada juvenile court declined to exercise jurisdiction. The court conditionally reversed and remanded, holding that the investigation required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was not complete. In this case, HSA conceded that it had not substantially complied with the ICWA notice requirements, the order terminating parental rights should be vacated, and reversal was required to determine the applicability of the ICWA. View "In re E.R." on Justia Law

A trial court must make explicit findings on the issues listed in Family Code subdivision (a)(2) of section 2030 regarding attorney's fees and costs. Wife appealed the trial court's judgment in a marriage dissolution proceeding, challenging the trial court's determination of child support, spousal support, attorney fees, and interests in an oilfield service. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that wife established the child support award in the June 2016 judgment was based on the erroneous exclusion of husband's income tax refunds from his net income available for child support; the exclusion of husband's voluntary contributions to a 401(k) retirement savings plan from his net income available for child support was error, unless on remand the trial court provided findings that justified the exclusion of all or part of those contributions from his income; and the trial court erred in declining to award wife additional attorney fees at the conclusion of the proceeding where the record clearly demonstrated a disparity in access and ability to pay. View "Morton v. Morton" on Justia Law

The Obata sisters, died intestate in 2013, having never married and with no descendants. Letters of administration of the estates were issued in the Alameda County Superior Court. A dispute arose regarding the line of succession that centered on the decedents’ father, Tomejiro and the impact of his “yōshi-engumi” by Minejiro and Kiku Obata in 1911. Appellants are the descendants of Tomejiro’s biological parents, the Nakanos. The court found in favor of the Obata family members. The court concluded that California recognizes Tomejiro’s yōshi-engumi as a legal adoption and that under the Probate Code, “The adoption of Tomejiro Obata by Minejiro Obata and Kiku Obata severed the relationship of parent and child between Tomejiro Obata and his natural parents.” The court of appeal affirmed, citing Probate Code sections 6450-6451. While the primary purpose of Tomejiro’s adoption may have been to create an heir, the role of an heir in Japanese society at that time was considerably more expansive than under California law, involving not just inheritance rights, but financial and moral obligations to care for relatives and honor the family’s ancestors. Whether Tomejiro’s adoption would have terminated his relationship with his biological parents under Japanese law now or in 1911 is immaterial. View "Estate of Obata" on Justia Law