Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

C.E. was three years old at the time of the relevant hearing. Mother's family and friends were actively involved in C.E.’s life. Appellant, Mother’s sister, cared for C.E. on Mondays and every other weekend. C.E. also spent significant time with Grandmother. Mother’s close friend, B, was considered to be like a sister to Mother and spent a lot of time with C.E. Mother died after a drowning accident in 2015. After Mother’s death, C.E. initially lived with Father; he also spent time with Appellant, B, and the rest of Mother’s family; they eventually became concerned about Father’s ability to parent C.E. Father was the subject of a domestic violence restraining order involving his children from a prior relationship. They filed a guardianship petition. The court granted temporary guardianship and subsequently conducted a hearing. Although Father initially appeared to challenge the petition, he left the courthouse after the court denied him a continuance. The court granted the petition. Six months later, Appellant filed a petition to be appointed as C.E.’s replacement guardian. Appellant also sought adoption. Father supported Appellant’s petition as did Appellant’s other family members. The court of appeal reversed the denial of the petition. The trial court erred when it failed to consolidate the guardianship action with the adoption proceeding, resulting in prejudice to Appellant. View "Guardianship of C.E." on Justia Law

A responding party's request for sanction-based attorney fees under Family Code section 271 is not a request for affirmative relief. In this dissolution case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the award of sanctions in the form of attorney fees. The court held that, because wife's request for attorney fees under section 271 was not a request for "affirmative relief," she did not run afoul of section 213 by requesting those fees in her responsive pleadings. The court also held that, because this issue was one of first impression based on husband's colorable interpretation of the law, the court denied wife's request that it order husband to pay her attorney fees on appeal as a sanction for filing an appeal that was "totally and completely without merit." Finally, the court held that wife’s request for attorney fees under section 271 was not a request for “affirmative relief,” she did not run afoul of section 213 by requesting those fees in her responsive pleadings. Finally, husband's argument that wife's February 2016 request was barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata was foreclosed. View "Perow v. Uzelac" on Justia Law

Respondent San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not oppose termination of the dependency of N.O., rather, the Agency recommended it. N.O.'s counsel opposed termination of dependency jurisdiction over the objection of N.O.'s parents. Mexico declined to exercise jurisdiction over Minor, who was detained in California when Minor's mother A.R. (Mother) was arrested at the international border for transporting a large amount of marijuana. Minor was ultimately placed by a California juvenile court with maternal grandmother in Mexico. A few months after her arrest, Mother was released from custody and returned to Mexico, where she participated in services through the agency Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF), which services were ordered and overseen by the juvenile court and Agency. Because Mother made substantial progress in services under her Agency care plan, Minor was returned to Mother's care. After a domestic violence (DV) incident between Mother and Minor's father S.G. (Father) in late December 2016 came to light in February 2017, Agency recommended Mother receive DV services, which were to be administered through DIF because Mother could no longer cross the border into the United States. When the court terminated jurisdiction in May 2018 it was unclear whether Mother had participated in such DV services. However, perhaps more important for purposes of this appeal, it also was unclear whether DIF had offered Mother such services, or believed they were even necessary. After multiple continuances of the section 364 review hearing, the juvenile court on March 8, 2018, granted Minor's counsel one last continuance, noting that it was "comfortable" closing the case based on the information then available to it and that it did not appear additional information regarding Minor would be forthcoming from DIF. On appeal, Minor contends the juvenile court's finding that conditions no longer existed in May 2018 that would justify the initial assumption of dependency over Minor in August 2015 was not supported by substantial evidence; that the court abused its discretion in not continuing the family maintenance review hearing until Minor was found and assessed; and that the juvenile court violated Minor's statutory right to counsel. The Court of Appeal determined Minor did not meet her burden of showing conditions still existed to justify the Agency's jurisdiction over her, and affirmed termination. View "In re N.O." on Justia Law

Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdiction finding against her in this dependency case. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing was insufficient to support jurisdiction where there was no nexus cited between the child's hygiene and any medical or dental condition. In this case, nothing in the record indicated that having body odor or wearing clothes that were dirty or too small—the only circumstances alleged in the petition the juvenile court sustained—placed the child at substantial risk of physical harm or illness. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the family court for a hearing on custody and visitation. View "In re Roger S." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and held that a "Trust Transfer Deed," signed by husband, granting certain real property to his wife, did not met Family Code section 852(a)'s express declaration requirement. The court held that without an express statement specifying what interest in the property was granted to wife, the reference to a "Trust Transfer" left the document's purpose ambiguous and thus rendered the purported transmutation invalid under section 852(a). The court held that the deed was fairly susceptible of at least two interpretations―the one wife proffered, whereby husband granted all of his interest in the property to her, thereby transmuting the residence into her separate property, and the one husband proffered, whereby he granted only an interest in trust to wife for the couple's estate planning purposes. View "Begian v. Sarajian" on Justia Law

After ex-wife filed a civil action alleging that ex-husband siphoned some of the community assets that were subject to a stipulated judgment, ex-husband successfully demurred and obtained a judgment of dismissal against ex-wife's civil action. Ex-husband then moved in the family court under the stipulated judgment's attorney fees provision to recover fees and costs he incurred in connection with the civil action.The Court of Appeal affirmed the family law court's award of fees and costs, holding that the attorney fees provision in the stipulated judgment encompassed these fees and costs because of its broad language, particularly, the phrase "in connection therewith." The court also held that the family law court did not abuse its discretion in deeming ex-husband the prevailing party because he obtained a judgment of dismissal against ex-wife's civil suit thereby achieving his litigation objectives, which was the applicable standard. Finally, the court held that the family law court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $90,000 in attorney fees and costs, and finding that counsel's hourly rates and number of charged hours were reasonable. View "Pont v. Pont" on Justia Law

Twins P.T and E.T. were removed from Mother’s care by the Alameda County Social Services Agency in April 2014 when they were four months old. Mother has a history of mental health issues and drug addiction; E.T. was found unresponsive and not breathing on her living room couch. After more than a year of reunification services, the children were returned to Mother in October 2015 with family maintenance services. In February 2017, Mother told her social worker that she had relapsed into drug use and needed help. They came up with a safety plan: Mother would temporarily place the children with their godparents who had previously served as the foster parents. Mother did not immediately test negative for drugs and bickered with the godparents. The juvenile court bypassed reunification services to Mother because she was previously provided services and reunification was unsuccessful. The court ordered a hearing to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Ultimately, the juvenile court denied Mother's petition that asserted changed circumstances and terminated her parental rights with a finding her children are adoptable. The court of appeal reversed, calling this “the rare case where the juvenile court erred in failing to recognize that Mother’s relationship with her children outweighed the benefit to the children that would accrue from termination of parental rights and a plan of adoption.” Mother did the right thing when she informed her social worker that she was again using drugs and sought help. View "In re E.T." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Riverside County Department of Child Support Services (the County) filed a complaint against defendant-respondent Michael Lee Estabrook (Father), seeking $288 per month in child support, as well as any healthcare expenses, for J.L., Father’s alleged daughter, whose mother, J.L. (Mother), was receiving public assistance. Father requested and received a judgment of non-paternity, and dismissed the County’s complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the County argued: (1) the family court erred by not ordering genetic testing; (2) the family court’s decision to apply the marital presumption was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the family court erred by permitting Father to assert the marital presumption because the presumption may only be raised by the spouses who are in the marriage; and (4) the family court’s finding of non-paternity was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal determined the family court erred by not ordering genetic testing; the family court’s decision to apply the marital presumption was not supported by substantial evidence; and the family court’s judgment of non-paternity was not supported by substantial evidence. View "County of Riverside v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

Petitioner Yaron Lief and real party in interest Pnina Nissan met in Israel in 2010. Nissan moved to San Diego and married Lief in 2011. They had a son in 2014. Lief filed a marital dissolution action against Nissan in 2017. The family court bifurcated the issue of custody and visitation, held a trial on Nissan's request to move with the child to Israel, and tentatively granted the request. The court ultimately entered a judgment granting Nissan's move-away request on November 7, 2018. After receiving notice from Nissan that she intended to depart for Israel with the child on November 22, Lief filed an ex parte application with the family court for an order preventing the move-away until after December 7, when the 30-day stay of the judgment granting the move-away request would have expired. The court ruled its August 10, 2018 order tentatively granting Nissan's move-away request started the stay period running, denied Lief's application on November 21, and ordered Lief to turn over the child to Nissan that evening. Lief petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and requested an immediate stay of the ex parte order purporting to allow Nissan to move to Israel with the child on November 22, 2018. The Court of Appeal found the family court erred when it ruled the 30-day statutory stay commenced with its August 10 decision, tentatively granting Nissan's move-away request: the court's oral statement of its decision at the end of the August 10 hearing was not a judgment or order. The period began to run when the family court filed the judgment granting Nissan's move-away request on November 7. "To correct the family court's error in ruling the stay began to run on August 10, 2018, issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate." View "Lief v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Two cases involving J.Y. were consolidated for this decision. In case No. C082548, appellant R.T., mother of minor J.Y., appealed a juvenile court’s order authorizing J.Y.’s removal from his previous caretakers and placement with the caretakers of his two siblings, minors Ja.Y. and Ju.Y., to be adopted through tribal customary adoption. In case No. C084428, mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order granting the Pit River Tribe’s (the Tribe) petitions for modification, giving full faith and credit to an amended tribal customary adoption order. R.T. contended removal and placement was not in the minor’s best interests, and that: (1) the Tribe did not have standing to file Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 petitions for modification; and (2) the juvenile court acted beyond its authority in giving full faith and credit to the amended tribal customary adoption order because it had already given full faith and credit to the original tribal customary adoption order. The Court of appeal concluded that mother lacked standing to raise the placement issue on appeal and rejected the remaining contentions. View "In re J.Y." on Justia Law