Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
by
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, appellant's request for a civil harassment restraining order. The court held that appellant is not permitted to use the civil harassment order process to collaterally attack a confidential child dependency and adoption proceeding concerning her biological daughter.In this case, appellant's parental rights were terminated in a child dependency proceeding after appellant refused cancer treatment for her daughter and threatened the caregiver and case worker. The juvenile court then denied appellant's petition to reinstate service, freed the daughter for adoption, and placed her with a confidential caregiver. After the court affirmed the dependency order, appellant tried to intervene in the adoption proceeding by requesting a civil harassment restraining order. The court held that appellant may not use the civil harassment order process to mount a collateral attack on the Welfare & Institution Code section 366.26 order terminating parental rights, the selection of a confidential caregiver, or the adoptive placement. View "Leah B. v. Michael V." on Justia Law

by
L.C. (Mother) appealed a final order of child support covering periods from 2014 to 2019, when Child turned 18. Mother contends the trial court’s child support order had to be reversed because the court calculated child support utilizing a 29 percent timeshare for P.B. (Father) during a period of time when Father had no visitation with the child, purportedly due to Mother’s interference with Father’s visitation rights. Mother also challenged the court’s failure to include certain payments Father received from his parents as income available for child support. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with Mother’s first contention, that it was improper to attribute nonexistent timeshare in response to Mother’s alleged interference with visitation, and concluded the order should be reversed so that support could be recalculated based on Father’s actual timeshare during the disputed time period, consistent with the statutory guideline under Family Code sections 4050-4076. In all other respects, the order was affirmed. View "County of San Diego v. P.B" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the dependency petition was filed, and the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction, after the family court had entered a final judgment awarding Todd T. sole legal authority to make healthcare decisions for his daughter, Anna T. After the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction a year later, it expressly declined to issue a juvenile court custody order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4, reverting back to the original family law decision. The juvenile court nonetheless ordered Anna to continue in treatment with a therapist selected by Anna's mother to be paid by Todd until the therapist determined a change would not interfere with Anna's treatment. The juvenile court also prohibited Todd from returning Anna to two healthcare providers who had previously seen her.The Court of Appeal held that the challenged orders, not having been made as part of a juvenile court custody order pursuant to section 362.4, had no continuing effect after the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction. In this case, although the juvenile court plainly recognized its ability to issue a juvenile court custody order pursuant to section 362.4, the juvenile court believed it unnecessary to do so. The court vacated the orders, and stated that any ongoing issues regarding Todd's authority to make healthcare decisions regarding Anna are properly addressed to the family court. View "In re Anna T." on Justia Law

by
C.V. (Mother) appealed an order issued under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 selecting adoption as the permanent plan for her son N.S. and terminating her parental rights. N.S.’s father was a member of the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians (the Tribe). The Tribe was involved in this case since the juvenile court found that N.S. was an Indian child and that the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) applied. On appeal, Mother contended: (1) the Tribe’s “decree” selecting guardianship as the best permanent plan option for N.S. preempted the statutory preference for adoption under section 366.26; (2) N.S.’s counsel breached his duties under section 317 and provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to discover what Tribal benefits or membership rights were available to N.S. before the termination of parental rights; (3) the court erred in finding that the Indian child exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(vi)(I) and (II) did not apply to preclude termination of parental rights; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody in Mother’s care would be a substantial risk to N.S.; and (5) the court erred in finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) does not apply to preclude termination of parental rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

by
The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, holding that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) does not apply here. Mother contends that the juvenile court and DCFS failed to satisfy the formal notice requirements under the ICWA and related California law.In this case, the initial inquiry conducted by the juvenile court created a "reason to believe" the children possibly are Indian children; DCFS's repeated efforts to gather information concerning the children's maternal ancestry constitutes substantial evidence that DCFS met its duty of further inquiry; but the juvenile court and DCFS's further investigation did not yield results that pushed their reason to believe the children are Indian children, to reason to know the children are Indian children. The court explained that a suggestion of Indian ancestry is not sufficient under ICWA or related California law to trigger the notice requirement. Because DCFS was not required to provide formal notice to the pertinent tribes, the court did not reach Mother's argument that the ICWA notices may have lacked necessary information. View "In re Dominic F." on Justia Law

by
The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (department) filed a petition seeking to remove an 18-month old girl based on mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues and noncustodial father’s failure to provide for her. However, after the child was detained, father came forward and said he had been trying to reunify with her since mother took the child when she was about four months old. He also said he had established his paternity through a genetic test and had been paying child support to mother throughout their separation. Father said he couldn’t yet take custody of the child because his housing, transportation, and employment weren’t stable, but he indicated he had obtained work and was attempting to find suitable housing. He also indicated he would return to Chicago, his home city, and live with relatives who were willing to help him raise her once he obtained custody. The department amended the petition to remove the allegations against father before the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, nonetheless maintained the child should be removed from both parents, and asked the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that placing the child with her parents would pose a substantial danger to her health, safety or well-being. Rights to the child were ultimately terminated, but the father appealed, averring his situation had changed: he obtained full-time employment with benefits and a permanent place to live. The court denied his motion, concluding he had shown his circumstances were changing, but had not changed. Before the Court of Appeal, father argued the entire procedure violated his due process rights and there wasn’t adequate support for the trial court’s finding that giving him custody would be detrimental to the child. The Court held a juvenile court could not terminate parental rights based on problems arising from the parent’s poverty, "a problem made worse, from a due process standpoint, when the department didn’t formally allege those problems as a basis for removal." Absent those impermissible grounds for removal the Court found there wasn’t clear and convincing evidence that returning the child to father would be detrimental to her. Termination of father’s rights was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

by
A July 2017 petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)(1) concerned J.P., born in 2013. J.P.’s mother had been arrested for DUI. J.P. and his younger half-brother, A.A., were taken into protective custody. The court found mother’s ex-boyfriend Albert to be A.A.’s presumed father and found L.P. to be J.P.’s presumed father. Albert indicated that he wanted to be designated as J.P.’s presumed parent. Mother opposed the request. Police had responded to disturbances between mother and Albert. In November 2017, J.P. and A.A. were moved from foster care to the home of Albert’s parents. L.P.'s whereabouts were unknown; he had not visited J.P. The Department reported positive interactions between the children and Albert. In September 2018, Albert asked the court to recognize him as J.P.’s presumed father. The court determined that Albert did not qualify as J.P.’s presumed father under Family Code 7611(d) but ordered weekly visitation between J.P. and Albert.Months later, Albert renewed his request to be considered a de facto parent to J.P. The court stated that after another hearing, it believed that Albert qualified as a presumed parent to J.P. Mother did not dispute the court’s authority to revisit its prior order. The Department and J.P.’s counsel supported Albert's motion. The court of appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order granting Albert presumed parent status for J.P. The juvenile court had authority under Welfare and Institutions Code 3851 to reconsider its prior order. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law

by
Mother petitioned under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 388 and 390 to set aside jurisdiction findings concerning her alcohol abuse and mental instability and to terminate dependency jurisdiction after a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation found that she was not mentally ill and did not meet the diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorder.The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's order summarily denying mother's section 388 petition and held that the juvenile court incorrectly characterized her petition as an untimely new trial motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 659. The court remanded for the juvenile court to determine whether mother has made the required prima facie showing that terminating dependency jurisdiction would be in the child's best interests. If such a showing has been made, the juvenile court is to conduct a hearing on the merits of the petition. View "In re Samuel A." on Justia Law

by
After police arrested their mother, 10-year-old J. and her half-brothers were found at a homeless encampment and detained by the Alameda County Social Services Agency, which filed a juvenile dependency petition. At a paternity inquiry, Mother testified that Father is J.’s father. Mother and Father lived together until J. was two years old. Father had participated in Nevada child support proceedings, acknowledged J. as his child, and was subject to a child support order. Father had regular visits with J. After the Agency filed an amended petition naming Father as J.’s alleged father, the court declared the children dependents of the court, and placed the children with their maternal grandfather. The court held a later hearing, ordered a legal guardianship by the grandfather, then dismissed the dependency.During the proceedings, Father maintained his relationship with J. and consistently stated that he wanted custody. Father repeatedly contacted the Agency and provided a birth certificate showing his name as J.’s father. Court-appointed attorneys represented Father but he was unrepresented during critical proceedings and none of the attorneys took action on his behalf. At the dismissal hearing, the court noted that no counsel was present on Father’s behalf and acknowledged that the prior proceeding, without Father's counsel present "was an error.” Contrary to Welfare and Institutions Code 316.2(b), and California Rule 5.635(g), the court clerk never provided Father with notice of the procedure he should follow to establish that he is J.’s father and to protect his parental rights. The court of appeal reversed the juvenile court orders, finding that Father was prejudiced by the failure to comply with the notice requirements. View "In re J.W.-P." on Justia Law

by
The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's dispositional order removing son and daughter from father's custody. The court heeded the holding of Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996, establishing that when a statute requires a fact to be found by clear and convincing evidence, and when there is a substantial evidence challenge, the reviewing court must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the existence of that fact to be highly probable.In this case, the court held that a reasonable trier of fact could have found it highly probable that placement of the minors with father would pose a substantial risk of them being harmed by exposure to future domestic violence, and that there were no reasonable means to protect the minors without removal from father's physical custody. The court rejected father's arguments to the contrary and his argument that the juvenile court's failure to state the facts it relied upon is reversible error. Because the last incident of domestic violence involving father was so dangerous and troubling, it is not reasonably probable that the juvenile court would have reached a different conclusion if it stated the facts it relied upon. View "In re V.L." on Justia Law