Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Blizzard invested in a tire pyrolysis project in Kansas and subsequently sued Schaefers. A Kansas jury returned a $3.825 million fraud judgment, which was entered in California. The California court added a judgment debtor (BKS) pursuant to the “outside reverse veil piercing” doctrine, which arises when the request for piercing comes from a third party outside the targeted business entity. The targeted entity was BKS. Schaefers owns a 50 percent interest in that LLC. Schaefers’ wife, Karin, owns the other 50 percent. Neither Karin nor BKS was a defendant in the Kansas action. The California court found that BKS is Schaefers’ alter ego.The court of appeal affirmed in part. The evidence is sufficient to support the finding that BKS is Schaefers’ alter ego. The court remanded for further proceedings so that the trial court may weigh competing equities that bear on the veil-piercing issue. Blizzard is entitled to recover the damages awarded by the Kansas judgment, but Karin may be an innocent third party who would suffer substantial harm if recovery is accomplished through the reverse veil piercing; there is no indication that she was involved in the fraud committed by Schaefers. Karin may not be responsible for debts incurred by Schaefers after their separation in 1996. View "Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers" on Justia Law

The parties’ son was born in November 2018. Mother initiated a claim for child support. Testing established father’s paternity. and a stipulated judgment entered. In February 2019, father requested protective orders under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act and sought sole custody, submitting evidence of mother’s repeated online cyberstalking and harassment. Criminal charges were filed against mother. Much of the harassing behavior involves the child. In March 2019, the court awarded father sole custody of the child. Proceedings on the domestic violence restraining order were stayed pending resolution of felony charges against mother. In August 2020, the court denied mother’s request to modify custody and continued her supervised visitation.In connection with requests for modification of the custody and visitation orders, mother requested attorney fees. Following a hearing, the court denied mother’s request for fees, noting that father had not exhibited any conduct to warrant a sanction-based award. Other statutes apply only to married parties and were inapplicable; there has been no finding that father made false allegations of child abuse. Mother is not the prevailing party in an action to enforce an out-of-state custody order. The court of appeal reversed in part. Mother may be entitled to attorney fees under Family Code 7605, which requires a court to “ensure that each party has access to legal representation to preserve each party’s rights,” using the appropriate needs-based criteria. View "C.T. v. K.W." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court's denial of her request for a permanent restraining order protecting her from father. While mother's appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction in an order from which mother did not appeal.The Court of Appeal held that mother's failure to appeal the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction does not render mother's restraining order appeal moot. In so holding, the court disagreed with certain cases to the extent they stand for the broad proposition that an appellate court can never grant effective relief in a dependency appeal following the unappealed termination of juvenile court jurisdiction. The court explained that if it were to conclude that the juvenile court's denial of mother's restraining order request constitutes reversible error and directed the issuance of the restraining order, the remittitur would vest jurisdiction in the juvenile court for the limited purpose of correcting that error. Therefore, correcting an erroneous denial of mother's restraining order request would immediately afford mother effective relief.The court also held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's requested restraining order where the evidence does not compel the conclusion that mother's safety would be in jeopardy without such an order. Furthermore, the juvenile court did not apply an incorrect legal standard in ruling on her request. The court stated that, even assuming there was error, such error would not warrant reversal because it is not reasonably probable that mother would have obtained a more favorable result under the correct standard. View "In re S.G." on Justia Law

Desirae and Forestt have two children, now eight and five years old. Desirae filed a dissolution of marriage petition. She separately requested a domestic violence restraining order against Forestt; that case was dismissed after Desirae failed to serve him. The family court granted the dissolution petition by default and awarded Desirae sole custody of the children. Desirae moved to Utah to join the children, who were living with her parents. Forestt later claimed he was unaware of the divorce proceeding and believed they were sending the children to Utah so they could work on their marriage. Forestt moved to set aside the default, claiming he had not been served properly and sought to prevent Desirae from leaving the state with the children. Desirae obtained a temporary domestic violence restraining order from a Utah court and submitted to the family court evidence that she had been subjected to domestic violence for several years. The family court set aside the default and awarded joint custody of the children to Forestt.The court of appeal vacated the order. Family Code section 30441 establishes a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the child’s best interest to award joint or sole legal or physical custody to a parent who a court has found to have committed domestic violence against the other parent within the previous five years. The family court erred in failing to apply the presumption. View "Noble v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The father of R.F. appealed a post-disposition order and judgment dismissing the juvenile dependency case and entering exit orders and sole custody of R.F. to Mother, decreasing his supervised visitation, and requiring Father’s visitation to be supervised by a professional monitor at Father’s expense. R.F. and sibling L.F. were removed from his custody based on findings of drug abuse. Father contended on appeal that he did not receive notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the juvenile court dismissed the proceedings and entered the exit orders. Father further argued that the errors were structural, requiring automatic reversal, and, if not structural, they constituted prejudicial reversible error. The Court of Appeal concluded there was no evidence in the record that Father received proper notice or an opportunity to be heard before the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction and imposed the exit orders. In addition, the visitation order was ambiguous as to whether the court ordered visitation a minimum of once a week or every other week. The Court held these errors constituted prejudicial error requiring reversal of the order terminating dependency jurisdiction, the exit orders, and the judgment entered on January 15, 2021. View "In re R.F." on Justia Law

E.M.’s parental rights as to her son Josiah (born in October 2017) were terminated pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The court of appeal conditionally reversed the termination order because the record does not demonstrate that the Department of Children and Family Services fulfilled its duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. 1901) (ICWA) or provided the information necessary to the juvenile court to make findings as to the applicability of ICWA. ICWA inquiry and determinations with respect to Father were virtually ignored until the permanency planning stage. DCFS neglected to interview four available paternal relatives in any reasonable timeframe to inquire whether Josiah has Indian ancestry. The paternal grandmother’s statement in April 2019 that she had Cherokee ancestry triggered the duty of further inquiry; DCFS did not follow up for seven months and withheld that information from the court. View "In re Josiah T." on Justia Law

The family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services in 2017, following a domestic violence incident. Mother did not work. Father was the sole financial provider for the family. They were not married but had been in a relationship for over 14 years. Father denied any domestic violence or drug use. The children denied witnessing any domestic violence. The family had prior referrals for physical abuse by mother in 2010, emotional abuse and neglect by mother and father in 2012, and a prior dependency case in 2014 based on domestic violence and mother’s substance abuse. In 2021, the court terminated father’s parental rights to the children, now 13, 10, and six years old.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court abused its discretion when it applied the wrong legal standard in finding the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply (Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i); the court did not have the benefit of new authority, In re Caden C. (2021), concerning the benefits to the children from continuing the relationship with father, or the detriment to the children of terminating the relationship. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders denying placement with Mother, and remanded for further hearing on Mother's request for placement. The court concluded that substantial evidence does not support the detriment finding. The court explained that Mother did not abandon the children or knowingly leave them in the care of an abusive Father. Rather, she fled California for safety reasons and regularly monitored the children's well-being, believing that Father would not abuse or neglect them. Furthermore, she quickly returned to California when trouble arose, attending hearings, participating in services, and undergoing a psychiatric evaluation. View "In re Solomon B." on Justia Law

K.L. and R.H. were the parents of Z.L.; their year-long relationship was defined by multiple acts of abuse by K.L., and the complete inability of either party to effectively communicate with the other. After their relationship ended, both filed requests for Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) orders against the other in December 2019. In February 2020, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that both K.L. and R.H. had acted as a primary aggressor against the other, and that neither had acted in self-defense. The court therefore issued mutual orders against both parties, and also issued orders granting joint physical and legal custody of Z.L. to both parties. The Court of Appeal reversed that order, finding the trial court erred by issuing mutual restraining orders without considering and following the relevant statutory authority. Because there was more than sufficient evidence supporting a DVPA order protecting R.H. and her child H.H. from K.L., the Court affirmed that order. It reversed the orders regarding child custody: "If, after the trial court regains jurisdiction following the resolution of the dependency proceedings involving Z.L., either party files a request for order concerning custody, the trial court shall consider and apply the rebuttable presumption of Family Code section 3044 and the factors that may overcome that presumption." View "K.L. v. R.H." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed in part and vacated in part in a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between wife, her husband, and the husband's mother. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended husband's mother's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment on the third cause of action. The court also concluded that the trial court erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment on the causes of action for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about wife's financial circumstances in 2009; and the trial court did not deprive wife of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly. The court remanded with instructions to the trial court to amend the language of the judgment to provide that its orders do not preclude wife from raising proper claims for community property interests, Epstein credits, Watts charges, or other similar claims in the family law court. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law