Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case was one of many "disagreements" about the control of the multi-million-dollar estate of Thomas Tedesco. Plaintiff-respondent Laura White was one of Thomas’s three biological daughters and a cotrustee of his living trust. Defendant-appellant Debra Wear (aka Debbie Basara Wear) was one of Thomas’s stepdaughters. In 2013, Thomas suffered serious health issues, which resulted in significant cognitive impairment, leaving him susceptible to being unduly influenced by anyone close to him. Gloria Tedesco, Thomas’s second wife, began denying White and her sisters access to their father, causing him to believe that they were stealing from him. Wear assisted Gloria, her mother, in unduly influencing Thomas via contacting, or facilitating access to, attorneys in order to change Thomas’s estate plan to disinherit his biological family in favor of Gloria and her family. In 2015, a permanent conservator of Thomas’s estate was appointed. Despite the existence of the conservatorship, Wear continued to assist Gloria in taking actions to unduly influence Thomas to change his 30-plus-year estate plan. Consequently, upon White’s petition, the superior court issued an elder abuse restraining order (EARO), restraining Wear for three years from, among other things, financially abusing Thomas, contacting him (either directly or indirectly), facilitating any change to his estate plan, coming within 100 yards of him, and possessing any guns, other firearms, and ammunition. Wear contended the EARO was void because: (1) the judge was disqualified; and (2) he violated due process by substantially amending the allegations in the petition and prohibiting her from possessing firearms and ammunition. She further claimed the petition failed to state a cause of action for elder financial abuse. The Court of Appeal agreed the court erred in including a firearms and ammunition restriction in the EARO and directed the trial court to strike it. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "White v. Wear" on Justia Law

In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether a spousal support agreement executed between 1986 and 2002 is enforceable, the court is not limited to a determination under Family Code section 1615, subdivision (a)(2) whether the agreement was unconscionable when executed. Rather, the court retains the power under Family Code section 1612, subdivision (a)(7) to shape public policy regarding premarital spousal support agreements to the extent not inconsistent with Legislative declarations of such policy, and to declare that a premarital spousal support agreement is unenforceable as against public policy solely because it is unconscionable at the time of enforcement.The court rejected all challenges to the trial court's rulings, except the court corrected an arithmetical error in the trial court's attorney fee award, and modified the order to direct husband to pay wife $870,000. The court also vacated the trial court's ruling on wife's request for order of March 14, 2014 seeking to modify the temporary spousal support order, and remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of pendente lite spousal support from the date of wife's request. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Zucker v. Zucker" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed with instructions the jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning A.C. However, the court concluded that, under the facts of this case, DCFS's failure to ask extended family members about potential Indian ancestry was prejudicial, and thus the court remanded the matter with directions for the juvenile court to order DCFS to comply with Welf. & Inst. Code, section 224.2. In this case, the record reveals readily obtainable information that was likely to bear meaningfully on whether A.C. was an Indian child. The court could not assume that the parents' mere denial of Indian ancestry on a form was sufficient to dispel prejudice from DCFS's failure to ask A.C.'s extended family members about potential Indian ancestry. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

The co-trustees and a beneficiary of the trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 850 alleging that defendant misappropriated trust assets and committed elder abuse against the trustor. The litigants settled and the guardian ad litem for defendant's minor children entered into an agreement with the co-trustees and certain trust beneficiaries, but not defendant (the first GAL agreement). Defendant and the children subsequently challenge the trial court's orders (1) enforcing the oral settlement agreement; (2) granting the GAL's petition to approve the second GAL agreement; (3) appointing the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem in certain probate cases; and (4) denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's orders and concluded that defendant failed to establish procedural and substantive unconscionability. The court rejected the argument that the GAL lacked capacity to make a contract in Jacqueline's name. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err by determining that defendant is precluded from repudiating the agreement because her objection is inconsistent with the children's interests. Furthermore, the court rejected the children's contention that they disaffirmed the settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement when they filed their repudiations of the agreements. Finally, the court concluded that there was no conflict of interest and thus no error in denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as guardian ad litem. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's order denying father's Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and vacated the order terminating parental rights as to the child. The court concluded that the evidence before the juvenile court in this case was woefully inadequate to support a finding that the Department exercised reasonable diligence trying to find father, given the unique facts already known to the Department. The court also concluded that the juvenile court erred in relying on Mia's best interests as a basis for overcoming the lack of notice to father and denying father's section 388 petition. Furthermore, the record does not support the Department's implied argument that father was to blame for the delay. Considered against the absence of any documentary evidence showing that the Department timely provided father a copy of the petition or required notices about how to assert paternity and request appointment of counsel, the court found prejudicial error. The court remanded for a new jurisdiction and disposition hearing as to father only. View "In re Mia M." on Justia Law

Mark Shenefield filed a request for order (RFO) seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child he shared with Jennifer Shenefield. In his declaration, Mark quoted from and referenced the contents of a confidential, court-ordered psychological evaluation undertaken during Jennifer’s previous marital dissolution. Mark’s attorney Karolyn Kovtun filed the paperwork. Jennifer opposed Mark’s request and sought sanctions for violations of Family Code sections 3111(d) and 3025.5, for unwarranted disclosure of the confidential custody evaluation. The trial court ordered the sanctions issue be heard at trial. Jennifer’s trial brief detailed her arguments for why the court should impose sanctions on both Mark and Kovtun. Mark did not file a trial brief. Following trial, the court issued sanctions against Mark in the amount of $10,000 and Kovtun in the amount of $15,000. Kovtun challenged the sanctions, filing a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d). A different court heard Kovtun’s request to vacate the sanctions imposed against her and denied the request. On appeal, Kovtun argued the court improperly sanctioned her because: (1) attorneys could not be sanctioned under section 3111; (2) the notice she received did not comply with due process standards; (3) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her; (4) the court failed to enforce the safe harbor provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7; and (5) the court improperly admitted and relied on a transcript of a meeting between Kovtun, Mark, and Jennifer. The Court found Kovtun’s arguments meritless, and affirmed the sanctions. View "Shenefield v. Shenefield" on Justia Law

Mother appealed an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argued that the Department of Children and Family Services and the court failed to comply with Code section 224.2 by inquiring whether her child is or might be an Indian child within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Mother had “denied Native American ancestry for the family.”The court of appeal affirmed, finding any error harmless. The maternal grandmother is the only person Mother identified as a person who should have been asked about Indian ancestry; she had expressed her desire to adopt the child and to have the child placed with her. Under ICWA, when an Indian child is the subject of foster care or adoptive placement proceedings, “preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with .. a member of the Indian child’s extended family,” 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), (b). Maternal grandmother, Mother’s counsel, and the child.’s counsel, each of whom requested placement with the maternal grandmother, would have had a strong incentive to bring to the court’s attention any facts that suggest that she is an Indian child. Their failure to do so implies that the maternal grandmother is unaware of such facts. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

Maria appealed the termination of her parental rights over her three children, who all have the same father, arguing that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to interview her extended family members about their Indian ancestry. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1901, gives Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation; where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 lists requirements to effectuate the Act’s policies. The court of appeal affirmed. The record does not support Maria’s argument that readily obtainable information would have shed meaningful light on whether the children are Indian children. There was a prior juvenile court finding that two of Maria’s children are not Indian children, the juvenile court asked Maria, the father, and paternal aunt about Indian ancestry, both parents eschewed Indian ancestry, and Maria was living with extended family members whom she could have asked about potential Indian ancestry. It was unlikely that any further inquiry of family members would have yielded information about Indian ancestry. View "In re Darian R." on Justia Law

In a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between Som, her husband, Joshua, and Joshua's mother, Sharon, the trial court ruled in favor of Sharon. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended Sharon's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. The court reversed the judgment on the claims for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. The court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about Som's financial circumstances in 2009 and did not deprive Som of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly.The court of appeal subsequently modified its opinion to read: the judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Sharon is reversed with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Joshua, per the July 29, 2010 deed and the July 18, 2011 deed. The judgment is also reversed as to the causes of action for slander of title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002 petition that alleged the mother (S.V.) had brandished a knife and pushed a female companion in the now-three-year-old child’s presence.A social worker inquired of S.V. about the child’s Indian ancestry; she did not give the social worker any reason to believe the child was or might be an Indian child. In preparing the detention report, a social worker interviewed the child’s maternal great-grandmother and maternal great-grandfather. It is not clear whether the social worker asked any relatives about the child’s Indian ancestry. S.V. filed a form stating that she did not have any Indian ancestry as far as she knew. If that changed, S.V. was to inform the court and the social worker. The juvenile court then inquired whether S.V. knew if alleged the father had Indian ancestry. She indicated that he did not have Indian ancestry. The court found it had no reason to know that the alleged father had Indian ancestry; his whereabouts were unknown.The court of appeal remanded. The first-step inquiry duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1903(2), requires the Department to interview, among others, extended family members and others who had an interest in the child. View "In re H.V." on Justia Law