Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The parties are married and have three sons born between 2005 and 2013. After the parties separated, M.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO, Fam. Code 6200) against A.S. for herself and her sons, alleging that A.S. enlisted her friends and mother to talk her into reconciling with A.S., that he threatened to kill M.S.’s male friend and followed him to his home, and that he engaged their children to spy on her.The court granted the DVRO specifying M.S. and her children as protected parties after hearing evidence of A.S. stalking and harassing M.S. and that A.S. often slapped the children “upside the head,” pushed them down, and choked them “in the name of playing,” screamed at the children, called them derogatory names, and encouraged them to engage in physical violence with each other for entertainment, in addition to the “spying.” The court also granted M.S. temporary physical and legal custody of the children with supervised visitation for A.S. The court of appeal affirmed the three-year DVRO. There was sufficient evidence of good cause for including the children in the DVRO. View "M.S. v. A.S." on Justia Law

David and Sara share joint legal custody of their five-year-old child. Initially, the child spent nearly 80 percent of his time with Sara. In 2017, David’s monthly income was $15,000; he paid $1,525 in monthly child support. Sara also received a $5,000 monthly gift from her father, which later increased to $7,500. In 2020, David moved to modify the child support order. His time with the child had increased to 42 percent; his monthly income had risen to $17,500. He also sought a seek-work order. Sara had not worked since 2013, The court reduced monthly child support to $891, retroactive to February 2020. In imposing a seek-work order, the court explained, “the policy of the State of California is that both parents should work and provide support for their minor child,” and that the order was in the “best interest of the child.”The court of appeal affirmed. Under Family Code section 4053, the trial court has the discretion to impose a seek-work order in an appropriate circumstance. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that such an order was in the “best interest of the child” and the order is consistent with various principles in section 4053. View "Haley v. Antunovich" on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal of the termination of parental rights was whether San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) conducted further inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) applied if there was “reason to believe” an Indian child was involved in the dependency proceedings involving nine-year-old K.T. and his two-year-old sister, D. Early on in the case, the children’s mother and K.T.’s father (father) reported they had possible Cherokee, Choctaw, and Blackfeet ancestry and gave CFS contact information for family members who might be able to provide more detail. CFS never followed up, and the juvenile court found ICWA didn’t apply without first ensuring CFS had pursued these leads. About two years into the proceedings, after the parents failed to reunify with the children, the court determined they were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. On appeal, mother and father argued that despite having reason to believe K.T. and D. were Indian children, CFS failed to conduct adequate further inquiry to determine whether ICWA applies. CFS conceded their error. As a result, the record did not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply, and the Court of Appeal reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law

Family Code section 30441 creates a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking custody within the past five years is detrimental to the child. If the court determines the presumption has been overcome, it must state its reasons in writing or on the record. The trial court issued a restraining order protecting a mother from the father of a child (born in 2015) and, citing the statute, granted the mother sole legal and physical custody. The court left intact a visitation schedule under which the child lived with each parent approximately half of the time. There were problems with the father not returning the child after his visitation. The court of appeal reversed the visitation order, stating that the case illustrates the need for clear and specific findings to facilitate appellate review and to inform the parties and ensure consideration of the proper factors in the first instance. The schedule amounted to joint physical custody, in violation of the statute. The trial court erred in refusing her request for a statement of decision. View "City & County of San Francisco v. H.H." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting the request of paternal relatives in Arizona to place J.Y. with them, although he barely knew them and had no bond with them. The principal reason stated by the trial court for its decision to send J.Y. to Arizona was the trial court's unfounded conclusion that the Department failed in its duty under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3 to give preferential consideration to other relatives in California (not the Arizona relatives) who requested placement back when the parents were receiving reunification services. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by deciding, without any support in the record, the Department failed in its duty to assess other relatives, and by ordering removal of the child from his de facto parents although there was no evidence that removal was necessary or in the child's best interest. View "In re J.Y." on Justia Law

J.O. and M.B. married in 2007 and for more than 15 years also have been in what they describe as a committed, polyamorous relationship with appellant. In 2018, appellant, J.O., and M.B. decided to have a child together. They agreed J.O. and M.B. would be the child’s biological parents, appellant would adopt the child, and J.O. and M.B. would maintain their parental rights. Together, the three of them would share equally in parenting rights and responsibilities. After E.B. was born, appellant began adoption proceedings. Consistent with the requirements for an independent adoption, California’s State Department of Social Services (CDSS) conducted an investigation and concluded the adoption was in E.B.’s best interest. Accordingly, CDSS recommended the uncontested adoption be granted. Rejecting CDSS’s recommendation, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to adopt E.B. Relying on Family Code section 7612, the trial court found appellant had not yet fulfilled E.B.’s needs for a substantial period of time, and there was no likelihood that E.B. would be taken from appellant, resulting in detriment to the child. Appellant moved the court to vacate its order. The trial court denied that motion too. To the Court of Appeals, appellant and CDSS argued the trial court applied the incorrect law to appellant’s adoption petition and, under the correct law, section 8617, the petition to adopt E.B. should have been granted. The Court agreed the trial court applied the incorrect law and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the applicable statute. View "Adoption of E.B." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the order terminating her parental rights to four-year-old Antonio R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, contending that the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother that Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), required the Department to inquire of the maternal extended family members, and the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not apply despite the Department's insufficient inquiry. The court also concluded that the information in the hands of the extended family members was likely to be meaningful in determining whether the child is an Indian child. In this case, the error was prejudicial because the court did not know what information the maternal relatives would have provided had the Department or court inquired. Accordingly, the court conditionally affirmed and remanded for the juvenile court and the Department to comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and California law. View "In re Antonio R." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting respondent's request to move their daughter, H.P., from California to Illinois. The court concluded that the Family Code permitted counsel to determine what was in H.P.'s best interest and make that position known to the trial court; any reliance on hearsay did not prejudice petitioner; and substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that circumstances had changed so significantly that granting the move-away request was in H.P.'s best interest. View "Ramsden v. Peterson" on Justia Law

K.P. (mother) and D.P. (father) appealed juvenile court orders denying mother’s petitions to change the court’s order terminating her reunification services and thereafter terminating both of their parental rights, freeing the minors for adoption. The petition for termination involved the parents' five children, and recounted the parents’ past abuse of the minors, the parents’ history of drug abuse, three of the children having been born with drugs in their system, the parents’ history with the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency), and the parents’ criminal history. A 2020 disposition report recommended the parents be bypassed for services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(13), due to the physical abuse of the minors and the parents’ extensive drug abuse. Later that year, father and mother filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to change the court’s order denying them reunification services. The court summarily denied the parents’ section 388 petitions by written orders, finding for each: “[T]he request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstance” and “the proposed change of order . . . does not promote the best interest of the child.” After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying mother’s section 388 petitions, but reversed its orders terminating parents’ parental rights. The Appellate Court found some evidentiary support for each element of the beneficial parental relationship exception, therefore the juvenile court's ruling there was inadequate evidence to support the exception was an abuse of discretion under the controlling caselaw. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to weigh the evidence presented under the applicable standard and, in its discretion, consider additional evidence. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Hebah Abdelqader appealed an order following a bifurcated trial wherein the superior court denied Hebah’s request for a restraining order against her ex-husband, Abdo Abraham, and granted joint physical custody of the couple’s children, A.A. and G.A. Hebah claimed the court made multiple errors when determining she had not met her burden of proving domestic violence. In addition, Hebah claimed the court erred in failing to articulate, on the record or in writing, the reasons it found the presumption under Family Code section 3044 had been rebutted. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hebah’s request for a restraining order. However, in the published portion of the opinion, the Court agreed the trial court erred in failing to state the reasons, on the record or in writing, it found the presumption under section 3044 had been rebutted. As such, the judgment was reversed as to that issue only and the matter remanded for further consideration. View "Abdelqader v. Abraham" on Justia Law