Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mother appealed from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her child Adrian L. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 She contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b) to inquire of extended family members, including maternal grandmother, paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt, regarding Adrian’s potential status as an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded additional inquiry would not have yielded information that was likely to bear meaningfully on the question of whether Adrian is an Indian child. The court explained that its review of the record as a whole does not disclose that unquestioned extended family members were likely to have had information that would have borne meaningfully on whether Adrian is an Indian child. Accordingly, any ICWA inquiry error under section 224.2, subdivision (b), was harmless. View "In re Adrian L." on Justia Law

Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it determined the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) satisfied its inquiry obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law as to daughter’s possible Indian heritage. No interested party filed a respondent’s brief; instead, the mother, DCFS, and daughter filed a joint application and stipulation for conditional affirmance and remand to the juvenile court to order DCFS to inquire of a non-relative extended family member (NREFM) caring for the child, and available maternal and paternal extended family members in compliance with ICWA and related California law.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed. The court explained that the juvenile court shall order DCFS to make reasonable efforts to interview the NREFM (I.C.) and available maternal and paternal family members about the daughter’s Indian ancestry. The court wrote that this case involves reversible error because the parties agree, and we concur, there was noncompliance with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and related California provisions. Here, DCFS only inquired of the parents regarding Native American ancestry. DCFS did not ask the NREFM I.C. (daughter’s caregiver and prospective adoptive parent), or the extended known maternal and paternal family members about Indian heritage. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), DCFS had a duty to ask daughter’s “extended family members” and “others who have an interest in the child” whether daughter is an Indian child. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Stephen Salmon (Husband) and Melissa Salmon (Wife) filed competing requests for domestic violence restraining orders against each other pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). At the conclusion of the hearing on both petitions, the trial court issued an order granting Wife’s petition and denying Husband’s. Husband appealed. He did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings or to support the issuance of a DVPA restraining order in favor of Wife. Instead, he challenged only the trial court’s denial of his petition, arguing: (1) the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion to the extent it believed Family Code section 6305 constrained its authority to simultaneously grant both requests for protective orders in this case; (2) even if section 6305 applied, the trial court abused its discretion by choosing between two identified aggressors in order to grant relief to only one of them; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant Husband’s request for custody of the parties’ children. The Court of Appeal concluded section 6305 indeed governed the parties' competing requests for competing protective orders; the statute expressly permitted the trial court to weigh the acts of the parties to determine if one should be considered the dominant aggressor before issuing a mutual restraining order; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband's custody request. View "Salmon v. Salmon" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and dispositional order as to her minor child, G.Z. First, Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that her minor son’s subdural hematomas were the result of her neglectful acts. Second, Mother argues her due process rights were violated when the juvenile court relied on Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1’s rebuttable presumption in finding neglect by Mother when it “never notified its intent to do so until all parties had argued and submitted the case.”   The Second Appellate District vacated the court’s factual findings, and directed the juvenile court upon remand to dismiss the petition. The court reversed the juvenile court’s order given the lack of substantial evidence. The court explained that here, as set forth in the preceding section, Mother presented evidence that G.Z.’s subdural hematomas were not the result of abuse or negligence by her, rebutting the presumption of section 355.1, subdivision (a). Mother’s family members who were interviewed all told the CSW they have no concerns of neglect or physical abuse by Mother. Because Mother provided rebuttal evidence, the burden shifted back to DCFS to prove the petition’s allegations. Here, substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. View "In re G.Z." on Justia Law

Timothy W. and Julie W. were in the midst of a dissolution of their marriage. The underlying dispute here relates to Julie’s disclosure of certain facts about Timothy’s past (the sensitive information) that Julie revealed to her codefendant and private investigator, Ronnie Echavarria, Sr. (Echavarria), in connection with the dissolution case. Echavarria revealed the sensitive information to at least one other person, which resulted in several other individuals learning the information. Timothy filed a civil case against Julie and Echavarria (defendants), alleging 12 separate causes of action, many of which were duplicative or not properly pleaded as separate claims. Defendants moved pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) to dismiss. The trial court granted the motions as to 10 of the 12 causes of action, all based in tort, and denied the motion as to two contract-based claims. Timothy appealed, arguing the court erred by granting the motion. Julie cross-appealed, arguing the remaining two causes of action should also have been dismissed. The Court of Appeal concluded that Timothy’s claims directly arose from the dissolution case, and that all of the claims were barred by the litigation privilege. His contract claims were barred on several additional grounds. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court properly granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the tort claims and incorrectly denied it as to the two breach of contract claims. View "Timothy W. v. Julie W." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the County of Los Angeles and other county defendants (the County) for removing her son, J.G., from her care. The County demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. It found the County was immune from suit and Plaintiff failed to allege a mandatory duty sufficient to overcome immunity. Plaintiff appealed and alleged a mandatory duty and, in the alternative, the court should have allowed her to amend her complaint. The court later denied Plaintiff’s motion to tax expert witness fees.   In a consolidated appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff had the burden to establish a reasonable possibility she could amend the complaint to state a claim. She says the determination of whether the collateral contacts provision created a mandatory duty is a factual issue and she “can likely identify more” collateral contacts. However, the court explained that the collateral contacts provision gives social workers discretion to determine which contacts are necessary. As a matter of law, it does not create a mandatory duty. View "Thompson v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In this case, which orginated from a marital dissolution action, the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees based on one of the party's frivolous motions to disqualify the other's attorney. The appellate court determined that the fact that the underlying action was voluntarily dismissed did not divest the court of jurisdiction to issue the award of attorney's fees. View "Marriage of Blake & Langer" on Justia Law

A.C. (Mother) is the mother of E.C., now three years old. In 2020, E.C. was taken into protective custody after Mother’s domestic violence-related arrest, and, in 2021, she was made a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).1 Mother timely appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights under section 366.26.2 E.C.’s alleged father, Ed. C., is not a party to the appeal. Mother’s sole claim on appeal is that Kern County Department of Human Services (the Department) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978(ICWA) and related California law with respect to its duty of “further inquiry,” which was triggered by information that maternal great-grandmother and two maternal great-uncles were enrolled members of the Apache tribe   The Fifth Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2, subdivisions (b) and (e), and rule 5.481(a)(5). The court further explained that if, after determining that an adequate inquiry was made consistent, the juvenile court finds that ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its existing order and proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, its ICWA finding shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the court’s orders terminating Mother’s parental rights are affirmed. View "In re E.C." on Justia Law

A mother appeals an order terminating parental rights over her son, based on a deficient initial inquiry about Indian ancestry. The only source of information about ancestry was the mother. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services could have satisfied its inquiry obligations by asking for contact information and making a few phone calls.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed and remanded to allow the Department and juvenile court fully to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq.) (the Act) and related California law. The court reasoned that because the Department does not argue the issue and because the effect tribal involvement may have had on this case is unknown, the son’s adoptive placement does not establish harmlessness. The court held that, after completing the initial inquiry, there is no reason to believe the son is an Indian child, the court shall reinstate its order terminating parental rights. View "In re Oscar H." on Justia Law

M.H. (Father) and A.C. (Mother) are the parents of K.H., now 20 months old. Due to his parents’ drug use, K.H. was taken into protective custody following his birth and made a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).1 The juvenile court subsequently terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights under section 366.26,2 and Father timely appealed. The sole claim advanced by Father is the alleged violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California law. Father contends Kern County Department of Human Services (the Department) and the juvenile court failed to comply with their affirmative and continuing duties of inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (a), the Department failed to comply with its broad duty of inquiry set forth under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and remand for an adequate inquiry is required.   The Fifth Appellate conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2, subdivision (b), and rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an adequate inquiry was made consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds that ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its existing order and proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, its ICWA finding. View "In re K.H." on Justia Law