Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Radell R. appealed a dispositional order denying him reunification services with his eight-year-old and six-year-old daughters under the bypass provision in California Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 (b)(6) for infliction of severe physical harm. He argued the juvenile court failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for making a bypass finding under section 361.5 (b)(6) and the finding isn’t supported by substantial evidence. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore reversed the bypass finding and remanded for the court to reconsider his entitlement to reunification services. View "In re T.R." on Justia Law

D.S. and A.S. were married and have children, ages 14 and eight. A.S. filed a petition for legal separation and an ex parte request for temporary emergency orders related to child custody and visitation, property control, and “an order that all contact between Mother and Father be peaceful and neither party disparage the other, alienate the children nor discuss details of the custody case with the child.” She alleged that D.S. had a “trigger temper” and that the “children and I have had to flee the home multiple [times] when his anger has gotten out of control.” She stated that she did not have access to the family’s bank accounts. After the court denied her ex parte request, A.S. filed, and was granted, a peremptory challenge against the judge who issued the denial. A week later, A.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), which sought personal conduct orders and a stay-away order. A.S. identified two dates on which she and her children had suffered abuse. D.S. denied the allegations and appealed the DVRO. The court of appeal reversed. The family court abused its discretion in granting the DVRO without holding an evidentiary hearing compliant with Family Code section 217. View "Marriage of D.S. & A.S." on Justia Law

In 2015, appellant Destiny C. (Mother) petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to her husband Justin C. (Father). Six years later, following a six-day trial on custody and visitation issues, the family court made final custody orders, directing both parents to share joint legal and physical custody of the couple’s then-seven-year-old daughter. Mother disputed that order, relying primarily on the Family Code section 3044 presumption against the award of joint legal or physical custody to a party who is found to have committed domestic violence “within the previous five years.” She contended the five-year period provided for in section 3044 ran backwards from the filing of the dissolution petition, not from the date of the family court’s custody ruling. The trial court rejected this "impractical construction." The Court of Appeal also rejected appellant's construction and affirmed the custody order. View "Marriage of Destiny C. & Justin C." on Justia Law

After D.H. (Mother) and B.G. (Father) divorced, Father was obligated to pay $10,000 per month in child support for the parties’ youngest child, A.G., subject to California Family Code section 3901. Father filed requests for orders (RFOs) seeking: (1) a judicial determination that his child support obligation had terminated; and (2) a refund of overpaid support—both on the basis that A.G. had turned 18 and was no longer enrolled as a full-time high school student after June 2020. Father also sought sanctions against Mother pursuant to Family Code section 271. The trial court declined to impose sanctions, but granted Father’s other requests, finding that A.G. was no longer a full-time high school student as of July 1, 2020, and ordering Mother to refund overpaid amounts of child support. On appeal, Mother argued that the court erred by: (1) misinterpreting the meaning of “full-time” in section 3901; (2) finding that A.G. was not a “full-time” high school student; (3) terminating child support retroactively; (4) implicitly finding a material change of circumstance to justify modifying child support; (5) relying on unadmitted evidence; and (6) improperly shifting the burden of proof to Mother on Father’s RFOs. The Court of Appeal found that “full-time” in Family Code section 3901 generally had the same meaning as set forth in Education Code section 48200 regarding compulsory education for minor children: “the length of the schoolday [designated] by the governing board of the school district in which the residency of either the parent or legal guardian is located.” Because the trial court did not apply this definition, the court's order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings, and additional discovery, if necessary, so that the court could make appropriate findings. Mother’s remaining arguments were rejected. View "Marriage of D.H. and B.G" on Justia Law

The Sonoma County Human Services Department filed a petition on behalf of then-11-month-old A.G., alleging that A.G.’s alleged father, F.G., recently been released from prison, violently attacked her Mother twice in the baby’s presence. The Department recommended that A.G. and her 14-year-old half-sister be declared dependents and remain in Mother’s custody with Mother to receive family maintenance services. Mother and F.G. had a history of domestic violence. Mother’s extensive child welfare history began in 2015, with allegations of general neglect, physical abuse, and emotional abuse inflicted by Mother on her older daughters. Mother had a history of substance abuse. The court declared A.G. a dependent and ordered family maintenance services. About 18 months later, a neighbor found Mother unconscious and unresponsive outside her apartment at around midnight, with A.G. crying and strapped in her stroller. Paramedics arrived; when Mother was finally roused, she became combative and displayed indicators of intoxication. She admitted taking two “bars” of Xanax.The court terminated reunification services and found that returning A.G. to Mother's care would “create a substantial risk of detriment” to A.G.’s “safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.” The court of appeal upheld the order, rejecting Mother's argument that the court improperly compared A.G.’s current foster home to Mother’s home and “evaluated [A.G.’s] best interest, instead of evaluating detriment of return.” There was substantial evidence that Mother’s history of drug use and relapse posed a risk of detriment to A.G. View "Sarah K. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal is whether section 5241 precludes the obligee from seeking a determination of arrearages allegedly owed by the obligor, where the obligor’s employer is subject to a valid earnings assignment order. The family court ruled section 5241 precludes such a request, but reached that conclusion by answering a different question: whether section 5241 precludes an obligee from seeking to enforce arrearages against an obligor whose employer is subject to an earnings assignment order. The court concluded section 5241 precludes such a request. As a result, the family court denied a request by Plainitff for an order to determine child and spousal support arrearages against her former husband, Defendant. The court also granted Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff’s attorney.   The Second Appellate District reversed the family court’s order and directed the court to determine the amount of arrearages, if any, Defendant owes Plaintiff.  The court explained that based on the language and legislative history of section 5241, we conclude that, where an employer is subject to an earnings assignment order, section 5241 protects obligors only from being held in contempt or subject to criminal prosecution for nonpayment of the support. Contrary to the family court’s ruling the statute does not preclude an obligee like Plaintiff from seeking arrearages or a determination of arrearages from an obligor like Defendant. Which in turn means Plaintiff’s request for an order determining arrearages was not frivolous for the reasons stated by the family court and did not support an award of sanctions against Appellant. View "Brubaker v. Strum" on Justia Law

C.K. (Father) and I.B. (Mother) appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to their infant child, D.B. They argued the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services failed to comply with its duty of initial inquiry into Father’s Indian ancestry under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, and related California law (ICWA), and thus the juvenile court erroneously found that ICWA did not apply. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and found that the error was prejudicial. It therefore conditionally reversed and remanded to allow the Department to fully comply with ICWA. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition alleging that the minor had been sexually abused by her father. Mother was not named as an offending parent in the petition. The juvenile court found that the Department failed to prove the sexual abuse allegations against the father but did not dismiss the petition. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported jurisdiction based upon unpleaded allegations of emotional abuse by the mother, a position urged by the minor’s counsel but opposed by the Department. The court subsequently entered a disposition order.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court violated the mother’s due process rights when it established jurisdiction based on the conduct of a parent the Department never alleged was an offending parent, and on a factual and legal theory not raised in the Department’s petition. Parents have a due process right to be informed of the nature of the proceedings and the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated so that they can make an informed decision on whether to appear, prepare, and contest the allegations. View "In re S.V." on Justia Law

This is an appeal from a family court’s self-described sua sponte sanctions order under Family Code section 271.1 The family court judge ordered Appellants (Mother) and her attorney, to each pay $10,000 to Respondent (Father) and partly justified the sanctions on its finding that Appellants unjustifiably accused the judge of being biased (or appearing to be biased).   The Second Appellate District considered whether the sanctions order represents an abuse of the family court’s discretion and reversed the family court’s order. The court explained that as to the attorney, the family court’s sanctions award is obviously wrong: Section 271 permits imposing sanctions only on a party, not a party’s attorney, and the sanctions award against the attorney is, therefore, improper. As against Mother, the sanctions award is an error, too, even if a marginally less obvious one. There is a question as to whether section 271 even authorizes a family court to issue sanctions on its own motion, but the court explained it need not decide that issue because the conduct relied on by the family court to impose sanctions here, even considered in the aggregate, does not rise to the level of meriting sanctions. The family court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. View "Featherstone v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Petitioners W.M. (minor), and Amber G. (her prospective adoptive parent/de facto parent) sought an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order removing W.M. from Amber’s care and placing her with out-of-state relatives she has never met. The California Legislature enacted a "complex scheme of placement preferences," and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) conflated the considerations involved in the placement of a child with those involved in removing a child posttermination from a prospective adoptive parent’s home. "While placement with relatives is generally favored when the need arises, removal from any stable, permanent, loving home (with non-relatives or relatives), particularly after a child has been freed for adoption, is not. By failing to recognize its burden in recommending W.M.’s removal, SSA obscured the critical decision the juvenile court needed to make: Was removing W.M. from her current placement in her best interest?" After carefully reviewing the entire record, the Court of Appeal found SSA was obligated to do much more pursuant to the prospective adoptive parent (PAP) preference. The statute also required the court to hold a hearing and review all material evidence relating to SSA’s removal decision before approving or rejecting it. In this case, it appears the court focused on the reasons for the delay in placing W.M. with her relatives, and neglected to sufficiently consider Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26(n)’s directive. Petitioners argued there was insufficient evidence that it would be in W.M.'s best interest to remove her from the only family she has ever known, and eliminate any chance she has of connecting with her siblings, for the opportunity to live with out-of-state blood relatives who are strangers to her. The Court of Appeal granted the petitions and vacated the juvenile court’s removal order. View "Amber G. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law