Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Swan and Hatchett are the parents of triplets born in 2016. They share custody. At a hearing addressing child support, Swan testified from a profit and loss statement that he had prepared for his self-employment as a tax preparer, real estate broker, mortgage broker, and appraiser, that his net income as of August 2017 was $40,498. The trial court found Swan’s bookkeeping poor, and after adding back certain deductions Swan had taken, calculated Swan’s income as $110,940 per year. The trial court ordered Swan to pay child support of $2,350 per month, retroactive to the beginning of 2017. Hatchett was not working. The trial court did not impute income to her due to insufficient information. In September 2018, Swan requested changes to the order, including ordering Hatchett to seek work and waiving interest on certain arrears. The court ordered Hatchett to undergo a vocational evaluation paid for by Swan. The parties stipulated that Swan was “entitled to a hardship when calculating child support.”The trial court denied his request to reduce the amount of child support and awarded Hatchett $10,000 in need-based attorney’s fees. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred by ignoring Swan’s evidence of his income, that he had a new child, and that Hatchett’s income had increased. The trial court’s refusal to consider Swan's evidence of his income for child support purposes conflicted with its finding that he could pay Hatchett’s attorney’s fees. View "Swan v. Hatchett" on Justia Law

S.B. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) with H.B.’s extended family members.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Department inquired about Indian ancestry with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees identified as a likely source of information about ancestry. The juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. Under the court’s deferential standard of review, the juvenile court did not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the juvenile court denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his petition filed under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 388 to reinstate reunification services with Minor, holding that, under the circumstances, it was error to deny Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition.A few days after Minor's birth, the Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition on his behalf under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300. The juvenile court terminated the reunification services of Father, who had been incarcerated since before Minor was born, and set a Cal. Well. & Inst. Code 366.26 hearing. The day before the hearing, Father filed his section 388 petition, stating that he had not been provided with services despite the court's orders. The court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition. View "In re Damari Y." on Justia Law

Robin J. appealed the denial of her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Michael M., the father of their two children. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court misapplied the law in denying Robin’s renewal request, and that Robin established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant the renewal request and decide whether the DVRO should be renewed for five or more years, or permanently. View "Michael M. v. Robin J." on Justia Law

A.C. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s dispositional finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 did not apply to the dependency proceedings to her five children. Mother contended that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 (b). After review of the juvenile court record, the Court of Appeal concluded that Mother’s argument lacked merit and therefore affirmed. View "In re Ja.O." on Justia Law

C.E. (mother) appealed an order terminating her parental rights to I.E. (the child) and freeing the child for adoption. Mother’s sole claim on appeal was that the juvenile court erred by ruling the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. The Court of Appeal found the record, especially the child’s consistent and compelling statements that she wished to be adopted, "amply supported" the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to the child. Because the Court found no abuse of discretion, judgment was affirmed. View "In re I.E." on Justia Law

After mother was released from a section 5150 hold, the Agency and mother agreed to a safety plan whereby 11-month-old S.F. would remain in maternal grandmother’s care. Mother violated the safety plan. Father was then residing in New York but was providing monetary assistance to mother and minor. Mother and her boyfriend alleged she received threatening text messages from father. The Agency detained S.F. and filed a petition alleging failure to protect under Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)(1), alleging that “father has anger management issues and “reported that he used to abuse crack cocaine and alcohol but that he is about 2 years sober.” Father desired to take custody and was willing to move to California. He alleged that he and his sister had been “physically present” and helped care for minor until minor was three months old.The juvenile court adjudicated S.F. a dependent of the court. The court of appeal reversed in part. The jurisdictional findings, the dispositional order removing S.F. from father’s custody, and the orders requiring father to engage in substance abuse testing and treatment are not supported by substantial evidence. The juvenile court adequately complied with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. The Agency had a reason to believe, but did not have sufficient information to determine there was a reason to know, S.F. was an Indian child. View "In re S.F." on Justia Law

Newborn A.H. was placed in a foster home. The Agency reported that it had denied a request for placement by J.B., a “nonrelative extended family member” (NREFM, Welf. & Inst. Code 362.7). J.B. filed a “Relative Information,” requesting that A.H. live with her. The Agency objected on the ground that J.B. was not a relative for purposes of the proceedings. The juvenile court agreed, stating that it independently considered placement with several relatives or with J.B. and denied placement with those individuals “for the reasons stated in the Social Worker’s Report.” J.B. filed a section 388 “Request to Change Court Order.” The juvenile court summarily denied J.B.’s petition, finding that the request did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances, and did not promote A.H.’s best interest. J.B. filed a notice of appeal. The Agency reported that in the dependency case of A.H.’s half-sibling, J.B. “created a division” between the Agency and the parents, falsely accusing the caregiver of neglect. The juvenile court terminated parental rights, selecting adoption as the permanent plan.The court of appeal dismissed J.B.’s appeal from the denial of her petition, the refusal to consider her relative information form, and the placement order. Although J.B. may have an “interest” in A.H. that is sufficient for filing a section 388 petition, she does not have a legally cognizable interest in A.H.’s placement such that she has standing to challenge the juvenile court’s placement decision. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

The Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of eight children, alleging sexual abuse. Mother initially indicated that her deceased mother “had some Native ancestry.” Father reported “no Native American ancestry.” Days later, Mother reported that “she is not Native American and she paid for genetic testing.” At the detention hearing, Mother’s counsel represented that Mother has no Indian ancestry that she knows. The juvenile court responded: "Maybe there was a misunderstanding. I’ll make a finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. 1901) does not apply.” Mother's ICWA-020 form indicated “no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” Father's form indicated “None.” The maternal aunt and the paternal grandfather both reported no documented information about Native American ancestry.After the contested hearing, the juvenile court declared dependency. A maternal cousin, the grandfather, and an aunt attended. The court again asked about Native American ancestry. The parents responded no. The court's finding that ICWA did not apply was included in the order.The parents did not challenge the jurisdictional findings or the dispositional orders but alleged that the Agency failed to satisfy its initial duty of inquiry into the children’s possible Native American heritage. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting their contention that the Agency was required to interview five additional extended family members, acknowledging that the Agency and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and continuing” duty of inquiry. View "In re E.W." on Justia Law

Appellants were the maternal grandparents of the dependent child C.P. At a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the juvenile court ordered a legal guardianship for the child and appointed grandparents as his guardians. Grandparents contended the court should have instead selected adoption as the child’s permanent plan and designated them as the child’s prospective adoptive parents. The Court of Appeal agreed with grandparents and therefore reversed the order of legal guardianship. The Court directed the juvenile court to reconsider the matter given this opinion and any changed circumstances. View "In re C.P." on Justia Law