Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff (Mother) appealed from the post-judgment order modifying the parenting plan between her and her former husband, Defendant (Father) with respect to their two minor children. Mother contends the family court abused its discretion in ordering the children to participate with Father in a therapy program operated by Family Bridges, which mandated no contact with Mother for a minimum of 90 days.   The Second Appellate District agreed and reversed the order. The court explained that nothing in the record supports the court’s finding that this significant disruption to the children’s established living arrangement with Mother was in their best interest. The order requires the children, for a minimum period of three months, to be moved out of their home and either moved across the country to Los Angeles if the Family Bridges program can be completed during a school break or moved into a new home in New York with Father until the program can be completed there during the school year. The children would not be allowed any contact with Mother during this disruptive period. Without evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to remove them from Mother’s custody for a period of at least 90 days in order to participate in the Family Bridges program, the court abused its discretion in issuing its order of December 22, 2021. View "Johnston-Rossi v. Rossi" on Justia Law

The Bureau filed a dependency petition with respect to L.B., Welfare and Institutions Code 300, due to Mother’s failure to protect L.B. from ongoing domestic violence between Mother and her long-term partner, T.Y., and her inability to provide support for L.B. due to her hospitalization for leukemia and consumption of high doses of pain medication. Mother had a history of arrests and had attempted suicide. Despite many reports to the contrary, Mother denied domestic violence, claimed she had no mental health issues, and denied using nonprescribed drugs. L.B.’s school attendance had been poor. L.B. was detained with Father.At the dispositional hearing, Mother testified about her intervening arrest for assault with a deadly weapon and denied telling a social worker that L.B. had seen domestic violence between her and T.Y. The juvenile court found Mother unable to protect the child from ongoing domestic violence and that Mother presented an ongoing risk to L.B. given her domestic violence history, her propensity to engage in violent acts, and her failure to take any preventative steps to allay the court’s concerns. The court granted sole physical custody of L.B. to Father, joint legal custody to both parents, and supervised visitation for Mother. The court of appeal affirmed. There was substantial evidence that L.B. would otherwise be at substantial risk of serious harm. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law

C.G. (Mother) and R.A. (Father) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to three of their minor children. Father’s parents repeatedly denied any Indian ancestry, but Mother reported she was affiliated with the Jemez Pueblo tribe in New Mexico. Father eventually denied having any Indian ancestry or tribal affiliation. The juvenile court found the children might be Indian children and ordered notice to be reported to the Jemez Pueblo tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The Jemez Pueblo tribe required individuals to have a 1/4 Jemez Pueblo blood quantum. Mother provided verification of her tribal registration status with the tribe, which confirmed her Jemez Pueblo blood quantum was over 1/4. A social worker from the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) contacted the Jemez Pueblo and was told that none of the children were registered members of the tribe. The social worker reported she contacted Annette Gachupin, a Child Advocate for the Jemez Pueblo and the tribe’s ICWA Representative. Gachupin confirmed that Mother was an enrolled member of the Jemez Pueblo tribe, but the children were not eligible to become registered members because their blood quantum was too low to meet requirements for tribal membership. Instead, the children were eligible for “naturalization,” which would only qualify them for tribal health services while excluding them from receiving federal funds that Jemez Pueblo members receive. Mother never completed the paperwork to have the children naturalized. The Department asked the juvenile court to find that ICWA did not apply because the children were not Indian children. The parents did not object, nor did the children’s attorney. The juvenile court found that the children were not Indian children and therefore ICWA did not apply. The lack of objections notwithstanding, the parents appealed the termination and the ICWA ruling. The Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court did not err: Indian tribes determine whether a child is a member of the tribe or eligible for membership. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that N., H., and A. were not “Indian children” for ICWA purposes. View "In re A.A." on Justia Law

Petitioner D.S. (Mother) was the adoptive mother of A.S. In 2021, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) petitioned on behalf of A.S. in response to allegations of physical abuse. During the pendency of the proceedings, Mother petitioned to have A.S. placed back in her home. She appealed the summary denial of her petition. However, on appeal, Mother did not address any issue encompassed by her petition, nor did she seek reversal of the order denying her petition or reversal of any prior jurisdictional or dispositional orders. Instead, Mother’s opening brief was entirely devoted to seeking review of the adequacy of the juvenile court and CFS’s efforts to fulfill their obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) seeking only to have the matter “remanded with instructions for the juvenile court to order full compliance with the inquiry provisions of the ICWA.” Consequently, the Court of Appeal construed Mother's appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ seeking an order directing the juvenile court and CFS to comply with their statutory duties under ICWA and the related California statutes. Upon consideration of the matter on the merits, the Court granted the requested relief. View "D.S. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Mother S.G. appealed after the juvenile court terminated her parental rights to her son. She raised two challenges. First, she faults the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for failing to exercise due diligence in locating her son’s father (Father). Mother argued this failure to locate Father, which included ignoring information she provided on how to locate him, invalidated the notice the court deemed proper for Father. Second, she contends DCFS did not comply with its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2,1 subdivision (b) when it failed to ask maternal and paternal extended family members about Indian ancestry within the meaning of Section 1903 of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and directed the juvenile court to order DCFS to complete its duty of due diligence to discover the whereabouts of Father and complete its initial inquiry of available maternal and paternal relatives into familial Indian ancestry. The court explained that this dependency proceeding lasted over two years. In that time, DCFS made two attempts to locate Father, and it did so using database search resources only. It made no attempt to inquire about Indian ancestry after obtaining Mother’s denial of such ancestry. The court found that DCFS did not exercise reasonable due diligence in its attempts to locate Father. The court also found that  DCFS erred in determining that ICWA did not apply without inquiring about available family members for whom it had contact information. View "In re Jayden G." on Justia Law

Mother gave birth to Minor’s half-brother and tested positive for drugs at the hospital, triggering a referral to the Solano County Social Services Department. Mother abandoned the newborn at the hospital. Three-year-old Minor’s whereabouts were unknown. The Department contacted Father, a truck driver, then in Michigan. Father explained that Mother left Minor in the care of a friend. The Department confirmed that Minor was safe in the friend’s custody. Father had cared for Minor for several months in 2019 when Mother was using methamphetamines and alcohol. Mother “got sober” in 2020. The Department filed a petition alleging Minor was at substantial risk of serious harm due to Mother’s ongoing substance abuse and that Father knew or should have known Mother was continuing to use drugs but left Minor with her “without a safety plan.” Father entered a denial.The court of appeal affirmed orders regarding detention and jurisdiction but reversed the disposition order. The Department must establish by clear and convincing evidence that placing Minor with Father “would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child,” The record lacked substantial evidence to support such a finding. The juvenile court also abused its discretion by ordering Father to engage in recommended reunification services—substance abuse testing, completion of a parenting class, and participation in a parent-partner program. The record lacks any evidence that Father uses or abuses narcotics or alcohol. Father co-parented three children of his prior marriage, all now adults. View "In re M.C." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from a post-judgment order denying her request for the entry of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) and instead adopting the QDRO proposed by Respondent. Appellant contends that the family court erred in two respects when it signed Respondent’s QDRO. First, the court erroneously used Respondent’s rank and salary at the time of the parties’ separation to calculate the community interest in Respondent’s pension instead of his final rank and salary at the time of his retirement, as required by the time rule. Second, the court committed legal error by ordering that Appellant’s property interest in the pension reverts to Respondent if she predeceases him.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that by mandating that upon Appellant’s death, her share of the pension would revert to Respondent, Respondent’s QDRO effectively revives the terminable interest rule, contravening Family Code section 2610. Thus, the court held that the provision cannot stand. View "Marriage of Belthius" on Justia Law

The Morenos sought a determination that Bertuccio was not an heir entitled to an intestate share of the Estate of Franco. The probate court granted them summary judgment, finding Bertuccio to be the child of a 1957 marriage between his mother Marilyn and Frank Bertuccio, under the marital presumption. Family Code section 7540(a) provides that “the child of spouses who cohabited at the time of conception and birth is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” Frank was identified as Bertuccio’s father on his birth certificate and paid child support for Bertuccio after he and Marilyn divorced. Marilyn purportedly told Bertuccio that Franco was his father. The court held Bertuccio was not entitled to prove Franco was his natural parent from whom he could inherit in intestate succession under Probate Code section 6453(b)(2).The court of appeal remanded. If Bertuccio were found to be a child of the marriage of Marilyn and Frank, pursuant to the marital presumption, he would not be entitled to prove Franco was his natural parent. However, the probate court erred in applying the marital presumption without first making the requisite finding that Marilyn and Frank were cohabiting at the time of Bertuccio’s conception and birth. View "Estate of Franco" on Justia Law

K.V. (Mother) and David V. (Father) appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to daughter M.V. They contend the court erred when it declined to order a supplemental bonding study and did not conduct a proper analysis of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.   The Second Appellate District reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded the matter to juvenile court. The court explained that by failing to determine whether M.V. had a substantial, positive attachment to her parents, and by relying on improper factors in assessing detriment, the juvenile court failed to perform the appropriate analysis when determining if the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. View "In re M.V. CA2/" on Justia Law

Appellant V.R. is the mother of now 11-year-old N.R. Mother appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to N.R. Mother argued that the order is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness or child detriment. Specifically, she argued that termination cannot be predicated on earlier, unchallenged findings of parental unfitness or child detriment as to N.R. because, after N.R. and her younger half-sister R.L. were removed from mother’s custody, the juvenile court returned R.L. to mother. According to mother, R.L.’s return to mother “rebutted” the earlier findings as a matter of law. If these earlier findings are disregarded, mother continues, no substantial evidence otherwise supports termination of her parental rights as to N.R.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court explained that the record reflects manifest differences between N.R.’s and R.L.’s needs and mother’s ability to parent each child. Throughout the proceedings, the juvenile court carefully considered this evidence and the respective risks the children faced in mother’s care. The court, therefore, rejected mother’s argument that R.L.’s return to mother rebutted or otherwise limited the vitality of prior findings of mother’s unfitness to parent N.R. or the detriment to N.R. of remaining in, or being returned to, mother’s custody. Notwithstanding its order returning R.L. to mother’s custody, due process permitted the juvenile court to rely on such findings at the section 366.26 hearing. View "In re N.R." on Justia Law