Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

C.E. (mother) appealed an order terminating her parental rights to I.E. (the child) and freeing the child for adoption. Mother’s sole claim on appeal was that the juvenile court erred by ruling the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. The Court of Appeal found the record, especially the child’s consistent and compelling statements that she wished to be adopted, "amply supported" the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to the child. Because the Court found no abuse of discretion, judgment was affirmed. View "In re I.E." on Justia Law

After mother was released from a section 5150 hold, the Agency and mother agreed to a safety plan whereby 11-month-old S.F. would remain in maternal grandmother’s care. Mother violated the safety plan. Father was then residing in New York but was providing monetary assistance to mother and minor. Mother and her boyfriend alleged she received threatening text messages from father. The Agency detained S.F. and filed a petition alleging failure to protect under Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)(1), alleging that “father has anger management issues and “reported that he used to abuse crack cocaine and alcohol but that he is about 2 years sober.” Father desired to take custody and was willing to move to California. He alleged that he and his sister had been “physically present” and helped care for minor until minor was three months old.The juvenile court adjudicated S.F. a dependent of the court. The court of appeal reversed in part. The jurisdictional findings, the dispositional order removing S.F. from father’s custody, and the orders requiring father to engage in substance abuse testing and treatment are not supported by substantial evidence. The juvenile court adequately complied with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. The Agency had a reason to believe, but did not have sufficient information to determine there was a reason to know, S.F. was an Indian child. View "In re S.F." on Justia Law

Newborn A.H. was placed in a foster home. The Agency reported that it had denied a request for placement by J.B., a “nonrelative extended family member” (NREFM, Welf. & Inst. Code 362.7). J.B. filed a “Relative Information,” requesting that A.H. live with her. The Agency objected on the ground that J.B. was not a relative for purposes of the proceedings. The juvenile court agreed, stating that it independently considered placement with several relatives or with J.B. and denied placement with those individuals “for the reasons stated in the Social Worker’s Report.” J.B. filed a section 388 “Request to Change Court Order.” The juvenile court summarily denied J.B.’s petition, finding that the request did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances, and did not promote A.H.’s best interest. J.B. filed a notice of appeal. The Agency reported that in the dependency case of A.H.’s half-sibling, J.B. “created a division” between the Agency and the parents, falsely accusing the caregiver of neglect. The juvenile court terminated parental rights, selecting adoption as the permanent plan.The court of appeal dismissed J.B.’s appeal from the denial of her petition, the refusal to consider her relative information form, and the placement order. Although J.B. may have an “interest” in A.H. that is sufficient for filing a section 388 petition, she does not have a legally cognizable interest in A.H.’s placement such that she has standing to challenge the juvenile court’s placement decision. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

The Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of eight children, alleging sexual abuse. Mother initially indicated that her deceased mother “had some Native ancestry.” Father reported “no Native American ancestry.” Days later, Mother reported that “she is not Native American and she paid for genetic testing.” At the detention hearing, Mother’s counsel represented that Mother has no Indian ancestry that she knows. The juvenile court responded: "Maybe there was a misunderstanding. I’ll make a finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. 1901) does not apply.” Mother's ICWA-020 form indicated “no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” Father's form indicated “None.” The maternal aunt and the paternal grandfather both reported no documented information about Native American ancestry.After the contested hearing, the juvenile court declared dependency. A maternal cousin, the grandfather, and an aunt attended. The court again asked about Native American ancestry. The parents responded no. The court's finding that ICWA did not apply was included in the order.The parents did not challenge the jurisdictional findings or the dispositional orders but alleged that the Agency failed to satisfy its initial duty of inquiry into the children’s possible Native American heritage. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting their contention that the Agency was required to interview five additional extended family members, acknowledging that the Agency and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and continuing” duty of inquiry. View "In re E.W." on Justia Law

Appellants were the maternal grandparents of the dependent child C.P. At a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the juvenile court ordered a legal guardianship for the child and appointed grandparents as his guardians. Grandparents contended the court should have instead selected adoption as the child’s permanent plan and designated them as the child’s prospective adoptive parents. The Court of Appeal agreed with grandparents and therefore reversed the order of legal guardianship. The Court directed the juvenile court to reconsider the matter given this opinion and any changed circumstances. View "In re C.P." on Justia Law

M.C. (mother) appealed the termination of parental rights to two of her children (the children) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the juvenile court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) responded that by failing to raise the issue, mother forfeited her right to raise it on appeal; alternatively, the Department argued that substantial evidence supports the court’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case. Mother also contended the juvenile court and the Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California statutes.   The Second Appellate District concluded the forfeiture doctrine does not bar mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s compliance with the UCCJEA, and the error requires conditional reversal of the parental rights termination orders with directions to the court to undertake the process that the UCCJEA requires. This disposition will permit mother to raise the unopposed ICWA arguments she makes on appeal. The court explained that here, the usual benefit from the application of the forfeiture doctrine—to encourage parties to bring issues to the trial court—would not be conferred under the facts of this case. Thus, although the Department or mother could have done more to urge the juvenile court to undertake the UCCJEA process, the objective facts supporting the need for such a process were readily apparent from the record. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services detained infant boy S.S. at birth, based on exigency, alleging his parents abused drugs and S.S. was born testing positive for various drugs. The juvenile court detained S.S. from his parents and placed him with his maternal aunt and uncle. The mother and father both denied Indian ancestry. The maternal aunt, however, said that the mother might have Yaqui heritage. The Department, in turn, notified the Pascua Yaqui tribe, which replied S.S. was not eligible for membership: the tribe would not intervene. The Department never asked paternal extended family members about the possibility of Indian ancestry. The court terminated parental rights in favor of a permanent plan of adoption by the maternal aunt and uncle, who were the caretakers and prospective adoptive parents. The mother appealed. At issue is the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, sections 1901 and following title 25 of the United States Code (the Act, or ICWA) and its California counterpart.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to inquire of the three paternal extended family members previously identified whether S.S. may be an Indian child. The court explained that the Department’s failure prejudices tribes. The Department had contact information for three extended paternal family members but did nothing with it, thus denying tribes the benefit of the statutory promise. It would be a miscarriage of justice to deny tribes the benefit of this legislation. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

When A.F. was 11 years old, she applied for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F., who held joint legal custody with her mother, Andrea F. Mother was the original guardian ad litem (GAL), and she retained attorney Edward Castro to represent A.F. Father successfully moved to disqualify Mother as the GAL and Castro as A.F.’s counsel. A.F. appealed the order disqualifying Castro. A new GAL was not appointed. Although A.F. brought the petition on her own behalf, the family court in her parents’ dissolution matter, appointed a “minor’s counsel” to represent her best interests there, in anticipation of changes to the custody and visitation arrangement that could result from the outcome in the DV matter. A.F. retained attorney Aaron Smith, to represent her in the DV matter. The court disqualified Smith for numerous reasons, including that there was a potential conflict of interest from having her maternal grandfather serve as a third-party guarantor. The court also interviewed A.F. and determined she was not competent to retain counsel independently, and it found Smith did not meet the requirements detailed by the California Rules of Court to serve as a “minor’s counsel.” The court appointed counsel in the DV matter, and prohibited Smith from replacing the attorney the court appointed as a “minor’s counsel.” A.F. appealed, contending that the issue of selecting her attorney should have been stayed pending the appeal of the court’s order disqualifying Castro. She also contended it was error to appoint counsel in the DV matter and to disqualify the attorney she chose to represent her there. The Court of Appeal: (1) concluded the court had subject matter jurisdiction to act in the DV matter while the first appeal was pending because her original attorney substituted out of the case; (2) reversed the appointment of a “minor’s counsel,” which was improper in a DV matter where a minor seeks a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA); (3) affirmed the order voiding the agreement between A.F. and Smith and removing Smith as her attorney on the basis that A.F. lacked competency to select her attorney independently; (4) reversed the order prohibiting Smith from serving as A.F.’s attorney in the matter because it was an abuse of discretion to completely disqualify him on the basis that the court rejected the fee agreement or that he failed to meet the requirements of Rule 5.242. View "A.F. v. Jeffrey F." on Justia Law

Jessica G. (Mother) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights to her son, Robert F. Relying on subdivision (b) Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, Mother argued that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry, because DPSS did not ask various extended family members whether Robert had any Indian ancestry. The Court of Appeal found DPSS took Robert into protective custody pursuant to a warrant, so DPSS did not take Robert into temporary custody under section 306. Accordingly, DPSS had no obligation to ask Robert’s extended family members about his potential Indian status under section 224.2(b). The Court therefore affirmed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re Robert F." on Justia Law

Appellant Madera County Department of Social Services (department) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a combined hearing for family reunification review and disposition from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3871 petition on November 15, 2021. The department contends the juvenile court erred when it ordered the department to provide additional reunification services to L.V. (mother) for her dependent children Damian L. and Jesse A. (collectively “the children”).   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the juvenile court’s order continuing mother’s reunification services. The court remanded to the juvenile court with directions to vacate its order continuing mother’s family reunification services. The court explained that the juvenile court erred in failing to consider the entire time period since the children’s initial removal when it calculated the 18-month statutory limit on reunification services. By the time the juvenile court ordered mother’s reunification services to continue in November 2021, mother had received approximately 26 months of services, which was well over the 18-month limit. View "In re Damian L." on Justia Law