Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Miguel D. (Father) left his eight-year-old daughter, M.D., alone inside a locked apartment that had no electricity, an empty non-operable refrigerator, and no edible food. After waking up to find her father and his truck gone, M.D. climbed through a kitchen window to look for him and was found wandering the apartment complex. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging Father failed to adequately supervise and protect M.D., and willfully or negligently failed to provide her with adequate food and shelter. The juvenile court found the petition true, took jurisdiction, and removed M.D. from Father’s custody while he was offered reunification services. On appeal, Father argued the Court of Appeal had to reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order because Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(2) prohibited the juvenile court from assuming jurisdiction over a child “solely” due to a parent’s indigence or poverty. He further argued the Court should reverse the dispositional order because the Agency failed to demonstrate there were no reasonable means to protect M.D. without removing her from Father’s custody. Because the record did not support either contention, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.D." on Justia Law

Malinowski filed for dissolution of her marriage to Martin. While that case was pending, Malinowski filed an ex parte request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, 6200), seeking to protect herself and the parties’ children. Pending a hearing on the merits, the trial court issued a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) against Martin with “no-contact” and “stay-away” provisions. Subsequently, the court modified the DVTRO to allow Martin brief contact with the children consistent with a visitation order. Malinowski contends the trial court erred by modifying the DVTRO without adhering to Code of Civil Procedure section 533, which requires notice and a showing of changed circumstances for modification or dissolution of an injunction or a temporary restraining order.The court of appeal concluded that section 533 does not provide the exclusive means by which a trial court in a DVPA action may modify a DVTRO; a trial court is not necessarily obligated to proceed under section 533 before modifying a DVTRO to allow for exceptions consistent with child visitation ordered in a parallel dissolution case. In an appropriate case, the requirements of due process may require the court to consider evidence presented at a noticed hearing consistent with section 533 in order to resolve disputed factual matters. View "Malinowski v. Martin" on Justia Law

Appellant Shauna Willis appealed an order granting her request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-husband, Respondent Ricky Willis. She contended the family court erred under Family Code section 3044(a) because the court maintained joint physical custody by keeping in place a visitation order which had granted each approximately equal custody time with their child, T.W. The issue presented by this appeal was whether the rebuttable presumption of section 3044(a) arose in a proceeding for issuance of a DVRO when neither party was seeking custody or a modification of a custody or visitation order. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise in that situation. "Our conclusion is based on the plain language of section 3044(a), which by its terms applies only when a party is seeking custody of the child and is reinforced by other statutory provisions." Because the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise, the family court erred by awarding Appellant sole legal and physical custody of T.W. Although Respondent did not appeal, the Court reversed that part of the order in the interest of justice. View "Marriage of Willis v. Costa-Willis" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a partition action by Plaintiff against her former significant other, Defendant.  The trial court entered default and a default judgment against Defendant. Nearly two years later, Defendant moved to vacate the default and resulting judgment, alleging he was never effectively served with the summons and complaint. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the trial court should not have granted Defendant set aside relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). She argued her personal service of the summons and complaint on Defendant was proper, and section 473, subdivision (b) applies instead, rendering Defendant’s motion “untimely.” Plaintiff also argued the trial court abused its discretion in not considering the estoppel doctrine when making its ruling.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendant’s motion to set aside the default and default judgment. On the record, the trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Defendant due to improper service of the summons and complaint. Defendant was “under no duty to act upon a defectively served summons.” (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.) Because the court had no jurisdiction in light of defective service, the court did not address Plaintiff’s remaining argument regarding equitable estoppel. View "Braugh v. Dow" on Justia Law

D.P., C.A. and E.A. (the adoptive parents of D.P.’s two older brothers) appealed an order denying a petition made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 for placement of D.P. in the siblings’ adoptive parents’ home. The siblings’ adoptive parents and D.P. (Appellants) contended the court erred by failing to apply the “relative placement preference” articulated in section 361.3. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Appellants forfeited this claim by failing to raise the issue at the trial court. But even if it were to consider it, the Court determined the siblings’ adoptive parents did not qualify as relatives for consideration under section 361.3. The Court further concluded the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition after finding it would be in D.P.’s best interest to remain with de facto parents A.G. and K.P. The Court, therefore, affirmed the order. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

Swan and Hatchett are the parents of triplets born in 2016. They share custody. At a hearing addressing child support, Swan testified from a profit and loss statement that he had prepared for his self-employment as a tax preparer, real estate broker, mortgage broker, and appraiser, that his net income as of August 2017 was $40,498. The trial court found Swan’s bookkeeping poor, and after adding back certain deductions Swan had taken, calculated Swan’s income as $110,940 per year. The trial court ordered Swan to pay child support of $2,350 per month, retroactive to the beginning of 2017. Hatchett was not working. The trial court did not impute income to her due to insufficient information. In September 2018, Swan requested changes to the order, including ordering Hatchett to seek work and waiving interest on certain arrears. The court ordered Hatchett to undergo a vocational evaluation paid for by Swan. The parties stipulated that Swan was “entitled to a hardship when calculating child support.”The trial court denied his request to reduce the amount of child support and awarded Hatchett $10,000 in need-based attorney’s fees. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred by ignoring Swan’s evidence of his income, that he had a new child, and that Hatchett’s income had increased. The trial court’s refusal to consider Swan's evidence of his income for child support purposes conflicted with its finding that he could pay Hatchett’s attorney’s fees. View "Swan v. Hatchett" on Justia Law

S.B. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) with H.B.’s extended family members.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Department inquired about Indian ancestry with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees identified as a likely source of information about ancestry. The juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. Under the court’s deferential standard of review, the juvenile court did not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the juvenile court denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his petition filed under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 388 to reinstate reunification services with Minor, holding that, under the circumstances, it was error to deny Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition.A few days after Minor's birth, the Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition on his behalf under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300. The juvenile court terminated the reunification services of Father, who had been incarcerated since before Minor was born, and set a Cal. Well. & Inst. Code 366.26 hearing. The day before the hearing, Father filed his section 388 petition, stating that he had not been provided with services despite the court's orders. The court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition. View "In re Damari Y." on Justia Law

Robin J. appealed the denial of her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Michael M., the father of their two children. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court misapplied the law in denying Robin’s renewal request, and that Robin established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant the renewal request and decide whether the DVRO should be renewed for five or more years, or permanently. View "Michael M. v. Robin J." on Justia Law

A.C. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s dispositional finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 did not apply to the dependency proceedings to her five children. Mother contended that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 (b). After review of the juvenile court record, the Court of Appeal concluded that Mother’s argument lacked merit and therefore affirmed. View "In re Ja.O." on Justia Law