Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A child, X.D., was born in May 2022 and immediately placed with prospective adoptive parents, Cliff and Rebecca, after his biological mother, Jessica, relinquished him for adoption. Jessica had suffered repeated physical and emotional abuse from X.D.’s biological father, Raymon, including an incident where Raymon struck her in the face two weeks after learning of her pregnancy. Following this, Jessica left Raymon, sought refuge in a domestic violence shelter, and cut off communication. Raymon was unaware of X.D.’s birth and believed Jessica had miscarried after she told him the baby “is not here no more.” Throughout Jessica’s pregnancy, Raymon made sporadic attempts to contact her but did not provide support for the pregnancy or the child.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the adoption petition and Raymon’s opposition, in which he claimed status as a “Kelsey S. father”—an unwed biological father who is constitutionally entitled to block adoption if he promptly demonstrates a full commitment to parental responsibilities. The trial court found Raymon qualified as a Kelsey S. father, reasoning that Jessica’s actions prevented him from asserting his rights and that he had shown sufficient emotional and financial commitment. The court excluded key evidence—screenshots of Raymon’s threatening text messages—on authentication and hearsay grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in excluding the text message evidence, which was sufficiently authenticated and relevant. Upon considering the full record, including the excluded evidence, the appellate court found insufficient support for Raymon’s claim to Kelsey S. status. The court further determined that it was not in X.D.’s best interest for Raymon to retain parental rights. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions to allow the adoption to proceed. View "Adoption of X.D." on Justia Law

Ashley McCall Hart and Steven Hart, who were married and have two children, became involved in a series of legal disputes following Ashley’s filing for dissolution of marriage in October 2017. On the same day, Ashley requested a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Steven, which the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted temporarily. Steven responded by filing his own DVRO request against Ashley, but after hearings, the court denied Steven’s request and granted Ashley a one-year DVRO. Ashley later dismissed a renewal request in accordance with a settlement agreement. In July 2023, Ashley again sought a DVRO, and the court issued a nine-month order. Before its expiration, Ashley requested renewal, which was granted for another nine months.Ashley appealed the renewal duration, arguing that Family Code section 6345 requires a minimum five-year renewal period for DVROs. The Superior Court had found Ashley demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of future abuse but believed it had discretion to renew the DVRO for less than five years.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that under Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a), a court may renew a DVRO only for five or more years, or permanently, at its discretion, but not for a period less than five years. The court found that the statutory language and legislative history clearly establish a mandatory minimum renewal period of five years, and the trial court’s discretion is limited to choosing between five years, a longer period, or permanent renewal. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order to the extent it provided for a nine-month renewal and remanded with instructions to modify the order to provide for a five-year renewal. View "Hart v. Hart" on Justia Law

Elena Kouvabina and Jacob Veltman, both attorneys, were married in 2010, had a child in 2012, and separated in 2017. Since their separation, Kouvabina, acting as a self-represented litigant, initiated a series of contentious legal proceedings related to their dissolution, custody, support, and related family law matters. Over a five-year period, she commenced, prosecuted, or maintained eleven appeals and writs in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three. Of these, nine—comprising five appeals and four writ petitions—were finally determined adversely to her, including repeated unsuccessful efforts to disqualify trial judges and appeals from orders on spousal support, child support, custody, visitation, and attorney fees.The San Mateo County Superior Court previously handled the underlying family law proceedings, issuing various orders and judgments that Kouvabina challenged through appeals and writs. In each instance, the appellate court either affirmed the lower court’s decisions or summarily denied her writ petitions. These adverse outcomes formed the basis for the appellate court’s review of her litigation conduct.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, on its own motion, reviewed whether Kouvabina met the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1). The court found that she had, within the preceding seven years, while self-represented, commenced at least five litigations that were finally determined adversely to her. The court rejected her arguments that appeals do not constitute “litigation” under the statute and that family law matters should be treated differently. The court declared Kouvabina a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation in California courts while self-represented without first obtaining leave from the presiding judge or justice. No costs were awarded. View "in re Marriage of Kouvabina" on Justia Law

A child, X.D., was born in May 2022 and immediately placed for adoption by his biological mother, Jessica, due to her history of physical and verbal abuse by the child’s biological father, Raymon. Jessica had left Raymon after a violent incident during her pregnancy and sought refuge in a domestic violence shelter, cutting off communication with him. Raymon, who had a significant criminal history and ongoing substance abuse issues, was unaware of X.D.’s birth and believed Jessica had miscarried. The prospective adoptive parents, Cliff and Rebecca, cared for X.D. from birth. Jessica identified Raymon as the possible father in adoption documents but did not provide his contact information.After being notified of the adoption proceedings in January 2023, Raymon opposed the adoption, claiming he qualified as a “Kelsey S. father”—a status that would require his consent for adoption if he had demonstrated a full commitment to parental responsibilities. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found in Raymon’s favor, ruling that he qualified as a Kelsey S. father based on his financial and emotional support and that Jessica’s actions had prevented him from asserting his parental rights. The court ordered supervised visits for Raymon with X.D. and required that Raymon be introduced as a family friend, not as X.D.’s father.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the exclusion of key evidence—screenshots of Raymon’s threatening text messages—and the sufficiency of evidence supporting Raymon’s status as a Kelsey S. father. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the text message evidence, which was relevant and sufficiently authenticated. Considering this evidence, the appellate court found insufficient support for Raymon’s claim to Kelsey S. status and determined that it was not in X.D.’s best interest for Raymon to retain parental rights. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order and directed that the adoption proceed. View "In re Adoption of X.D." on Justia Law

Gregory D. is the father of X.D., a child born in 2014. In 2015, Gregory D. kidnapped X.D. and her mother, assaulted the mother, and endangered X.D., leading to a prior dependency proceeding in which the mother was granted full custody and the father was allowed monitored visits, though he rarely exercised them. In December 2023, X.D.’s mother was killed during a violent incident, leaving X.D. without a parent to care for her. At that time, Gregory D. was incarcerated and had not been in contact with X.D. for years. X.D. was placed with her maternal grandmother.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County seeking dependency jurisdiction over X.D. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), citing the absence of a parent able to provide care. After Gregory D.’s whereabouts were discovered, he suggested his mother and brother as possible caregivers. The Department investigated and found the paternal grandmother’s home unsuitable due to her health and living conditions, and the paternal uncle was unresponsive and already caring for two young children. X.D. expressed fear of her father and no interest in living with his relatives.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g), is appropriate when an incarcerated parent cannot arrange for suitable, reliable, or appropriate care for the child, even if the parent suggests relatives who are unwilling or unable to provide such care. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order exerting dependency jurisdiction over X.D. and ordering reunification services for Gregory D. View "In re X.D." on Justia Law

After the death of David Balandran in August 2021, his wife Felicia became the sole parent of their two young daughters. David’s parents, Juan and Cindy, had previously enjoyed regular contact with the children, both before and after David’s passing. Felicia continued to allow the grandparents to visit, though the frequency and scheduling of visits varied due to family circumstances, including therapy and illness. In July 2022, the grandparents sought a formalized visitation schedule, requesting overnight and weekday visits. Felicia opposed a court-ordered schedule, preferring to maintain flexibility and asserting her willingness to facilitate reasonable visitation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a trial on the grandparents’ petition under California Family Code section 3102. The court found Felicia to be a fit parent but granted the grandparents’ request for structured visitation, ordering visits on the first and third Sundays of each month and weekly Wednesday dinners. The court reasoned that the grandparents could provide unique insights and support related to the children’s deceased father. Felicia appealed, arguing that the order infringed on her constitutional rights as a fit parent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the constitutional principles established in Troxel v. Granville and subsequent California decisions, the appellate court held that a fit parent who allows reasonable grandparent visitation is entitled to a presumption that her decisions are in the children’s best interests. The court found that the trial court failed to give “special weight” to Felicia’s preferences and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that her voluntary visitation schedule was detrimental to the children. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to deny the grandparents’ petition for court-ordered visitation. View "Balandran v. Balandran" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married in 2016 and have one child together. After their separation in 2019, the mother experienced mental health issues, and in December 2020, the parents signed a marital settlement agreement granting the father sole legal and physical custody of their daughter, with the mother receiving visitation rights. This arrangement was formalized in a dissolution judgment in July 2021. In October 2021, the mother requested a change in custody, citing improved circumstances and alleging that the father had relocated, was not complying with court orders, and was restricting her contact with their child.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County held a three-day evidentiary hearing in November 2022. The trial court made detailed factual findings, including that the father was uncooperative, had violated court orders, denied visitation and communication, and was not credible. The court found the mother to be more capable of facilitating contact and noted her sobriety and efforts to co-parent. Based on these findings, the court ordered that the mother have sole physical custody of the child, while both parents would share joint legal custody. The father did not object to the tentative decision before judgment was entered in January 2024.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the father forfeited his due process arguments by failing to raise them in the trial court and found that he was not denied due process, as he had notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court also rejected the father's claim regarding the separation of siblings, noting that two were stepsiblings and one was a half-sibling, and found no legal error. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s custody order and awarded costs to the mother. View "In re Marriage of R.K. & G.K." on Justia Law

Justin J. (Father) appealed a jurisdiction finding and disposition order declaring his children, Hunter V. and B.V., dependents of the juvenile court. The court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), alleging the children's mother had a history of substance abuse and left the children without proper care. The petition also alleged Father had an extensive criminal history and was incarcerated, which placed the children at risk.The Los Angeles County Superior Court held a detention hearing where neither parent was present. The court detained the children and ordered monitored visitation for both parents. At the jurisdiction hearing, the court amended the petition to allege Father was unable to parent due to his incarceration and inability to make an appropriate plan for the children. The court sustained the amended allegations and proceeded with the disposition hearing, declaring the children dependents of the court and ordering reunification services for both parents.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court violated Father's due process rights by failing to provide notice of the amended allegations, which were based on a different set of facts and legal theory from the initial petition. The court also violated Father's statutory right to be present at the jurisdiction hearing, as required by Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d). The appellate court applied the Chapman standard for federal constitutional error and concluded the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the court reversed the jurisdiction finding and disposition order as to Father and remanded the case for further proceedings with Father present unless he waives his right to be present. View "In re Hunter V." on Justia Law

R.K. (Father) appeals an order granting sole physical custody of his daughter to G.K. (Mother). Previously, Father had sole physical custody. He argues he was denied due process because he was not given advance notice of the proposed custody change and the trial court ordered a move-away of the child without an evidentiary hearing. Additionally, Father contends the trial court did not consider the separation of the daughter from her three siblings. However, Father did not raise these issues in the trial court and provided an inadequate record for the appeal.The trial court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing and made detailed factual findings about Father's uncooperative and disrespectful behavior towards Mother, the court, and court procedures. The court found that a significant change in circumstances indicated it was in the daughter's best interest for Mother to have sole physical custody. Consequently, the trial court granted Mother sole physical custody and ordered that the parties continue to share joint legal custody.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court noted that Father failed to object to the trial court's tentative decision and did not preserve his due process claim. The appellate court found that Father was not denied due process as he had notice that physical custody was at issue and had the opportunity to oppose the request during the evidentiary hearing. The court also rejected Father's claim regarding the separation of the daughter from her siblings, noting that two of the three children were stepsiblings, not biological siblings, and compelling circumstances were not required to justify their separation.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order granting Mother sole physical custody of the daughter. View "In re Marriage of R.K. & G.K." on Justia Law

X.K. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former husband, M.C., under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). She alleged a history of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse by M.C., including incidents where he slapped her, pulled her away from a car, and forced her to have sex. She also claimed M.C. engaged in coercive control, such as restricting her movements and financial resources. X.K. requested sole custody of their daughter, J.K.C., and no visitation for M.C.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied X.K.'s ex parte request for a temporary restraining order, stating the events described were not recent and did not provide sufficient reason to restrain M.C.'s conduct. At the evidentiary hearing, X.K. represented herself, while M.C. had legal counsel. The court focused on the custody and visitation disputes between the parents and denied the DVRO request, reasoning that these issues did not fall under the definition of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in its understanding of the definition of "abuse" under the DVPA and improperly denied the DVRO because the allegations occurred in the context of a custody dispute. The appellate court noted that X.K.'s evidence, if credited, could constitute physical and sexual abuse and conduct disturbing her peace. The court emphasized that the trial court should have considered the totality of the circumstances, including incidents in China, when assessing whether M.C.'s conduct in California constituted abuse.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new hearing to properly evaluate the evidence and apply the correct legal standards under the DVPA. View "X.K. v. M.C." on Justia Law