Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The child's ("Isabella G.") father and paternal grandparents appealed the denial of the grandparents' petition for placement of the child. The father also appealed the termination of his parental rights. This case involved repeated requests by the child's grandparents for placement of the child, starting when the child was first detained in protective custody. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not conduct an assessment of the grandparents' home as required under Welf. & Inst. Code section 361.3, governing relative placement. Instead, the Agency placed the child in the home of a nonrelative extended family member and secured the cooperation of the grandparents and other relatives by representing that the Agency could not change the child's placement for a year. After a year, the grandparents again requested placement. The Agency did not conduct an assessment of their home as required. After reunification services were terminated, the Agency disregarded the grandparents' new request for placement. The grandparents retained counsel and filed a section 388 petition. Only then did the Agency complete a relative home assessment, approving the placement in less than three weeks. At the hearing on the petition, the juvenile court denied the grandparents' request to proceed under section 361.3, instead applying the caregiver adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (k). The Agency conceded the juvenile court erred in applying the adoption preference prior to terminating parental rights. The Agency maintained, however, that section 361.3 did not apply because the grandparents' request for placement was made after the reunification period ended and no new placement was necessary. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that when a relative requested placement of the child prior to the dispositional hearing, and the Agency does not timely complete a relative home assessment as required by law, the relative requesting placement was entitled to a hearing under section 361.3 without having to file a section 388 petition. Consequently, the Court reversed the juvenile court's orders denying the grandparent's request for placement under section 366.26, subdivision (k), necessarily reversed the orders terminating parental rights, and remanded for a relative placement hearing under section 361.3. View "In re Isabella G." on Justia Law

Uncle, the half-brother of the child’s biological father, supported mother after father abandoned her during the pregnancy and has been very involved in the child’s care. Father has had very little interaction with the now-three-year-old girl. The trial court denied uncle’s petition to establish a parental relationship, as a third natural parent, finding that uncle met the statutory criteria of a presumed parent, but that the presumption was rebutted under amended Family Code section 7612(c) and (d). Pursuant to section 7612(c), the trial court found that recognizing only two parents—mother and father—would not be detrimental to child, and ruled that, under section 7612 (d), an earlier filed judgment of parentage for father rebutted uncle’s presumed parent status. The court of appeal reversed; the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors, particularly the willingness and availability of one of the parents to take custody of child, if such a need were to arise, and whether a familial relationship exists between that parent and child such that the recognized value of two parents can be fulfilled in a meaningful way. That value may be expressed in the opportunity for financial support and its appurtenant rights and benefits. View "Martinez v. Vaziri" on Justia Law

Uncle, the half-brother of the child’s biological father, supported mother after father abandoned her during the pregnancy and has been very involved in the child’s care. Father has had very little interaction with the now-three-year-old girl. The trial court denied uncle’s petition to establish a parental relationship, as a third natural parent, finding that uncle met the statutory criteria of a presumed parent, but that the presumption was rebutted under amended Family Code section 7612(c) and (d). Pursuant to section 7612(c), the trial court found that recognizing only two parents—mother and father—would not be detrimental to child, and ruled that, under section 7612 (d), an earlier filed judgment of parentage for father rebutted uncle’s presumed parent status. The court of appeal reversed; the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors, particularly the willingness and availability of one of the parents to take custody of child, if such a need were to arise, and whether a familial relationship exists between that parent and child such that the recognized value of two parents can be fulfilled in a meaningful way. That value may be expressed in the opportunity for financial support and its appurtenant rights and benefits. View "Martinez v. Vaziri" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant C.K. (father) appealed the juvenile court's disposition order removing his child, A.K., from his custody after declaring her to be a dependent of the court. He argued on appeal that the evidence failed to establish that he suffered from substance abuse such that removal was the only means of protecting her. Finding no reversible error in the order, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re A.K." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders over H.R. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that father was H.R.'s alleged but not biological father. In light of the conflicting statements before the juvenile court, the court could not that say the juvenile court erred in awaiting the results of genetic testing to prove biological paternity, or that it erred in finding him only an alleged father. Further, under the facts of this case, the court could not say that the juvenile court erred in holding him responsible for H.R. and sustaining the allegations of failure to provide support. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "L.A. County DCFS v. E.C." on Justia Law

In order to avoid foreclosure, Wife sold the marital home to Lawyer, who already had a junior lien on the property in the form of a family law attorney's real property lien. On appeal, Wife challenged the superior court's order disqualifying Lawyer from representing her in divorce proceedings with Husband. Husband argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Lawyer because Lawyer violated California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-300, which prohibits lawyers from entering into unfair business agreements with their clients. The court concluded that the trial court erred in disqualifying Lawyer on Husband’s motion because Husband had no standing where he has no personal stake; regardless of Husband's standing, the court saw no continuing effect Lawyer’s alleged misconduct will have on the subsequent proceedings and concluded that no grounds otherwise support disqualifying Lawyer; and therefore, the court reversed the judgment. View "Murchison v. Murchison" on Justia Law

In their one-day dissolution trial, Paul was represented by his attorney. Susan was not represented by counsel. The court denied Susan’s continuance request and admitted Paul’s 22 exhibits into evidence.The court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage, declining to award spousal support to either party, dividing the couple’s property, stating that Susan waived future spousal support and that the court would not have awarded spousal support in any event because “each party was self-supporting,” and finding that Paul was entitled to a credit of $2,500 for support payments he had made to Susan in 2012 and 2013. Susan timely filed notice of appeal. Because there had been no court reporter, Susan requested a settled statement under California Rules of Court, 8.137. The court of appeal vacated; the order cannot stand because it was entered without a motion, without the required findings, and based on the false premise that Susan was responsible for the protracted nature of the proceedings on her motion. View "Mooney v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Bianka, a 13-year-old girl from Honduras, hopes to avoid deportation by obtaining “special immigrant juvenile” (SIJ) status. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), SIJ status is a classification created by Congress to provide special immigration protection to undocumented, unaccompanied children entering the United States who have been the victims of parental abuse, neglect, abandonment or some similar circumstance. Bianka initiated a parentage action under the Uniform Parentage Act, Fam. Code, 7600 et seq., naming her mother as the respondent. Bianka also filed a pretrial request for order asking the court to place her in the sole legal and physical custody of her mother and to make the additional findings necessary to allow her to petition for SIJ status, namely that she cannot reunify with her father because he abandoned her and it is not in her best interest to return to Honduras. The trial court declined to make the requested finding. The court concluded that the UPA is the exclusive means by which unmarried adults may resolve disputes relating to rights and obligations arising out of the parent-child relationship, including child custody, visitation and support. In an action between natural, alleged and/or presumed parents, the parentage of each party to the action is squarely at issue and is adjudicated before issues of custody, visitation and support are considered. The court further concluded that under the circumstances present here, where Bianka’s father’s identity and whereabouts are known, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Bianka to join her father to the pending action. Finally, the court provided instructions to Bianka on the next steps in seeking a custody order and/or SIJ findings. View "Bianka M. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

When Mother was about one-month pregnant, she and N.S.’s father were arrested for illegally growing and possessing marijuana for sale in their Hayward home. About two weeks after N.S. was born, they were again arrested for possessing marijuana for sale in their home. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that N.S. faced a substantial risk of harm (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)). N.S. was placed with a maternal relative who lived in a two-unit building in Union City. Mother moved into the other unit. Visits between Mother and N.S. went well. Mother regularly attended a support group, participated in therapy, repeatedly tested negative for drugs, had no contact with Father, and moved out of the Hayward home, listing it for sale. N.S. had no medical issues and was not alleged to have suffered any physical harm in her parents’ care. The Agency nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction because Mother had been arrested twice for serious charges. The court sustained the dependency petition, concluding that there was a current risk of harm. While appeal was pending, the juvenile court dismissed dependency jurisdiction, awarding custody to Mother, with supervised visits for Father. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal, noting that Mother suffered no harm as a result of the jurisdictional findings below. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

Raul and Ingrid married in 1978 in Santa Cruz County. In 1993, the family moved to Chile, where Ingrid had been born. The couple separated in 1995. Since 2010, Raul has resided in New York. In 2012, Ingrid filed a dissolution petition in Santa Cruz, seeking attorney fees and spousal support. Raul signed a receipt for papers mailed to New York, but did not appear. The court ordered him to pay support plus attorney fees. Later, the court garnished Raul’s wages. In 2013, Ingrid sought an order determining Raul’s arrearages. Raul appeared on his own behalf. The court ruled that the support order was valid and awarded arrearages. Months later Raul moved to quash service for lack of jurisdiction and to set aside the 2013 orders and garnishment. Raul asserted that Ingrid “has lived and continues to live in Chile since . . . 2000 or 2001.” Ingrid introduced evidence showing her presence in the county for at least part of the six months prior to her filing. The court found that Raul had submitted to jurisdiction and later entered default. The court of appeal reversed. While Raul’s appearance constituted a general submission to jurisdiction and he forfeited his objection to an untimely hearing notice, the court erred by entering default while Raul’s court of appeal petition was pending. View "In re: Marriage of Obrecht" on Justia Law