Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

E.G. was born in 2015 while his then 22-year-old mother, K.K. (mother), and 34-year-old father, R.G., were incarcerated. After his birth, mother arranged to have an unrelated female take E.G. home from the hospital. About two months later, Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) received a welfare report concerning the state of this woman’s home. SSA substantiated the report, and SSA took E.G. into protective custody. SSA placed E.G. with his maternal grandmother in June 2015, and he seemed to be doing well. Grandmother facilitated weekly supervised visits between E.G. and mother during her incarceration. Mother was happy about E.G.’s placement and expressed the desire to continue regular visitation. She took a parenting class, worked through a parenting handbook, and passed her GED while incarcerated. SSA challenged the juvenile court’s order granting reunification services to the mother. SSA argued the court should have bypassed reunification, citing Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). In rejecting SSA’s argument, the court decided drug treatment ordered as the result of a deferred entry of judgment was not "prior court-ordered treatment" for purposes of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). The Court of Appeal found "no principled difference between drug treatment ordered pursuant to Penal Code section 1000 (PC1000) and any other drug treatment ordered by a court during unrelated criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court reversed reversed the judgment and remanded the case for the juvenile court to reconsider its ruling in light of PC1000 as “court-ordered treatment” as contemplated by section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

Mother had sole custody of the child, K.C., under a New York decree. Mother and her husband, J.S., petitioned the trial court to declare that the consent of G.C.S., the natural father, to the adoption is not required and to terminate Father's parental rights. The trial court granted the petition. Father argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the New York custody order pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Fam. Code, 3400 et seq. Section 8604, subdivision (b) provides that when a birth parent has sole custody and the noncustodial parent has willfully failed to communicate with or to provide support to the child for a period of one year, the parent having sole custody may consent to the child’s adoption. The court held that this section unequivocally applies to adoption proceedings and is not subject to the UCCJEA. Nor is there a reason to adopt Father's suggestion that the court treat the UCCJEA as a precursor to the adoption proceeding. Finally, the application of section 7822, subdivision (a)(3) is within the context of an adoption proceeding, and the UCCJEA does not apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "I.S. v. G.C.S." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her two children, arguing that the juvenile court should have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship exception pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The Department's section 300 petition alleged, among other things, that mother has a history of illicit drug abuse and the drug use renders her incapable of providing the children with proper care and supervision. The court affirmed the order, concluding that the juvenile court reasonably concluded that the mother failed to show her relationship with the children outweighed the benefits of adoption. View "In re Noah G." on Justia Law

In this marital dissolution case, the trial court found four investment accounts held in joint title by wife Billie Miller and husband Dane Cooper during their marriage to be wife's separate property. The trial court also ordered that wife be reimbursed for her down payment on the marital residence on the ground her separate property was the source of the down payment. After the parties separated, wife lived in the marital residence for approximately eight years. For this time period, the trial court determined wife should have been reimbursed for monies she paid to maintain the residence. On appeal, husband contended: (1) the jointly titled investment accounts were community property for which wife was not entitled to any reimbursement; (2) wife introduced insufficient evidence to show the separate property nature of the funds used to purchase the marital residence; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing wife to live rent-free in the marital residence during the years after separation while making husband pay half of the maintenance and repairs for which the community received no benefit. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in ordering her to be reimbursed for the down payment, and that wife owed the community "Watts" charges for periods when she had exclusive use of the marital residents. Wife was entitled to "Epstein" credits for the periods when she owed "Watts" charges. The Court affirmed in all other respects; the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Cooper" on Justia Law

In this case the competent spouse, Lynn Bower unquestionably paid for the support and maintenance of her conservatee husband David. In fact she devoted about 72 percent of the couple’s $200,000 marital estate income to making the $12,000 a month payments to a home specializing in Alzheimer’s care for David. What she didn’t do was comply with the letter of an order of the probate court to pay lump sum large professional fee claims directly to David’s conservator and several other creditors. Instead she either paid those claims directly herself, or those claims were paid indirectly from escrows based on liens asserted by the relevant professionals. Based on the literal noncompliance with the terms of the order, the probate judge ordered the community estate of the Bowers divided, with the conservator receiving David’s share. Because the probate court erroneously proceeded on the premise that article 3 of part 6, division 4 of the Probate Code, section 3089, was triggered by noncompliance with orders to pay professional fees directly to the conservator in a lump sum, rather than refusal to comply with an order to support the conservatee spouse, the Court of Appeal reversed an order dividing the estate and remanded the matter to the trial level for application of the proper standard to the facts of this case. View "Conservatorship of Bower" on Justia Law

Mother Jessica O. and Father Scott O. were the parents of D.O. Mother had three older children (Je.O., Y.O, and Jo.O., collectively, Siblings) by another father. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition after D.O.'s mentally ill father committed several acts of domestic violence and the mother failed to take protective action or otherwise cooperate with the Agency. After the Agency filed the petitions, the mother absconded with D.O. and Y.O. At the time of the detention hearing, their whereabouts were unknown, and neither parent attended the hearing. The court made a prima facie finding on the petition and ordered D.O. detained out of the parents' custody. One week later, police located D.O. with the father in a grocery store parking lot when the mother was caught shoplifting. D.O. and Y.O. were detained together in one foster home; their brothers were detained together in another. A recommendation was made, and the juvenile court terminated parental rights as to D.O. and ordered adoption as her permanent plan. On appeal, the mother and the Siblings contended the juvenile court erred when determining whether there would be substantial interference with D.O.'s sibling relationships by improperly considering the caregivers' assurances that sibling visits would continue, instead of by considering the factors specifically enumerated by statute. The Court of Appeal found the juvenile court cited five evidentiary bases supporting its conclusion. "Notably, the court did not rely solely on unsupported assurances from the caregivers that they would allow future visits; rather, the court cited the caregivers' proven track record of facilitating visits, and the paternal grandmother's commitment to the mother's new baby (who is related to D.O. but may not be related to the paternal grandmother). … And although the minor clearly enjoyed the time she spent with her half siblings, there was no evidence that the detriment she might suffer if visits ceased presented a sufficiently compelling reason to forgo the stability and permanence of adoption by caretakers to whom she was closely bonded." The Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of parental rights. View "In re D.O." on Justia Law

The family court determined appellant Bruce Frencher, Sr., owed $11,083.84 in child support arrears. Frencher contends the family court erred in its calculation because the excess Social Security derivative benefits paid for his child should have been applied to the arrears owed by Frencher. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was a miscalculation and reversed the judgment. View "In re Marriage of Hall & Frencher" on Justia Law

Mother C.S. appealed an order awarding sole custody of her children to Father A.G. Mother argued the trial court erred by: (1) not basing its order on the children’s best interests; (2) committing prejudicial evidentiary rulings; (3) denying Mother’s request during trial for a continuance to obtain counsel; and (4) committing separate errors that constituted cumulative error. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Mother’s contentions and affirm the order. As part of its decision, the Court also concluded the "doctrine of implied findings" applied in this case where the parties did not request a statement of decision, the court did not prepare one, and the settled statement used by the parties did not contain an express statement by the trial court that it complied with the procedures required for adopting a statement of decision and that the settled statement serves as the court’s statement of decision. View "A.G. v. C.S." on Justia Law

The single mother of five children, 8 to 15 years old, struggled with abusive relationships, homelessness and unemployment. They lived primarily in Marin County from 2000 until they moved to Richmond in 2009. In 2015, Mother asked Contra Costa Children & Family Services to place the four youngest children in foster care. CFS did so and filed petitions alleging Mother’s failure to protect and inability to provide support. The court ordered supervised visitation and that CFS refer Mother to substance abuse treatment and parenting education. CFS's disposition report recommended that the court order family reunification services and transfer the case to Marin County. Mother was participating 12- step meetings and alcohol abuse education in Marin and expected to secure a Marin apartment. Marin County court accepted the transfer and continued the case. Later, Marin’s Health and Human Services Department asked the court to transfer the cases back to Contra Costa because it had discovered that a county employee had a familial relationship to the parties, rendering the Department unable to continue services. Mother opposed the transfer; there was no evidence that the proposed transfer served the children’s best interests. The court of appeal remanded the cases to Marin, noting that all of the parties conceded error. View "In re Nia A." on Justia Law

Mother challenged the juvenile court's jurisdiction orders that adjudged two minors, Mia and Angel, to be dependents of the court. Mother has three children: Destiny (now deceased), Mia, and Angel. The court concluded that the evidence supports a finding that, if Mother had not neglectfully allowed Destiny to walk away from the family home unattended, then she would not have been crushed to death by a falling gate. Mother’s neglect in allowing Destiny to walk away from the family home unattended was a substantial factor, along with Destiny’s own locomotion, and along with the children who pushed down the gate, in causing her death. The evidence in the record supports a finding of factual, “but for,” causation between Mother’s negligent supervision and her daughter’s death. The court also concluded that the dependency court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (f) - sibling abuse - and the court need not explore whether another ground for jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Mia Z." on Justia Law