Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

After his stepfather, Donald, assaulted his mother, Heidi, in Alexander’s presence, Alexander, then three years old, became the subject of a dependency petition. At the time, Donald, Alexander’s biological father, Joel, and Michael, the man with whom Heidi was living at the time of Alexander’s birth, had competing motions pending. Two weeks after the dependency petition was filed, the family court ruled that both Michael and Joel qualified as presumed parents and designated both under Family Code section 7612(c), which authorizes multiple presumed parents. Considering itself bound by that order, the juvenile court found both Michael and Joel to be presumed parents, but subsequently denied Michael visitation. The court found that Donald also satisfied the requirements for presumed parent status and designated him as such. The court of appeal held that the juvenile court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent. Because Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction over paternity issues to the juvenile court upon the filing of a dependency petition, the family court order on which the juvenile court relied, issued subsequent to the filing, was void. The court found no error in the designation of Donald as a presumed parent, which was supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Alexander P." on Justia Law

After the family court ordered that sole legal and physical custody of the child would remain with father, mother appealed. The court concluded that the family court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant mother’s request for custody and for visitation in its entirety. The court also concluded that the family court complied with Family Code section 3041.5 where the family court has the authority to order drug testing to continue indefinitely as a condition to further visitation and the family court has the authority to order that a positive drug test result would immediately trigger a reduced visitation schedule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "Heidi S. v. David H." on Justia Law

After the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over 11-year-old Armando L., who had been a dependent of the juvenile court for two years, Armando’s mother contends the juvenile court improperly denied her an evidentiary hearing on the issues of Armando’s custody and whether the juvenile court’s jurisdiction should have been terminated. The court concluded that mother had a right to present evidence at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 364 hearing to challenge dismissal of the dependency action and to present any evidence relevant to the juvenile court’s exit orders. The juvenile court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on these issues deprived mother of her due process right to present evidence, and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re Armando L." on Justia Law

In 2014, the family court entered a permanent custody order granting. Father, a Bay Area resident, physical custody of L. during school years, while Mother was awarded physical custody at her home in Virginia during the summers. Th court stated that one of the primary considerations in granting Father custody during the school year was the presence of Mother’s family members in the Bay Area, which provided Mother a place to stay while visiting L. and allowed Mother’s family to share in L.’s care. The order noted the relocation of Mother’s family members from the Bay Area, among other factors, would be changed circumstances “requiring a new analysis.” Less than a year later, Mother requested modification of the custody order, claiming her parents had relocated to Virginia. Father claimed that Mothers' parents retained ownership of their California home.The request was heard by a different judge than the judge who had entered the custody order, who, without explanation, denied Mother’s request and granted sanctions to Father under Family Code section 271 in the amount of $5,000. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the statement in the custody order specifying changed circumstances requiring a reconsideration of custody arrangements was not binding on subsequent judges. View "Anne H. v. Michael B." on Justia Law

In 2010, Perez sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Torres-Hernandez to stay away from her and their eight and two-year-old daughters. Perez and Torres-Hernandez had been in a relationship for 10 years. Perez claimed many instances of physical and emotional abuse. The court issued a three-year restraining order, providing sole physical custody of the children to Perez, and weekend visitation to Torres-Hernandez. In 2011, Perez sought to modify the order to include protection for her children. Perez claimed that during Torres-Hernandez‘s visits with the children, he had physically abused them. The court suspended visitation between Torres-Hernandez and the younger daughter; ordered supervised visitation with the older daughter; and amended the order to prohibit Torres-Hernandez from making contact with Perez including phone calls, e-mails, and text messages. In 2013, Perez unsuccessfully sought permanent renewal of t order. The court of appeal reversed the denial. The trial court erroneously concluded that: there must be new evidence of abuse or threatened abuse to renew the order, and Torres-Hernandez‘s past abuse or violations of the existing order did not support renewal; the evidence of new abuse must be physical in nature; and evidence of abuse of the children was not relevant to the DVRO renewal. View "Perez v. Torres-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Alexandria P., an Indian child, was placed with her extended family in Utah, after the dependency court concluded that Alexandria's foster parents, de facto parents, failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to depart from the adoptive placement preferences set forth in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The court remanded the matter twice because the lower court used an incorrect standard in assessing good cause. The dependency court has now correctly applied the law governing good cause, considering the bond Alexandria has developed over time with the foster parents as well as a number of other factors related to her best interests. The court affirmed the judgment because substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the foster parents did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to depart from the ICWA’s placement preferences. View "In re Alexandria P." on Justia Law

U.S., the presumed father of five-year-old Robert S. and three-year-old Miguel S., and J.V., Robert’s biological father, each appealed the termination of their respective parental rights to the children. U.S. and J.V. argued insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply in this case, and further argued the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to comply with its obligations under ICWA. U.S. and J.V. also argued the juvenile court erred by finding the children adoptable and terminating parental rights while a child abuse report investigation was pending. The Court of Appeal granted SSA’s unopposed motion to take additional evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909, which shows the juvenile court concluded the child abuse report was unfounded and the home study for Miguel and Robert’s prospective adoptive parents was completed and approved by SSA. That evidence mooted U.S.’s and J.V.’s challenges to the order terminating parental rights based on the pendency of the child abuse report investigation at the time of the permanency hearing. As for U.S.’s and J.V.’s ICWA challenges, although SSA was informed the children were both eligible to enroll in two different Chippewa tribes, the record did not show that any further efforts on the part of SSA or the juvenile court were made before SSA proposed that the court find that ICWA did not apply and the juvenile court made that finding. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the order terminating parental rights for the limited purpose of allowing SSA to make active efforts necessary to secure tribal membership for the children, in compliance with rules 5.482(c) and 5.484(c)(2) of the California Rules of Court. View "In re Miguel S." on Justia Law

Appellant V.T. is the minor's (Z.F.) maternal grandmother and former legal guardian by appointment of the probate court. The sole issue raised for the Court of Appeal's review in this appeal was whether the juvenile court was required to articulate the applicable standard of proof when it found termination of the probate guardianship to be in the best interest of the minor. Although the parties argued the applicable standard was by clear and convincing evidence, the Court found otherwise. While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court entered a separate order terminating parental rights. In their supplemental briefs, both parties argued that the case was not moot and should not be dismissed. Because the issue presented in this appeal was of continuing public interest and likely to recur, the Court of Appeal decided this case on the merits without deciding whether it was otherwise moot, and affirmed the trial court's order. View "In re Z.F." on Justia Law

Older Brother, born in 2003, Sister, born in 2005, and Younger Brother, born in 2009, were removed from the custody of their mother in 2011. The juvenile court terminated reunification services to Mother later that year. In 2015, after spending several years in placements that included a guardianship and foster care, the children were living in three different homes. Mother sought to modify their placements (Welfare & Institutions Code section 388) asking that they be placed with their maternal grandmother. The court denied the petition and later terminated Mother‘s parental rights as to Sister and Younger Brother, selecting adoption as the permanent plan for the two. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Mother’s arguments that the court erred by denying her petition without holding an evidentiary hearing; there was not clear and convincing evidence Younger Brother was adoptable; and the court should have applied the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights (section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(v)). Mother did not make a prima facie showing that removing the children from their placements and placing them with Grandmother would be in their best interests. The court reasonably could conclude that the permanency and stability of adoption outweighed the disruption of sibling relationships that could occur. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a 12-year-old child from Honduras who entered the United States without documentation, seeks to obtain "special immigrant juvenile" (SIJ) status under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J). In this case, the family court refused to appoint a guardian ad litem for petitioner unless he gave his father notice of the application for a guardian ad litem. The court concluded that the family court erred in requiring parental notice before appointing a guardian ad litem where neither a statutory requirement nor procedure exists for providing notice to parents of the application for a guardian ad litem; decisional law does not require parental notice prior to appointment of a guardian ad litem; and due process does not require notice to parents before a guardian ad litem may be appointed. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "Alex R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law