Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The presumed father of 10-year-old Anthony Q. appeals the juvenile court's disposition order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c), removing Anthony from his physical custody. The juvenile court found that there would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being of the child if he were returned to father's home. Father contends that the juvenile court lacked authority to make a removal order because Anthony was residing with his maternal stepgrandmother, not with father, at the time the section 300 petition was filed in this case. The court agreed that the juvenile court cited the incorrect statutory provision in ordering Anthony removed from father's physical custody, but disagreed that section 361, subdivision (c), provides the sole statutory authority for the removal of a child from the physical custody of a parent who has been found to pose a substantial danger if allowed to live in the same home as his or her child or otherwise to exercise that parent’s right to legal and physical custody. The court concluded that, in this case, the juvenile court's error in relying on section 361, subdivision (c), rather than the broader grant of authority in sections 361, subdivision (a), and 362, subdivision (a), was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "In re Anthony Q." on Justia Law

Mother and Miguel Z. had two children during their marriage, Minor 1 born in 2009, and Minor 2 born in 2010. Mother and Miguel Z. filed for divorce in 2014, but the divorce was never finalized. Miguel Z. said he separated from mother because he could not stop using drugs and he was in and out of prison. In April 2015 after he got out of prison, he moved to Arizona in order to help support his sobriety. After separating from Miguel Z. mother had three children with Anthony R. Anthony R. challenged a juvenile court's denial of his request to be declared a third parent under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c) for mother's two children with Miguel. The juvenile court concluded section 7612, subdivision (c) was inapplicable because it found there was no existing parent-child relationship between Anthony R. and the children. The Court of Appeals agreed with that reasoning, adding that Anthony R. failed to meet his burden to establish a parentage claim under the Uniform Parentage Act, which was necessary to seek third parent status under section 7612, subdivision (c). View "In re M.Z." on Justia Law

In 1964, appellant Robert Cassinelli and respondent Janice Cassinelli were married; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received zero. As a result, the trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest. However, it could properly order Robert to reimburse Janice for her lost community property interest; doing so would not have violated either federal law or finality principles. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order awarding Janice the same amount on a different theory. View "Marr. of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

In 2011, when the minor "T.M." was seven years old, his mother died and he began living with father. In 2015, an unknown reporter told social services the minor was afraid of his father, who had been punching him. The minor reported to the social worker father had been punching him “for the last five years,” including “whoopings” when the minor got into trouble and “for no reason.” The minor was aware father hits his stepmother. Father was convicted of a 2012 misdemeanor domestic violence incident against stepmother. He failed to complete the batterer’s treatment program that was part of his sentence. T.M. was ultimately placed with an uncle, and indicated he did not want to return home. At a contested jurisdiction hearing, father testified the minor was lying about being afraid or having been beaten. Apparently referencing father’s disruptive behavior during the hearing, the court noted he was unable “to control himself in any setting, let alone should the child be subject to his behaviors.” The court set review hearing dates and reiterated therapeutic visitation and conjoint counseling could begin after both father and the minor had an opportunity for individual counseling. Father appealed the juvenile court's order denying him visitation with T.M., arguing the trial court applied the wrong standard in finding that visits would be detrimental to T.M. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "In re T.M." on Justia Law

Father married Mother in 1978. Minor was born in 1979. In 1981, Mother filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. Father’s default was entered, and an interlocutory judgment of dissolution was entered. The family court granted custody of Minor to Mother and ordered Father to pay $200 per month in child support. A final judgment of dissolution was entered in 1984. Over the years that followed, Father fell into arrears on child support. In 2012, Father sought stay of enforcement of the child support arrears on the ground he had overpaid Mother; equitable set-aside of the child support arrearages on the ground Minor had lived with her grandparents (Father’s parents) since she was two years old; credit for child support charged during the time Minor lived with grandparents; and set-aside of interest on arrearages. The court of appeal remanded the family court’s denial of the request, to allow the family court to exercise its discretion to determine whether it would be inequitable to allow Mother to enforce the child support order for the period during which Minor was living in the home of her grandparents. View "In re: Marriage of Wilson" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant S.P. (mother) and respondent F.G. (father) were parents to E.P. (child). Mother appealed the trial court's child support order requiring father to pay her $14,840 per month, as well as pay expenses relating to E.P.'s extracurricular activities, health and education directly to those providers. Mother argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion as to the appropriate amount of child support considering E.P.'s historical and then-current expenses; (2) there was insufficient evidence that it was in E.P.'s best interests to aware support in an amount below that contemplated by statute; and (3) the trial court erred by not making findings explaining its reasons as to (1) and (2). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's support order. View "S.P. v. F.G." on Justia Law

Two weeks after Mr. Magney was hospitalized and while he was receiving palliative care, the course recommended by his treating physician (and by his prior treating physician and consulting cardiologist) and desired by both Magney and his wife, Humboldt County Adult Protective Services filed a petition under the Health Care Decisions Law (Prob. Code, 4600), ex parte and without notice, to effectively revoke Magney‘s written advance care directive (the validity of which has never been questioned) by removing his wife as his designated agent for health care decisions and to compel medical treatment. Two weeks later, Humboldt obtained a temporary treatment order. Within days, Humboldt withdrew its petition and the trial court vacated the order, but denied Magney’s request for statutory attorney fees. The court of appeal reversed, noting “an appallingly inadequate evidentiary showing,” and “misleading the trial court both as to pertinent provisions of the Health Care Decisions Law and as to Mr. Magney‘s medical status.” Humboldt had no reasonable cause to proceed under the Health Care Decisions Law. View "Humboldt County Adult Protective Services v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The minor, then three years old, became the subject of a dependency petition after his stepfather, Donald, assaulted his mother, in the minor’s presence. The minor’s paternity was the subject of separate family court proceedings filed by Michael and Joel, the minor’s biological father. Michael is the man with whom mother was living at the time of the minor’s birth. The family court ruled that both Michael and Joel qualify as presumed parents under Family Code section 7612(c), which authorizes multiple presumed parents. When the juvenile court inquired into the minor’s paternity, all three men sought to be declared presumed parents. Michael and Joel based their claims on the family court’s order, while Donald argued that he had served as the minor’s father for 20 months before his assault on mother. Considering itself bound by the family court’s order, the juvenile court found all three to be presumed parents. The court of appeal concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent; section 316.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction over paternity issues to the juvenile court upon the filing of a dependency petition. The court upheld the designation of Donald as a presumed parent, as supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Alexander P." on Justia Law

Cynthia C. and Gerardo L. appealed the termination of their parental rights to their daughter, R. L. Gerardo contended the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders, and all subsequent orders, had to be reversed because the juvenile court did not have home state jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. He also contended he did not receive notice of the proceedings pursuant to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. Cynthia joined in Gerardo's arguments to the extent they inured to her benefit, but raised no other issues. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeals found Cynthia and Gerardo's arguments unavailing, and affirmed termination of their parental rights. View "In re R.L." on Justia Law

A very high wage-earner making $1.9 million during the marriage agreed to a stipulated divorce judgment providing for above-guideline child and spousal support. In this appeal of the denial of the high earner's post-judgment request for a reduction of his child support obligations to guideline and his request to terminate spousal support in the wake of the wife's remarriage, he raised two issues: (1) with respect to a clause in the stipulated judgment that any future modification proceeding would be reviewed de novo, did that clause eliminate the usual change-of-circumstances rule that applied to post-judgment modifications?; and (2) with respect to a clause that said if the high earner's ex-wife remarried to a person making less than $400,000 a year, the high earner would still keep paying her spousal support (but at a reduced rate). did the ex-wife's remarriage terminate spousal support anyway, given that the clause did not expressly mention Family Code section 4337? The Court of Appeals answered both questions in the negative, thus concluding there was no error in the orders challenged here. View "In re Marriage of Cohen" on Justia Law