Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father appealed from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring their infant daughter a dependent of the juvenile court and removing her from their custody after the juvenile court sustained an amended petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Mother and Father also contend that the juvenile court failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1900 et seq. The court concluded that the juvenile court's jurisdiction finding is supported by substantial evidence where there was ample evidence that Mother was hiding her current drug use. In this case, the court concluded that, due to the juvenile court's failure to comply with the requirements of the ICWA by not giving notice to the Cherokee tribe, the disposition order may only be conditionally affirmed. Accordingly, the court remanded for compliance with the ICWA and related California law. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "LA Cnty. DCFS v. Shahida R." on Justia Law

Father appealed from a judgment entered pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, selecting tribal customary adoption (TCA), as the permanent plan for his children. The court rejected Father's contention that the juvenile court erred in affording the TCA order full faith and credit. The court concluded that the Tribe “did not duly exercise subject matter jurisdiction prior to the initiation of the dependency proceedings under 25 U.S.C. section 1911(a), or by transfer under 25 U.S.C. section 1911(b).” In view of the legislative determination that an Indian child’s best interests normally will be best served by preserving his or her tribal connections, there being no evidence to the contrary, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the TCA as the permanent plan. The court rejected Father's claim that the juvenile court erred in affording the TCA order full faith and credit because he was not given an adequate opportunity to be heard on the visitation terms of the TCA order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fresno Cnty. Dept. of Social Serv. v. Jimmie S." on Justia Law

David W. appealed a postjudgment order establishing a duty of parental support to former spouse Cecilia W. for their adult child, Robert W., pursuant to Family Code section 3910.2 David contended: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction; (2) applied incorrect legal standards; and (3) did not have substantial evidence to support its order finding Robert to be incapacitated from making a living and without sufficient means. After review of the record, the Court of Appeal found jurisdiction but agreed the trial court failed to apply correct legal standards, and there was no substantial evidence to support its order. The Court reversed the order and remanded with directions. View "Marriage of Cecilia & David W." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and disposition orders declaring her son to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and removing the son from Mother’s custody. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding as to Mother where Mother has significant limitations, has very little control over her limbs, could not speak, used a wheelchair, and relied on others to meet all of her activities of daily living. Further, the evidence before the juvenile court also set forth specific social worker concerns about Mother and her unwillingness to parent her son to the extent she was able, and Mother failed to provide any care and control over her son. Finally, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's disposition orders and finding of reasonable efforts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the orders. View "LA Cnty. Dept. of Children and Family Serv. v. Maritza M." on Justia Law

Mother has five children who became the subjects of dependency proceedings in 2010. In 2014, after a contested hearing spanning multiple hearing dates, the juvenile court dismissed the case and entered an order stating, “Conditions do not exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under section 300 and are not likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.” The juvenile court dismissed the dependency and ordered informal family maintenance. The court of appeal affirmed, citing Welfare and Institutions Code section 3641 and reasoning, that when the social services agency opposes termination of dependency jurisdiction, it bears the burden of proof to show the existence of the conditions section 364(c) specifies must be proven to support retention of dependency jurisdiction. In this case, however, the social services agency recommended dependency jurisdiction be terminated. Counsel for the dependent children opposed the recommendation and bore the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions justifying initial assumption of dependency jurisdiction either still existed or were likely to exist if supervision were withdrawn. View "In re Aurora P." on Justia Law

A single mother of five children subject to dependency proceedings sought to reverse a court order denying her further reunification services with respect to her three oldest children and to stay a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26 that had been set for September 16, 2015. She claims the court erred in denying her further reunification services because she has made and continues to make reasonable efforts to address the problems that led to the removal of her children, so denial of additional services is not in the children’s best interests. The court of appeal stayed the hearing, but ultimately denied the petition and lifted the stay. Mother has received extensive child welfare services and has taken advantage of them only sporadically. The children have been involved with the dependency system for 11 years, and have spent six years in out-of-home placement with multiple caregivers, not always in healthful circumstances. Mother’s drug abuse, mental instability, and abusive relationships with men, have exposed the children to a continuing risk of harm, delayed their educational development, and left them without a stable home. The court’s factual findings in determining to withhold further services were supported by substantial evidence. View "D.T. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Glenn Drake challenged the trial court’s order requiring him to pay adult child support for his emancipated son, Dallas. His appeal raised two issues: (1) whether the conditions of Family Code section 3910, subdivision (a) for payment of adult child support met; and (2) whether the trial court erred by ordering that adult child support payments be made to Terri Drake, Dallas’s mother and Glenn’s ex-wife, and allowing her to use those payments for her personal expenses. Although the trial court misconstrued the standard for an award of adult child support, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err by ordering Glenn to make support payments because the evidence established that Dallas was incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means. The trial court erred, however, by ordering that Glenn make the adult child support payments to Terri. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order awarding adult child support but reversed to the extent it required support payments be made to Terri. On remand, the trial court had to consider and decide the best means for paying adult child support to Dallas. View "Marriage of Drake" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant S.H. (mother) was the biological mother of C.G. (born in 2013), the child at issue here, and B.H. (born in 2011), who was C.G.’s half sibling. Both children were removed from mother’s custody, and her parental rights were eventually terminated. On appeal, mother argued that the order terminating her parental rights as to C.G. should have been reversed for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian and Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). After review of the specific facts entered into the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed and remanded. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

In 2012, Cueto obtained a two-year domestic violence prevention restraining order against Dozier, the father of her eight-year-old son. Shortly before the order was set to expire, Cueto sought permanent renewal of that order. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Cueto’s request, finding that she had not established an objectively reasonable fear of future abuse by Dozier. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the restraining order should be renewed for five years or permanently under 14 Fam. Code, 6345(a). While the trial court relied on the fact that Dozier had not violated the order, it should have considered his history of violence and failure to attend anger management classes as required for visitation with his son. View "Cueto v. Dozier" on Justia Law

Mother Y.Z. appealed a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her children, G.P. and A. P., and choosing adoption as the appropriate permanent plan. Mother contended the court erroneously found that the children should have been removed from their relative caregiver and placed in a foster home under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 387 deprived her of the ability to raise an exception to the adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Mother also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that the beneficial relationship exception to the adoption preference was inapplicable. "Jose P.," the presumed father of G.P. and A.P., joined Mother's arguments and argued his due process rights were violated when the court terminated his parental rights without having made a detriment finding as to him. Upon review of the juvenile court order, the Court of Appeal concluded the court's findings under section 387 as well as its determination that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply were supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the Court found that Father invited the error he appealed, and even if he did not do so, the juvenile court's findings were sufficient to support termination of Father's rights. View "In re G.P." on Justia Law