Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Natasha B. appealed a juvenile court order that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, T.G. At a dispositional hearing, Natasha was bypassed for reunification services because her rights to her other children had previously been terminated. On appeal, Natasha argued that bypassing her for reunification was improper because the orders terminating services and parental rights with respect to T.G.'s half siblings were on appeal at the time of T.G.'s dispositional hearing, and therefore were not an appropriate basis for bypass. The Court of Appeal found the decision to bypass Natasha for reunification was not improper, and affirmed the juvenile court. View "In re T.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carol Guess appealed a judgment dismissing her action against defendants Mark and Ivy Bernhardson for a declaration that she still had a spousal support judgment lien against real property previously owned by her former husband, L. Donald Guess. The Bernhardsons purchased the property at issue from a bank after it conducted a trustee's sale on his trust deed on that property. On appeal, Carol argued the trial court erred by interpreting applicable statutes regarding judgment liens as fixing the amount of her support judgment lien at the time of her ex-husband’s encumbrance (i.e., trust deed) on the property at the amount then mature and owing (then zero dollars), and not at the amount owing at the time of the transfer to the Bernhardsons; and concluding the obligation of Husband under the marital dissolution judgment to maintain life insurance for her benefit was neither a money judgment nor a spousal support judgment on which a judgment lien could be created. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s dismissal of Carol’s suit, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Guess v. Bernhardson" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court's findings against her as not supported by substantial evidence. Mother used her hand or a sandal to spank her two children on the buttocks on those “rare” occasions when lesser disciplinary measures proved ineffective, but never hard enough to leave bruises or marks. At issue was whether a juvenile court may conclude mother has inflicted “serious physical harm” within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 without first examining whether her conduct falls outside the right of parents, which exists elsewhere in California civil and criminal law, to discipline their children as long as the discipline is genuinely disciplinary, is warranted by the circumstances, and is reasonable (rather than excessive) in severity. The court concluded that the juvenile court may not. Because the juvenile court’s ruling relied on its categorical view that “hitting children with shoes” is “physical abuse” and “not a proper form of discipline,” the court vacated the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding as to mother and remanded so that the juvenile court may in the first instance apply the reasonable parental discipline doctrine. View "LA Cnty. DCFS v. Jessica G." on Justia Law

The juvenile court denied reunification services to D.F., the mother of A.M., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), because her parental rights to another child had been permanently severed. Mother challenged the order bypassing reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing, asserting subdivision (b)(11) did not apply because her parental rights were severed in another state. The Court of Appeal found that the plain language of subdivision (b)(11), unlike that of subdivision (b)(10), contained no such limitation. The Court therefore denied mother’s writ petition challenging the denial of reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. View "D.F. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing her sons, Dakota and Joseph, from her physical custody and ordering suitable placement. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred by applying the removal statute, Welfare & Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c), to Dakota and Joseph because they were not residing with Mother when the Department initiated the petition and had not been residing with her for at least five years. The court held that the statute does not contemplate that a child could be removed from a parent who is not living with the child at the relevant time. Accordingly, the court reversed the dispositional order. View "L.A. Cnty. DCFS v. Stacey J." on Justia Law

Appellant, 16 years old when the petition underlying this appeal was filed, had a troubled history. Since 1999, her family has had 36 child welfare referrals from Lake, Shasta, Siskiyou and Solano Counties; it had five voluntary family maintenance cases between 2002 and 2014 but did not fulfill any of the suggested or requested services. Appellant appealed juvenile court orders continuing her as a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committing her to the custody of the probation officer for placement in "New Foundations." She argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that she resisted or obstructed a peace officer; (2) the court erred in failing to dismiss the section 602 petition (which she claimed impermissibly increased her maximum confinement time); and (3) the court abused its discretion in terminating her status as a section 300 dependent child and adjudging her a delinquent minor. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with her first contention and therefore reversed the orders. View "In re Amanda A." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a trial court's order that appellant Kierstin Smith pay $124,352 to claimant-respondent Cindy Smith, and $151,967, subject to a specified offset, to respondent Mark Smith. Kierstin argued that the trial court erred by combining cost shifting pursuant to Family Code section 2030 with sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271, making no explicit differentiation between sums awarded pursuant to each statute. She further argued that the trial court abused its discretion in making an award under either statute. Mark and Kierstin divorced in 2002, but they have remained engaged in litigation regarding child custody and support, which has expanded to involve Cindy, Mark's current wife. The most recent proceedings began in December 2008, when Mark applied for a post-judgment modification of child support, attorney fees, and sanctions, and also included consideration of Mark's January 2010 application seeking a change in child custody, and Kierstin's August 2012 application for a modification of child support. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's order, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Marriage of Smith" on Justia Law

Mother B.O. and Father W.M. appealed a juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights to their three-year-old daughter K.M. The sole issue raised on appeal centered on Orange County Social Services' (SSA) lack of inquiry regarding K.M.'s American Indian heritage as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). SSA admitted it failed to comply with the ICWA requirements. Rather than stipulating to a limited reversal and having the matter returned to the trial court for further proceedings, SSA sought an immediate do-over with the trial court while the matter was still pending on appeal. With its briefing on appeal, SSA filed a motion asking the Court of Appeal to consider evidence of that hearing and the juvenile court's order concerning SSA's ICWA investigation and remedial efforts at notification. SSA argued the Court of Appeal had to dismiss this appeal because Mother and Father's issues on appeal were rendered moot by the post-judgment activities. The Court of Appeal disagreed: the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the ICWA issue following its termination of parental rights. Because the juvenile court's post-judgment ICWA order was void, this appeal was not moot. And due to the undisputed ICWA violations, the Court of Appeal ordered a limited reversal of the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "In re K.M." on Justia Law

This case centered on A.O., a minor who was 12 years old at the time of detention, and her mother, who suffered from bi-polar disorder and exhibited paranoid and aggressive tendencies. The court found jurisdiction over A.O. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) and removed her from mother’s care. At the six-month review hearing, the court found that returning A.O. to mother would be detrimental to A.O. and that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) had provided adequate reunification services. At the twelve-month review hearing, the court terminated reunification services and ordered that A.O. be placed in a Planned Permanent Living Arrangement. Mother appealed the orders from the six- and twelve-month review hearings, and, citing the court’s failure to advise her of her right to appeal after the disposition hearing, she also appealed the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed jurisdiction and disposition but reversed the court’s findings at the six- and twelve-month review hearings that DPSS had provided reasonable reunification services. View "In re A.O." on Justia Law

Husband appealed the trial court's finding of a family home as community property and award of reimbursement of husband's separate property contributions under Family Code section 2640. The trial court also charged husband for the fair market rental value of the home from the time wife moved out to the date of judgment. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that if property is acquired during marriage with both separate and community funds, the transmutation requirements of section 852 must be satisfied before the reimbursement provisions of section 2640 apply. In this case, the documents do not contain an express transmutation of husband’s separate property, and therefore, husband’s separate property contributions remained husband’s separate property. Husband held a separate property interest in the property proportionate to the separate property funds that he contributed. View "Bonvino v. Bonvino" on Justia Law