Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the denial of the domestic violence restraining order she sought against defendant. The trial court found substantial evidence of physical violence, but concluded that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof. In this case, the testimony that the trial court did permit revealed significant acts of emotional abuse, well beyond accessing and disseminating texts and email. The acts of isolation, control, and threats were sufficient to demonstrate the destruction of plaintiff’s mental and emotional calm. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to consider this testimony as the basis for the order because this evidence demonstrated abuse within the meaning of section 6320 of the Family Code. The court also concluded that the fact that there had been a six month hiatus in violence in this case does not support the trial court’s erroneous imposition of a requirement of a showing of likelihood of future abuse. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the trial court to issue the protective order. View "Rodriguez v. Menjivar" on Justia Law

Two-year-old B.H. was removed from the custody of his parents, B.H. (Father) and K.E. (Mother) and declared the child a dependent of the court. The court thereafter denied Father reunification services under the bypass provision of section Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10). Father subsequently appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings against him and that there was insufficient evidence to support the denial of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10). After review of the particular facts of this case, the Court of Appeal rejected these contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

In November 2013, Amber L. arrived at a probation drug test appointment with her two-year-old daughter, A.R., and told her probation officer that she had used heroin just hours before. Amber told the officer A.R.'s father, Manuel R., was waiting in the car and could care for the child. When officers went to the car, Manuel also appeared to be under the influence of drugs. Officers searched Manuel and found a hypodermic needle in his pocket. Officers also searched the car and found marijuana and another needle in Amber's purse. Both parents were arrested and A.R. was taken to Polinsky Children's Center. At the time of their parents' arrest, A.R. and her half-sister, four-year-old A.L., were living with their paternal grandmother. Neither Amber nor Manuel lived with the paternal grandmother. Amber was staying in hotels and Manuel was homeless. (Manuel's parental rights to A.R. were also terminated, as were A.L.'s father's rights, but neither father was a party to this appeal. As a result of the parents' arrests, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed petitions on behalf of the minors alleging they had suffered, or were at a substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm as a result of their parents' inability to care for them because of drug use. Amber appealed orders terminating her parental rights to her minor children. The Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court erred by refusing to hear testimony on the issue of active efforts at the permanency planning hearing, but concluded that the court's error was harmless. The Court of Appeal rejected Amber's contention that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that continued parental custody would likely result in serious physical or emotional damage to the minors, and affirmed the orders. View "In re A.L." on Justia Law

Father appealed a jurisdictional finding and dispositional order in the dependency case of his three children, contending, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to find he is a current abuser of marijuana. The court concluded that father’s admitted use of marijuana, his failure to ensure his very young children were adequately supervised, and his absent drug tests all constituted sufficient evidence to support both the jurisdictional finding and the dispositional order. The court concluded, however, that father provided sufficient information of possible Indian heritage to trigger the Indian Child Welfare Act's, 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963, notice provisions. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's finding in that regard and remanded with directions. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "L.A. Cnty. DCFS v. Roland C." on Justia Law

This petition involves a paternity and support action filed in a Zurich court in 2008, alleging that petitioner, a resident of California, is the father of Jayden. Both Jayden and his mother live in Switzerland. The court held that when a foreign judgment establishing paternity and child support is registered in California for enforcement purposes under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Fam. Code 4900 et seq., a California court order may not order genetic testing to challenge registration of that order. In the context of this case, genetic testing is not relevant to any matter that is properly before the trial court in this enforcement proceeding under the Act. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for writ of mandate. View "County of L.A. Child Supp. Serv. Dept. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

M.J. and C.C. appealed orders entered following the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in the juvenile dependency case of their minor children, thirteen-year-old D.C., ten-year-old Ce.C., and nine-year-old F.C. In early 2015, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency petitioned the juvenile court on behalf of the children following allegations of sexual abuse in the household. The minors lived with M.J. and C.C., an unmarried couple who had adopted them after a previous dependency case involving the minors. The Agency alleged C.C. had sexually abused D.C., including by having sexual intercourse with her and forcing her to orally copulate him. The Agency further alleged M.J. had allowed C.C. back into the family home following D.C.'s disclosure of abuse, despite Agency intervention and an Agency safety plan. The Agency concluded D.C. had been sexually abused, or there was a substantial risk D.C. would be sexually abused, and there was a substantial risk that Ce.C. and F.C. would be abused or neglected. M.J. argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's dispositional order removing the minors from her custody, and the court erred by not complying with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). C.C. argued the evidence was insufficient to support the court's jurisdictional findings; the court erred by approving provisions in his case plan requiring him to admit to sexual abuse of D.C.; and the court erred by limiting his educational rights over Ce.C. and F.C. C.C. also joins in M.J.'s contentions. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court erred by finding ICWA inapplicable to this case without providing notice to the tribes in which C.C. claimed potential membership. The Court therefore vacated the court's ICWA finding and remanded with directions to provide such notice. In all other respects, the Court disagreed with M.J. and C.C.'s contentions and affirmed. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was one of first impression as to whether a default judgment was void for lack of notice where the marital dissolution petition requested the court to determine the property rights of the parties but did not list any property. Rather than listing assets and debts, the petition stated that the parties would stipulate to division of the assets and debts and, if this did not occur, the petitioner would amend the petition. Before either of these alternatives occurred, the court struck Joseph Eustice's answer to the petition, conducted a prove-up hearing, and entered a default judgment disposing of the marital property. Prior to the court striking Joseph’s answer, both parties served on each other preliminary declarations listing all known assets and debts subject to disposition. "Normally, for notice purposes, a default judgment cannot dispose of property which has not been listed in the marital dissolution petition or an attached property declaration. Rather than concluding, here, that the default judgment is void because it disposes of property not listed in the petition, we hold the default judgment is valid and enforceable because Joseph appeared in the proceedings by filing a response listing assets and debts subject to disposition, and Joseph received notice of the assets and debts disposed of in the default judgment by being served with the [his wife's] two preliminary declarations. Furthermore, any deficiency in notice was waived by Joseph’s response to the petition and preliminary declaration, both of which listed the property disposed of in the default judgment. We therefore reject Joseph’s contentions and affirm the judgment." View "Marr. of Eustice" on Justia Law

In November 2014, 21-month-old A.A. (Child) was detained and removed from the home and care of her mother, As.A. (Mother). While in the family home, Child had been allowed to play with lit matches, exposed to heavy marijuana smoke, and surrounded by a variety of drug paraphernalia and drugs in plain sight. Mother was arrested and temporarily incarcerated. Child's father, S.S. (Father), who lived separately, had a history of substance abuse and declined to take custody of Child. Mother and Father did not contest the juvenile court's jurisdiction, and Child was placed with foster parents, the C.'s. At the C.'s, Child was reportedly healthy, happy, and enjoying visits with Mother, who wanted to regain custody of Child. At a disposition hearing approximately one month later, the Imperial County Department of Social Services reported that Child had passed away the previous day. The Department informed the court that multiple investigations were ongoing regarding the circumstances of Child's death. The Department was conducting a separate investigation for the welfare of other children who had been living in the C.'s home. The police department was conducting a criminal investigation, and other governmental agencies were investigating the C.'s for foster care and day care licensing purposes. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether a juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over a dependency case after the subject child has died, for the purpose of learning the child's cause of death and/or appointing a guardian ad litem to investigate potential tort claims for the child's estate. The juvenile court determined it must terminate its jurisdiction under the circumstances. The Court of Appeal agreed and affirmed. View "Imperial County Dept. etc. v. S.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Barry Schneer (father) appealed a family court order finding California lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to make an initial child custody determination regarding his daughter. Father filed his child custody petition on June 24, 2013. In support of the petition, father declared the child was born in June 2011 in Miami, Florida, and that the child and mother resided with father in Twentynine Palms, California, from April 2012 onward. In an attachment to a request for an emergency decree, father alleged mother took the child to Florida to visit the child's grandparents “under [the] presumption of her return following a short visit,” but mother and the child had been in Florida for more than three months “with no date of return.” In her response and in a motion to quash and dismiss the petition, defendant-respondent Alice Llaurado (mother) alleged the child lived in Miami since her birth and never resided in California. Mother declared she and the child visited California several times between August 2012 and March 2013, but she never stayed more than a few weeks at a time. Mother denied having any intent to relocate to California, and denied residing in any state other than Florida. Father argued the California family court erred by ruling California was not the child's home state for purposes of the UCCJEA because the child did not reside in California during the six-month period immediately before father filed his child custody petition. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with father's interpretation of the UCCJEA and reversed the family court's order. View "Schneer v. Llaurado" on Justia Law

In a previous decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment terminating Johneisha Kemper's parental rights to her daughter, rejecting Kemper's contention that she received ineffective assistance of her appointed juvenile dependency counsel. Kemper then brought a legal malpractice action against the same appointed juvenile dependency attorneys, their supervising attorney, and the County of San Diego.2 She alleged defendants' legal representation breached the applicable standard of care and caused the termination of her parental rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on the collateral estoppel doctrine. The court granted the motion and entered judgment in defendants' favor. Kemper appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed: "Causation is an essential element of a legal malpractice claim, and Kemper is barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine from relitigating the issue of whether her juvenile dependency attorneys caused the termination of her parental rights. We decline Kemper's request that we create a new exception to the collateral estoppel rule based on an analogy to the writ of habeas corpus procedure applicable in juvenile dependency cases." View "Kemper v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law