Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A paternity complaint was filed against Appellee, alleging that he was the father of a child. A default judgment was later entered against Appellee ordering him to pay child support. More than fourteen years later and after the child had turned eighteen years of age, the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) filed a motion for judgment to collect reimbursement for $14,195 in child-support arrearages from Appellee. In response, Appellee filed a motion for paternity testing. The circuit court entered an order ordering genetic testing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the plain language of Ark. Code Ann. 9-10-115(e)(1)(a), Appellee was not entitled to a paternity test because the period that Appellee was required to pay child support ended when the child turned eighteen, and likewise, the period of time in which Appellee could seek a paternity test also ended when the child turned eighteen.

The circuit court entered an order denying Jimmy Mann's petition to intervene in a dependency-neglect case. Mann filed an unsigned notice of appeal belatedly. The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the notice of appeal filed by Mann was untimely and was not signed as required by Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(b)(1)(B). Mann later filed a motion for belated appeal. The Supreme Court denied DHS's motion to dismiss and granted Mann's motion for belated appeal, holding (1) it was plain from the motion and response that relief was proper; and (2) because there was attorney error in perfecting the appeal in this case, the attorney was referred to the Committee on Professional Conduct for appropriate action.

After Mother got pregnant, she told Father she wanted to put the baby up for adoption. Mother subsequently moved several times without telling Father her location. Father filed with the putative-father registries in four states and filed paternity actions in both Texas and Arkansas. Mother gave birth in Arkansas, and the infant was placed with Appellees, the adoptive parents, on that same day. Appellees filed a petition for adoption, and Appellant filed a complaint in intervention. The circuit court determined that Appellant's consent was not required for the adoption and granted the adoption of the infant to Appellees. The Supreme Court vacated the decree of adoption and reversed the finding that Appellant's consent was not required, holding (1) Appellant's efforts to establish a significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship were sufficient such that his consent to the adoption was required pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 9-9-206(a)(2); and (2) therefore, the circuit court's finding that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not required was clearly erroneous. Remanded.

Wife and Husband gave birth to a daughter, after which Husband filed for a divorce. The divorce decree filed by the circuit court provided that Wife would be granted custody of the child and adopted a limited visitation schedule for Husband agreed upon by the parties in order to accommodate Wife's nursing of the child. The parties agreed that once their daughter reached eighteen months of age, they would adhere to the standard visitation schedule. Once the child reached eighteen months, Wife moved to modify visitation based on her desire to continue nursing her child. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Wife failed to prove a material change in circumstances had occurred.

This case arose from a dependency-neglect proceeding. After a permanency-planning hearing was set, the circuit court discovered that the Department of Human Services (DHS) had failed to draft and put into place a case plan. The court then ordered that, as the case worker had forty-one cases on her caseload and fifty juveniles in fostercare, DHS should rectify the issue in five days. DHS subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, asserting that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction and violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by issuing an order that DHS alleged invaded the discretionary functions of the executive branch. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its jurisdiction to act to protect the integrity of the proceedings and to safeguard the rights of the litigants before it when it ordered DHS to correct problems that were preventing work and services.

Child was born to Appellant and her former husband. When Appellant and her former husband divorced, Appellant was given custody of Child. Appellant subsequently married Appellee. Appellant later filed for divorce from Appellee, and the circuit court granted Appellee visitation rights. Appellant appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in ruling that Appellee stood in loco parentis to Child. The Supreme Court reversed the award of visitation, holding that the circuit court erred by characterizing the relationship between Appellee and Child as one of in loco parentis, as the facts demonstrated that Appellee assumed the role of a caring stepparent but fell short of embracing the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a parent.

Stepmother filed a petition to adopt her stepson, J.P., whose biological mother had died. The same day the petition for adoption was filed, J.P.'s Father filed a consent to the adoption and waiver of appearance. J.P.'s Grandmother and Great-Grandmother subsequently filed a motion to intervene and a third-party petition for grandparent and great-grandparent visitation. The circuit court denied Stepmother's petition to adopt and granted visitation of J.P. to Grandmother and Great-Grandmother. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant Grandmother and Great-Grandmother's motion to intervene; (2) reversed the circuit court's order for grandparent and great-grandparent visitation, holding that the court clearly erred in finding that Grandmother and Great-Grandmother had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the loss of the relationship between them and J.P. was likely to harm J.P; and (3) affirmed the circuit court's denial of the petition for adoption where it properly found that adoption was not currently in J.P.'s best interest.

After Appellant was charged with criminal nonsupport, he filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he had been held in criminal contempt for nonpayment of child support, and therefore, the State was precluded from prosecuting him for the same conduct based on double-jeopary grounds. The circuit court found that Appellant had been held in criminal contempt for an arrearage that had accrued through 2003, and therefore, the State was barred from prosecuting Appellant criminally for nonpayment that occurred prior to that date. The State subsequently amended its information charging Appellant with criminal nonsupport by calculating his arrearage from 2003 until 2010. Appellant filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that criminal nonsupport was a continuing offense and that the state was constitutionally prohibited from punishment Appellant multiple times for nonpayment. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that criminal nonsupport was not a continuing offense and that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not not prosecution of Appellant for any arrearage accruing after 2003. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's prior contempt proceedings did not present a double-jeopardy bar to the State's prosecution for criminal nonsupport in this instance.

Cheryl Duncan filed for divorce from Mark Duncan. The circuit court entered a divorce decree, incorporating and adopting a property-settlement agreement between the parties but not merging it into the decree. The circuit court subsequently entered a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO), which separated Mark's retirement plan into an account for Mark and an account for Cheryl. Later, Cheryl filed a motion for contempt and judgment, seeking an award that she maintained represented the value of her interest in Mark's retirement plan following the date of the divorce. The court granted judgment in favor of Cheryl against Mark in the amount of $115,936, representing the decrease in market value of Cheryl's half of Mark's retirement account following their divorce. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred by entering the judgment against Mark for $115,936 where the losses due to market fluctuation occurred after Cheryl's portion of Mark's retirement plan had been segregated pursuant to the QDRO. Remanded.

John Kelly appealed a divorce decree granting Christy Kelly a divorce, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in finding that Christy's stock in Tarco Roofing Materials (TRM) was nonmarital property, and (2) the circuit court erred in finding John liable for one-half of the deficiency resulting from the sale of the marital home. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding Christy acquired an enforceable right when she acquired her shares of TRM stock during her marriage, and therefore the circuit court erred in finding that the TRM stock was nonmarital property. Because the case was reversed for further proceedings relating to the division of property, the Court did not address John's second issue.