Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case began as a divorce action. The circuit court ordered Husband to pay Wife a judgment, and in compliance with that order, Husband paid Wife approximately forty percent of the total judgment entered against him. Thereafter, Wife filed a notice of appeal to advance an argument that the circuit court erred in refusing to award increased child support and the full measure of her attorneys' fees. Husband filed a cross-appeal. Wife argued that Husband's cross-appeal should be dismissed because Husband voluntarily paid part of the total judgment entered against him, which, she contended, constituted a waiver of the right to appeal the judgment. Husband argued that only a voluntary satisfaction of a judgment in full would equate to a waiver of his right to appeal, not his partial payment. The Supreme Court dismissed Husband's cross-appeal, holding that Husband's payment was a voluntary acquiescence to the judgment against him, and therefore, Husband waived his right to appeal the judgment. View "Hall v. Hall" on Justia Law

Appellant Benefit Bank appealed from the circuit court's order finding that the mortgage it held to certain property was second and subordinate to the interest of Appellee Marilyn Rogers obtained in her divorce. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the circuit court erred in finding that Appellee's interest was prior to Appellant's interest because the divorce court lacked authority to impose a lien on real property to secure alimony payments. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding (1) the divorce court did not lack the authority to impose the lien as it did, where it was stipulated to by the divorcing parties; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that the lis pendens filed by Appellee created or perfected a lien. View "Benefit Bank v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Clayton Coker appealed a divorce decree entered in the circuit court, asserting (1) the circuit court committed clear error in granting Samantha Hess-Coker a divorce based on the ground of indignities, and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in granting an award of attorney's fees to Samantha. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the decision of the circuit court. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Clayton's conduct constituted such indignities to Samantha as to render her condition intolerable; but (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in granting attorney's fees in an amount in excess of that Samantha sought. View "Coker v. Coker" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the decree entered by the circuit court granting the petition of Appellees, Appellant's parents, to adopt Appellant's daughter. On appeal, Appellant contended that the circuit court erred in denying her request for the appointment of counsel because, as an indigent, she was entitled to appointed counsel in a private adoption proceeding under both the federal and state Constitutions. She also argued that the circuit court's findings in support of the adoption were clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's first argument was not preserved for appeal; (2) the circuit court correctly found that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not necessary; and (3) the circuit court's finding that the adoption was in the child's best interest was not clearly erroneous. View "Lucas v. Jones" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed a decision of the circuit court denying her petition for change of custody, denying a petition for citation of contempt for parental alienation, and excluding expert testimony. In 2008, a dependency-neglect proceeding was opened under the Arkansas Juvenile Code, and the Arkansas Department of Human Services sought and obtained custody of Appellant's daughter, S.S. The proceedings were closed and the case under the Juvenile Code was dismissed when Appellees were granted permanent custody of S.S. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in applying the Juvenile Code in reopening the case, but the juvenile division of the circuit court nevertheless had jurisdiction to hear the case; and (2) while the circuit court errantly attempted to decide this case under the standards for deciding permanency placement, the circuit court's conclusion that it was not in S.S.'s best interest to change custody was not in error. View "Young v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Appellant Brittany Mahavier appealed orders of the circuit court granting a permanent guardianship of her son to her mother, Appellee Teresa Mahavier, and declaring the Arkansas Statutes on guardianships to be unconstitutional. Appellant stipulated below that there was sufficient evidence to establish a need for the guardianship but did not agree to the guardianship so she could maintain her constitutional challenges based on equal protection and substantive due process. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the constitutional arguments because the Attorney General was not notified of the constitutional challenges to the guardianship statutes, as required by Ark. Code Ann. 16-111-106(b), and there was not full and complete adversarial development of the constitutional issues. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for compliance with the notice requirement of section 16-111-106(b). View "In re Guardianship of A.M." on Justia Law

Appellee Theresa Dennie filed a paternity action, contending that Appellant Grady Tracy was the natural father of M.T. and requesting custody of the child, with Tracy having visitation. Tracy filed a motion for the appointment of an attorney ad litem, which the circuit court granted. Prior to the final hearing in the matter, Tracy objected to the circuit court's receipt of the ad litem's report. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court left custody with Dennie and awarded Tracy standard visitation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Tracy's objection to the admission of the ad litem's report and in admitting the report, as (1) the report's contents and recommendation were admissible by law or the Court's rules, even if hearsay; and (2) the admission of the report did not violate Ark. R. Prof'l Conduct 3.7. View "Tracy v. Dennie" on Justia Law

Child was born to Father and Mother in Minnesota. After the family moved to Arkansas, Father's parents (Grandparents) filed a petition for guardianship of Child. The court ultimately entered an order of guardianship appointing Grandparents as guardians of Child. Mother filed a petition to terminate guardianship, asserting several claims. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying the petition to terminate the guardianship. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the application of Ark. Code Ann. 28-65-401 in this instance violated Mother's constitutional rights because when a natural parent, who has not been deemed unfit and who has consented to a guardianship, files a petition to terminate that guardianship, that parent must put forth evidence that the guardianship is no longer necessary, and once the court is satisfied that the conditions necessitating the guardianship have been removed, the guardians shoulder the burden of rebutting the presumption that termination is in the child's best interest; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion where it did not apply the correct legal standard in evaluating Grandparents' motion for a psychological evaluation. View "In re Guardianship of S.H." on Justia Law

Upon the divorce of Kayla Pierce McKenzie and Appellee Joshua Pierce, Kayla was awarded custody of their minor child. Kayla subsequently married Appellant, Cleo McKenzie. Appellee later filed a motion for a change of custody due to Appellant's depression and lack of stability. Kayla requested that the motion be denied. Appellee's attorney caused subpoenas duces tecum to be served on the custodians of the records of two medical facilities requesting the medical and mental health records for Appellant. Appellant filed a motion to quash, asserting that he was not a party to the custody dispute and that issuing the subpoenas violated his rights protected under state and federal law. Appellant also sought sanctions pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11. The circuit court denied the motion to quash and request for Rule 11 sanctions. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari and held (1) a nonparty's medical records cannot be subpoenaed under the circumstances presented in this case; and (2) the motion to quash should have been granted. Remanded for consideration of whether Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate in this case.

Employer began withholding a portion of wages from Employee's paycheck as the result of an income-withholding order stemming from child-support arrearages. Employee filed a complaint against Employer, asking the circuit court to enjoin Employer from withholding further amounts and that he be awarded damages for all amounts wrongfully withheld. The circuit court dismissed Employee's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly dismissed the case with prejudice, as Employee was barred from bringing this civil action against Employer, who was required to comply with the withholding order; and (2) the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act was constitutional.