Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Four children were removed from their parents' care based on domestic abuse in the parents' relationship. The parents later divorced and the mother was able to regain custody, but thereafter she entered into another abusive relationship. Two of her sons physically intervened in one violent confrontation between the mother and her new partner and notified the police of the abuse. The State took the boys and their two younger siblings into temporary custody. Their mother appealed the superior court's finding that all four children were children in need of aid. Because the Supreme Court concluded that continued exposure to domestic violence placed the children at substantial risk of injury, the Court affirmed the superior court’s finding that the mother's extensive history of abusive relationships was likely to result in harm to the children, and that the children were in need of aid under state law.

"Philip J." is the father of seven children who were adjudicated to be children in need of aid. On appeal, he claimed that his right to due process was violated because he was unaware that the State would seek adjudication findings at the conclusion of a hearing that started as a contested probable cause (temporary custody) hearing. He also argued that he was denied due process because he was not allowed to present a closing argument. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Philip was not denied due process because he had notice that the State was seeking adjudication findings, because he had an opportunity to be heard on adjudication, and because he was not denied the opportunity to deliver a closing argument. The Court affirmed the superior court's order adjudicating all of the children as in need of aid.

Leon Burts filed for divorce in 2009. The superior court valued Leon’s post-retirement military health insurance benefit as a marital asset and allocated it to Leon. Leon appealed, arguing that the benefit was too speculative to be valued and that state courts are preempted from treating this type of federal benefit as a marital asset. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s characterization of this benefit as marital property, but concluded the court’s valuation was erroneous. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the value of the benefit.

An Alaskan military couple divorced in 2008. Their agreement for custody of their two children was incorporated into the divorce decree. The following year, the father, who anticipated relocating with the military, sought modification of the custody arrangement. In its order denying modification, the superior court tried to give effect to the parties' custody agreement but did not independently analyze the best interests of the children. Because a substantial change in circumstances occurred, and because a custody decision must be based on an independent best-interests analysis, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the superior court to undertake a full best-interests inquiry. The Court also remanded for the superior court to resolve a dispute concerning payment of a custody investigator.

A mother appealed the superior court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for her motion to modify child custody. In October 2009 Kalindi filed a motion seeking to modify "interim" custody and visitation, to establish "final child custody orders," and to determine the rule of law regarding the effect of Shaun’s prior domestic violence on the custody decision. Kalindi sought sole legal and primary physical custody of their children and requested an evidentiary hearing. The superior court denied her motion without a hearing, stating that an August 2008 hearing had resulted in a "final order" and concluding that Kalindi was "barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel from attempting to re-litigate legal and factual matters that existed prior to the August 22, 2008 hearing," including "factual issues that were known or should have been known to" her at the hearing. Kalindi appealed the May 2010 order; her primary argument was that the superior court erred by denying her a custody modification hearing to present evidence of Shaun’s history of domestic violence. Because the Kalindi was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this case, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings.

Ronald and Sharon Stevens separated in August 2006, ending a 40-year marriage. In June 2007 they appeared before the superior court for their divorce trial. Before the trial ended, the parties entered into what they thought was a settlement on the property division issues. But the parties could not agree on the exact terms of the settlement, and in August 2008 they returned to the superior court for a second day of trial on the property division issues. The superior court valued the property, equitably divided the estate, and ordered each side to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. Pertinent to this appeal, the trial court valued the parties’ two residences as of the date of the first day of trial. Sharon appealed and Ronald cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred in valuing the real property as of the date of the first day of trial when the second and final trial day occurred over a year later. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Branwen Collier and William Harris are the parents of a daughter, Zada. The parties agreed to shared physical custody of their daughter, and the superior court decided that joint legal custody was in the child’s best interest. The mother later filed a motion for modification of joint legal and shared physical custody, asserting that her work schedule had changed since the parties agreed on a physical custody schedule, that the father had violated court orders, and that he was not communicating effectively. The mother sought sole legal and primary physical custody. The superior court denied the motion without a hearing and awarded attorney’s fees to the father. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the mother was not entitled to a hearing on her motion to modify custody under the circumstances of this case, but vacated the award of attorney’s fees.

Raising over 50 separate points in this second appeal, Allen Heustess challenged the superior court’s rulings on child support, property distribution, and attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court conducted an exhaustive review of the superior court record, and affirmed almost all of the superior court’s rulings, except: (1) because the record did not support the superior court’s finding regarding Mr. Heustess' income for 1995 and because the superior court did not deduct federal income tax liability from his gross income in its child support calculations for the years 1991 to 1996, the Court reversed the court’s calculation of the child support arrearage; (2) because the superior court may have considered Mr. Heustess' "vexatious" litigation conduct when it divided the marital estate and also considered it when it enhanced the award of fees against him, the Court remanded the superior court’s property division for additional findings; (3) the Court vacated the portion of the general fee award that is based on the parties’ relative economic circumstances so it could be reconsidered after the court recalculated Mr. Heustess' child support arrearage and the overall property division. But the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order enhancing the award of fees in Mrs. Bonnie Kelley-Heustess' favor, and affirmed the remaining rulings of the superior court in all respects.

The superior court awarded sole legal custody of two children to their mother, Taunya, upon her motion to modify custody. Their father, William, appealed, arguing that the superior court improperly weighed the best interests of the children. Because the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the superior court’s conclusions and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision.

A child lived with both of his parents for the first two years of his life. His parents then separated, and they shared custody of the child for about a year, first under an informal agreement and later under the terms of the divorce decree. Less than a month after the decree was entered, Appellant Michael Rego (father) notified Appellee Joanna Rego (mother) that he intended to relocate to his former home state. Following a hearing, the superior court ruled that the move constituted a change of circumstances that justified a custody modification. Applying a "best interests" analysis, the superior court awarded custody to the mother if the father moved. The father appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because the superior court applied the correct legal standard concerning the planned move and it did not abuse its discretion in weighing the best interest factors, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision regarding custody.