Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Darren McLaren sued his wife Teresa for divorce. The superior court divided the couple's property, intending to award each spouse approximately half of the marital estate. Teresa, who appeared pro se, appealed multiple aspects of the property division. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court correctly resolved all of the issues appealed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court.

David S. appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter Hannah, who is an Indian child. Hannah was taken into the custody by the Office of Children's Services (OCS) while David was incarcerated. David remained in jail for the first 20 months of Hannah's life. David was released from prison and was on parole for five months, during which time he had regular visits with Hannah. David then became a fugitive for nine months, before being recaptured and reincarcerated. While David was a fugitive, OCS petitioned for termination of his parental rights, and two months after David was returned to prison, the superior court held a termination trial. The superior court found that Hannah was a child in need of aid due to David’s abandonment, incarceration, and substance abuse. The superior court also concluded that OCS had engaged in active efforts to help David's rehabilitation, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and that it was in Hannah's best interests for David's parental rights to be terminated. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling because OCS established all requirements necessary for termination.

John Weinberger and Patrice Weinmeister are the parents of a young son. After an incident of mutual domestic violence, John obtained an ex parte restraining order against Patrice. John and Patrice both sought custody of their son in the separate custody proceeding that followed. After a one-day bench trial, the superior court determined that Patrice had a "history of perpetrating domestic violence," but the court also ruled that Patrice rebutted the presumption against awarding custody to her. John appealed the custody decision. John contended that the superior court's determination that Patrice overcame the presumption was based on a misreading of AS 25.24.150(h). John argued that the superior court read this statute with "or" between the conditions for rebutting the presumption rather than "and." In other words, rather than reading the statute to require consideration of an intervention program, and a showing that Patrice does not engage in substance abuse, and a showing that the child’s best interests would be served by awarding custody to her, John argued that the superior court interpreted the statute to allow the presumption to be overcome if Patrice made any one of the three showings identified in the statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with John. Because Patrice failed to rebut the statutory presumption, the superior court erred by awarding custody to Patrice and the custody order was reversed.

Stephanie F. and George C. both sought physical and legal custody of their son and daughter. Following lengthy proceedings, the superior court found that it would be in the children's best interests for custody to be awarded to George. But the court also found that George committed two acts of violence against Stephanie in the months leading up to their separation. The acts were described by the court as "situational violence" not reflective of a chronic pattern, but still a history of violence under AS 25.24.150(g). As a result, a statutory presumption against awarding custody to George was triggered. The superior court concluded that George did not rebut the presumption because he did not complete a batterers' intervention program. Assuming (without deciding) that the perceived conflict between the statutory presumption and the children's best interests likely violated the children's and George's right to due process, the superior court avoided the presumed constitutional question by articulating an alternate standard for overcoming the statutory presumption. Stephanie appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the completion of a batterers' intervention program is not the only way to rebut the presumption in AS 25.24.150(g), and because the statute does not prevent the superior court from conducting a complete best interests analysis, the statute did not raise due process concerns. The superior court did not abuse its discretion or make clearly erroneous findings of fact when it ruled that it was in the children's best interests to be with George, but it did not consider whether the steps George took to address his history of domestic violence rebutted the presumption in AS 25.24.150(g). Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for consideration of that issue.

The Bethel Superior Court entered an order terminating an incarcerated father's parental rights to three of his five children. The father appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by finding that the State made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his family and finding that it was in the children's best interests for his parental rights to be terminated. Because the superior court's active efforts and best interests findings were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling terminating the father's parental rights.

A mother petitioned the superior court to adopt her biological son. She was never married to the child's father. While the court concluded that the father's consent was not needed, it denied the petition as not being in the child's best interests. Instead, the court granted physical and legal custody to the mother and visitation rights to the father. Because Alaska's adoption statute does not contemplate an adoption under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Appellant James Grace suffered permanent brain injuries when his helmet failed after he braked to avoid hitting a dog and was thrown over the handlebars of his motorcycle. Appellant and his wife, Kathleen, filed personal injury and loss of consortium claims against the helmet retailer and manufacturer. The Graces received disbursements from the receiver of one of the manufacturer's second-tier insurance providers that had filed for bankruptcy and gone into liquidation, and entered a settlement agreement with the third-tier insurance carrier. Appellant and his wife separated at some point after the accident, divorced for a month, and remarried. Except for a partial disbursement of funds that occurred while their final divorce hearing was pending, the Graces were unable to agree upon how the remaining settlement and insurance proceeds should be divided. The Graces' lawyer filed an action for interpleader asking the superior court to determine how to divide the remaining funds. After a one-day trial, the superior court concluded that: (1) based on the "analytic" approach in "Bandow v. Bandow," the portion of the recovery from the receiver for the manufacturer's second-tier insurance carrier that was allocated for past economic loss, past medical loss, and rehabilitation services was marital property and should have been divided equally; and (2) the recovery from the third-tier insurance carrier was the result of a jointly-assigned bad faith insurance claim and belonged to both parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's division of the proceeds from the second-tier insurance carrier, but reversed its division of the proceeds from the third-tier insurance carrier.

"Martha" and "William" are the parents of six children. They appealed the superior court’s order adjudicating their two youngest children as children in need of aid and placing the children in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS). Martha and William argued that the superior court abused its discretion in making various evidentiary rulings and contended that it was clearly erroneous for the superior court to find that the children were in need of aid and that continued custody by the parents would be contrary to the children’s best interests. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to adjudicate the children as in need of aid and to keep them in the custody of OCS for a period not to exceed 18 months.

"David S." appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter Hannah, an Indian child. Hannah was taken into the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) while David was incarcerated. David remained in jail for the first 20 months of Hannah's life. David was released from prison and was on parole for five months, during which time he had regular visits with Hannah. David then became a fugitive for nine months, before being recaptured and reincarcerated. While David was a fugitive, OCS petitioned for termination of his parental rights, and two months after David was returned to prison, the superior court held a termination trial. The superior court found that Hannah was a child in need of aid due to David’s abandonment, incarceration, and substance abuse. The superior court also concluded that OCS had engaged in active efforts to help David’s rehabilitation, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and that it was in Hannah’s best interests for David's parental rights to be terminated. David appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s ruling because OCS established all requirements necessary for termination.

Michael and Rebecca Sheffield of Unalaska divorced in 2009. Because Michael planned to move to Virginia in 2010, he sought school-year custody of the couple's two sons. The superior court ruled that the children's best interests supported school-year custody with Michael in Virginia. Rebecca appealed, arguing that the superior court placed too much emphasis on the older son's preference to live in Virginia with his father, especially in relation to the geographical stability that would result if the children remained in Unalaska. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's consideration of the older child's preference was appropriate and that the superior court adequately considered the other statutory factors. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's decision.