Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Alaska Supreme Court
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A father appealed various procedural actions taken by the superior court in his divorce and custody proceeding. Appearing pro se, he alleged that the court’s expedited procedures violated his due process rights and reflected judicial bias. He also argued that the court abused its discretion in its award of attorney’s fees. Because the court’s procedures did not violate the father’s due process rights and the father has not shown that the court was biased against him, the Supreme Court affirmed the procedural decisions of the superior court. But because the superior court did not follow the established process for the award of attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s attorney’s fees order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Berry v. Berry" on Justia Law

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Richard Villars and Kathleen Villars were married in 1984, divorced in 2002. Richard served in the military for most of the marriage, first in the United States Air Force and later in the Alaska Air National Guard. Prior to filing their dissolution, the parties drafted a settlement agreement dividing their property such that each person was to receive half of the marital estate. The value of Richard’s military retirement benefits was not known at the time of dissolution because he had not yet qualified for benefits. However, Richard and Kathleen agreed to split the marital portion of Richard’s military retirement benefits 50/50 should Richard receive them. Richard began collecting his military retirement benefits in 2009 at the age of 48, twelve years earlier than he and Kathleen had expected at the time of dissolution. Kathleen asserted she was entitled to collect her marital portion of Richard’s military retirement benefits when Richard began collecting them. Richard disagreed, arguing that the parties intended Kathleen to collect only when Richard turned 60 years old. The superior court determined that the settlement agreement was unambiguous and the parties intended to divide equally the marital portion of Richard’s military retirement benefits when he began receiving them, not when he turned 60. The superior court ordered Richard to repay Kathleen 50% of the marital portion of the retirement benefits he had received to date. Richard appealed, arguing that the superior court’s finding on the parties’ intent was erroneous and that the retirement benefits were his separate property until he reached the age of 60. Richard further argued that the superior court impermissibly modified the settlement agreement. Because the findings of the superior court were not clearly erroneous and the superior court did not make an impermissible modification to the settlement agreement, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Villars v. Villars" on Justia Law

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A father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). He challenged the superior court's findings that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his Indian family, arguing that OCS failed to investigate placement with his extended family members and did not provide him with adequate visitation and remedial services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCS made active efforts, and accordingly affirmed OCS's decision.

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This case arose from a Child In Need of Aid (CINA) case involving four Indian children who were removed from their parents’ care due to substance abuse and domestic violence. The children were placed with their maternal grandmother, who claimed that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) permanently removed the children and placed them with a non-Native foster family while she was away in Montana caring for her elderly mother. There were substantiated reports of harm relating to the grandmother’s care, and the tribe expressed dissatisfaction with the children’s placement with their grandmother. After removing the children, OCS did not provide the grandmother with notice of scheduled permanency or placement hearings for the children. Over a year after returning from Montana, the grandmother formally requested that the children be placed with her. OCS denied this request and the grandmother appealed, arguing that the children should be placed with her and that the failure to provide her with notice of hearings conducted during the preceding year violated her due process rights. After a full hearing, the superior court denied the request, finding good cause to deviate from the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) placement preferences. The court further concluded that the grandmother was neither entitled to notice of earlier hearings nor prejudiced by a lack of notice. After the superior court proceedings, the children were adopted by the foster family with whom they had bonded. The grandmother appealed the adoption. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because there was not good cause to deviate from the ICWA preferences, the adoption should be set aside and OCS should begin to reunify her with her grandchildren. The grandmother was correct in her argument that she did not receive proper notice of the earlier permanency proceedings. But because any prejudice to the grandmother was cured by the subsequent hearing in which she participated and was able to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and because the superior court did not commit plain error by finding good cause to deviate from ICWA’s placement preferences, the Court affirmed the superior court’s ruling.

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A couple lived together briefly in New Mexico and then separated, with the man moving permanently to Alaska. Shortly after he moved, the woman ("Stephanie W.") discovered that she was pregnant and gave birth to a son. The child had no contact with his father for the first three years of his life. At his paternal grandmother's initiative, the child then visited his father in Alaska several times over a three-year period, including a year-long visit during which he attended kindergarten in Alaska. After the boy returned to New Mexico, the boy's father filed for legal and primary physical custody. After a trial, the superior court awarded primary physical custody to the father and summertime visitation to the mother. Legal custody as to schooling decisions was awarded to the father. Legal custody as to all other decisions was awarded jointly to the mother and father. The mother appealed. Because Stephanie has not shown that the superior court's findings on a sexual abuse issue were clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's finding that the child had not been sexually abused by the father. But the Court remanded the custody issue for a new consideration of the best interests of the child in two respects: (1) Because Stephanie brought her allegations of sexual abuse against the father in good faith, the Court remanded for reconsideration of the "close and continuing relationship" factor in accordance with this opinion; and (2) because the court did not discuss the father's ongoing obligation to support the child, the Court remanded for consideration of the continuity and stability factor.

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Rudy R. moved to modify the agreement through which he and Heather W. shared 50-50 custody of their daughter. He argued that recent legal troubles and instability in Heather's life amounted to changed circumstances that required modifying the custody agreement in the child's best interests. The superior court agreed. Heather appealed, arguing that the evidence did not show that any of her changed circumstances affected her child. The superior court also found that it was in the child's best interests for Rudy to have primary physical custody. Heather argued this was an abuse of discretion because the trial court considered impermissible character evidence, gave disproportionate weight to some factors while ignoring others, and refused to consider evidence of past domestic violence between the parties. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding changed circumstances and did not assign disproportionate weight to certain statutory best interest factors. But because the issue of domestic violence was never adjudicated, the Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Rudy has a history of domestic violence, and, if so, whether he rebutted the statutory presumption against an award of custody.

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This case concerned the ownership of James "Jim" and Terrie Gottstein’s former marital home. Jim paid for the property, but Terrie’s name alone was on the deed. The Gottsteins lived in the home for 15 years before moving out; they later separated. Terrie entered into a deal to sell the property to another couple, the Krafts, for significantly less than its appraised value, and Jim objected. One month before closing, Jim recorded a notice of interest under AS 34.15.010, which forbid a spouse from selling "the family home or homestead" without the consent of the other spouse. Neither the Krafts nor Terrie knew about the notice of interest, and the sale went ahead as planned. Following the sale, Jim filed suit against the Krafts, requesting that the superior court recognize his ownership interest in the property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Krafts. The superior court concluded that it was not "the family home or homestead," rendering Jim’s notice of interest under AS 34.15.010 ineffectual. Jim appealed, arguing: (1) that the statute protected his interest in the property; (2) that the Krafts had constructive notice of his interest and therefore were not bona fide purchasers; and (3) that Jim has an equitable interest in the property and the superior court was mistaken in not granting his request for an equitable remedy. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phrase "family home or homestead" in AS 34.15.010 refers to a family’s residence. Because the disputed property was vacant, and the couple had moved to another home at the time of sale, it did not fall under the spousal consent requirement of AS 34.15.010(b). Jim thus did not put the Krafts on notice of any legally valid claim to the property.

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Bobbie Ann Hunter and Shaun Conwell had two sons before separating. Conwell filed a complaint for custody in 2006 but Hunter did not respond. The superior court granted Conwell sole legal and primary physical custody of the boys in a 2006 default judgment. Nearly two years later Hunter, acting pro se, sought modification of custody. The superior court denied Hunter’s motion without a hearing because it concluded that Hunter’s allegations were insufficient to constitute a substantial change in circumstances. Hunter appealed, and in a 2009 opinion the Supreme Court rejected as time-barred her arguments regarding the initial custody determination, but reversed the superior court’s denial of her motion for modification. The Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Hunter’s allegations of: (1) potential verbal abuse of the boys; (2) a change in Conwell’s employment requiring significant time away from the boys; (3) signs that the boys were developing mental health problems; and (4) Conwell’s interference with court-ordered telephonic visitation. An evidentiary hearing on remand was held and the superior court found that Hunter had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of custody. The court noted, however, that Conwell’s continued interference with telephonic visitation would alone amount to a substantial change if not remedied going forward. Hunter moved for reconsideration; her motion was deemed denied after 30 days. Hunter then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s finding of no substantial change in circumstances.

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A wife left her husband in Ohio and moved with their son to Alaska, where she filed for divorce. The husband filed for divorce in Ohio. The parties agreed Ohio had child custody and property division jurisdiction. The superior court dismissed the wife’s divorce action and the wife appealed, arguing that not granting a divorce was error regardless of the pending Ohio litigation. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant the divorce, the Supreme Court affirmed.

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The parents of a developmentally disabled adult woman appealed a superior court's decision to appoint a public guardian, rather than the parents, as the woman's legal guardian. The superior court found that the parents failed to take advantage of resources available for the daughter's development and did not support the daughter's contact with extended family. On appeal, the parents argued that they should have been appointed as guardians and that the appointment of a public guardian, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unfit to serve as guardians, violated their constitutional right to parent their child. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the public guardian, and because the superior court's action did not violate the parents' substantive due process rights under the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court in all respects.