Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

When Chad and Jessica Lewis divorced, they participated in a settlement conference to divide their property. Following the settlement conference, the superior court recited a proposed settlement agreement on the record, and both parties agreed to it. Jessica then filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law incorporating terms which differed from the agreement as recited by the court. The superior court accepted Jessica's proposed findings and decree over Chad's objection. Chad appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that there was no evidence that the parties agreed to the terms set out in Jessica's proposal and because the terms recited on the record are unenforceable, the Court vacated the superior court’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law and remanded the case for a new property division. View "Lewis v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In this appeal the issue before the Supreme Court was the superior court's valuation and distribution of marital property in the divorce of Carolyn Vieve Day and Charlie T. Williams. Day appealed on three grounds: (1) she contended that the superior court erred when it found her to be employable; (2) that the facts and equities of this case did not support a 50-50 property division; and (3) that the superior court should not have included in the marital estate funds that had already been spent by the date of trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded for additional findings on the superior court's 50-50 property division because the court did not make sufficient findings to explain why an equal distribution was justified in the presence of facts that appear to favor a greater distribution to Day. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it was error for the superior court to include in the marital estate funds that had already been spent by the time of trial. With regard to Williams, he cross-appealed on three grounds: (1) that the superior court erred when it revalued the parties' duplex after divorce; (2) that the court should not have applied the active appreciation theory when valuing the land on which the parties' paint business was situated; and (3) that the court should not have awarded attorney's fees to Day. The Supreme Court agreed with Williams that revaluing the duplex would have been improper, but because it was not clear whether the superior court actually revalued the duplex, the Court vacated the order to sell the duplex and remanded for reconsideration and clarification. Furthermore, the Court held that it was error for the superior court to award Day the duplex without considering whether she would be able to afford to keep or sell the property. As to Williams's remaining two claims, the Court affirmed the superior court's decisions. View "Day v. Williams" on Justia Law

A couple divorced in 2008, and the mother was granted sole legal custody and primary physical custody of their three children. At the time of the divorce, the superior court stated that if the father met certain conditions he could return to the court to seek modification of the child custody order. In 2009, he filed a motion to modify custody, seeking joint legal custody and increased visitation. The superior court, largely adopting a master's report and recommendations, left sole legal custody and primary physical custody with the mother, but expanded the father's visitation. The father appealed the superior court's 2010 custody modification order. Because the superior court neither committed clear error nor abused its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the majority of the superior court's order. But because the superior court's order failed to explain why it did not order any changes to the father's visitation during the children's summer vacation, the case was remanded for further explanation regarding summer visitation. View "Jack C. v. Tally C." on Justia Law

A father and a mother share joint legal and equal physical custody over their daughter. The father sought to obtain a passport for the daughter, but federal law requires the consent of both parents if the child is under the age of 16. After the mother refused consent, the father brought a motion in the superior court requesting that the mother be ordered to execute a notarized statement of consent for the passport. The superior court denied this motion and the father appealed. Because the superior court abused its discretion in denying the father's motion, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Patrawke v. Liebes" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Gorton and Stephanie Mann are the parents of a young son. When they divorced, the superior court awarded them a shared physical custody schedule and to calculated child support. This appeal arose from that calculation and from the amount the superior court allowed Jeffrey to deduct from his income for child support payments he was already making for his two children from a prior marriage. The superior court allowed Jeffrey to deduct from his adjusted gross income the actual amount of child support he paid to the mother of his two older children from the prior marriage. But Jeffrey claimed that he should receive a deduction for a hypothetical 27% of his income that caring for the older children would cost him if they lived with him full time and he did not have shared custody of those children. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision that Jeffrey was only entitled to deduct from his adjusted income the amount of child support actually paid for the children from his prior marriage under Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(a)(1)(C). View "Gorton v. Mann" on Justia Law

Appellants Richard and Durena Tracy appeal the superior court’s dismissal of their state law negligence and federal constitutional claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS). This case arose from Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceedings to protect their granddaughter, Annie. The Tracys also appealed the superior court’s denial of summary judgment in their favor and its award of attorney’s fees against them. The Tracys are the biological grandparents of "Annie" and now her adoptive parents. When Annie was five, a kindergarten teacher erroneously suspected Annie had been victim to sexual abuse by Richard. OCS investigated the allegation, all the while Richard was not permitted contact with Annie until the investigation was complete. When the allegations were deemed groundless by an OCS expert, Richard and Durena sued OCS for damages stemming from the fees and expenses they incurred defending themselves from the OCS investigation. Ultimately the Tracys lost that battle, and the district court granted OCS's request for attorney fees. Affirming the superior court's dismissal of the Tracys' claims, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorneys' fees against the Tracys. The Court found that because there was no bad faith nor asserted with improper motive, the superior court should not have given OCS an award of fees. View "Tracy v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Eight days after relinquishing her parental rights to twin children, their mother filed a motion requesting that the superior court order the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS) to release the children's annual Permanent Fund Dividends (dividends) to her. The superior court granted the motion. The guardian ad litem (GAL) and OCS opposed her motion. The superior court ordered OCS to provide proof of compliance with 15 AAC 23.223(i). OCS filed copies of the address change forms and an affidavit of the OCS employee who completed the forms stating OCS had complied with the Department's regulation. The superior court concluded OCS's filing did not comply with the regulation's "evidence of the change in legal custody" requirement and ordered OCS to release the dividends to the mother. The GAL sought reconsideration, which the superior court denied. The Supreme Court granted the GAL's petition for review. OCS and the GAL argued that the fact the Department paid the dividends to OCS suggests the Department itself thought the change of address forms were sufficient to comply with 15 AAC 23.223(i) and the superior court should have deferred to the Department's determination. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed: the superior court (and all of the parties in the superior court proceeding) knew of OCS's custody of the children because the superior court itself signed the custody order. "There was and could be no dispute that OCS actually was entitled to redirect and hold the children's dividends, regardless of the information provided to the Department." The Court reversed the superior court's decision. View "Tea, Guardian Ad Litem, on Behalf of A.T. and S.T." on Justia Law

"Jade" is the biological daughter of Roy and Sheila. Jade is an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Between 1998 and 2007, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) received at least 12 reports of drug abuse and child neglect in the family. Before Jade's birth in September 2004, the couple's older children were transferred to OCS custody for two years. Roy and Sheila attempted to complete drug treatment programs but were unsuccessful. Sheila relapsed while pregnant with Jade; her discharge report from the treatment program indicated she tested positive for cocaine in August 2005 and stopped attending treatment sessions or contacting drug counselors in October 2005. Roy was discharged for positive drug tests and missing treatment. Since being taken into OCS custody in July 2008, Jade has lived in five separate placements. In its termination order, the superior court found that termination of parental rights was in Jade's best interests and that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Roy contested three of the superior court's findings: that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family; that termination was in Jade's best interests; and that good cause existed to deviate from the ICWA placement preferences. Sheila did not appeal the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the superior court's conclusions with regard to OCS's efforts to keep the family together, and that it was in Jade's best interests to terminate Roy's parental rights. View "Roy S. v. Alaksa" on Justia Law

M.K. is a 34-year-old mentally ill Alaska Native woman who lived in a rural village. In 1999, when M.K. was 22, her father A.K. sexually assaulted her. M.K. reported the crime to police, but soon changed her story and A.K. was not tried at that time. A.K. continued to live with the family for four years until advances in DNA evidence led to his case being reopened, and to A.K. being charged and convicted in 2003 of the sexual assault. M.K.'s mother remained married to A.K., who has since been released from prison and was on probation and prohibited from living with M.K. M.K.'s mother had no plans to divorce A.K., and testified that she is not sure whether A.K. will return to live with the family when his probation ends. The Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) petitioned for guardianship of M.K. in July 2008 based on M.K.'s mental illness and her inability to manage her own care. The court visitor completed a report, and a hearing was held over several days, following which the superior court appointed the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) as M.K.'s full guardian. M.K. objected to this decision. The superior court treated her written objection as an implicit motion for reconsideration and denied it. M.K. appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in its application of the guardianship statutes in her case, in its best interest finding that OPA should be appointed in place of M.K.'s mother, and in appointing OPA as a full (as opposed to partial) guardian. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "In Re Protective Proceedings of M.K." on Justia Law

A woman died intestate survived by her husband and three adult children from a previous marriage. The husband had acquired a boat for a fishing charter business during his marriage to the decedent, but the boat and charter business were titled in his name alone. Relying on principles of equitable distribution for divorce cases, the estate's personal representative asked the court to include half the value of the boat and a skiff in the estate's property because marital funds had been used to purchase them. The court denied this request, and the estate's assets were distributed according to statute. The children appealed, contending their mother's estate held an undivided interest in the boats and business. Because the superior court correctly decided that the equitable distribution framework for divorce proceedings did not apply in probate proceedings, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Pestrikoff v. Hoff" on Justia Law