Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A father challenged a superior court’s decision to terminate his parental rights, arguing that the court’s conclusions were not supported by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was not in the best interests of the child, and that the court improperly considered certain facts. Because the record supported the superior court’s decision to terminate the father’s parental rights, and because the superior court properly considered the record as a whole, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherman B. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Tierice Coleman is the biological father of two minor sons, T.C. and J.C. T.C. was born in January 2000 to Elka McCullough, a woman with whom Coleman had a brief relationship. J.C. was born in March 2000 to Laura Bianchi, a woman with whom Coleman had a long-term relationship at the time of J.C.'s birth and with whom he was cohabitating at the time of trial. McCullough petitioned for child support with respect to T.C. Coleman did not contest that he owed support, but he argued that he should be allowed a deduction under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3(a)(1)(D) because he was currently living with J.C., the child of his relationship with Bianchi, and his relationship with Bianchi commenced prior to his relationship with McCulluogh. McCullough argued that because J.C. was born after T.C., Coleman should not be allowed the deduction. The superior court concluded that Coleman was not entitled to a deduction. Coleman appealed the superior court's ruling to the Supreme Court who affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Coleman v. McCullough" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her young son. The mother had a long history of substance abuse and relinquished parental rights to her older daughter in 2008 because she was unable to care for her. During the 18 months following the child’s removal, the mother continued to abuse drugs until she was incarcerated. At that point, she entered an intensive residential substance abuse program at the prison, which she successfully completed two weeks prior to the termination trial. In appealing the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights, the mother argued to the Supreme Court that the court erroneously: (1) denied her motion to continue the termination proceedings; (2) determined that termination was in the best interests of the child; and (3) failed to consider legal guardianship as an alternative to termination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Hannah B. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Judith R. challenged the superior court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, "Dexter." The court terminated her rights based on her longstanding, unremedied mental illness. In its ruling on the record, the court sua sponte, directed the parties to consult with Dexter's therapist about the advisability of allowing continued contact between Judith and Dexter following termination of Judith's parental rights, but the court's written order made no mention of post-termination contact. On appeal, Judith challenged the superior court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in Dexter's best interests and the court's failure to issue a "detailed order regarding post-termination visitation." Because the court's best interests finding was supported by substantial evidence and because the court was not required to address post-termination contact in its termination order, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Judith R. v. Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

Victoria ("Vicky") Cox and John Floreske were married in July 1981. They separated in September 2007 and divorced in June 2009. During their marriage, Vicky and John amassed a highly illiquid marital estate including three businesses and two subdivisions. After a bench trial each party was awarded a mutual right of first refusal on all properties awarded to the other party. This right was personal to the parties and would not survive them. Vicky appealed the superior court’s denial of her motion for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(4) and (5) arguing that: (1) the mutual right of first refusal is void under Civil Rule 60(b)(4); and (2) the superior court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to vacate the mutual right of first refusal under Civil Rule 60(b)(5). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to vacate the mutual right of first refusal under Civil Rule 60(b)(5). View "Cox v. Floreske" on Justia Law

Helen S. K. and Samuel M. K. were married in 1990. Helen filed for divorce in December 2010, requesting sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties' three minor children and equitable division of the marital assets. Samuel counterclaimed, requesting joint legal and shared physical custody of the children. The superior court awarded joint legal custody of all three children, shared physical custody of the parties' two younger children, but awarded Samuel primary physical custody of the parties' oldest child. The court imputed income to Helen and required that she pay Samuel child support. The court divided the parties' marital assets equally and made other decisions concerning the valuation and distribution of certain marital assets. Helen appealed this decision on several grounds, including the use of in camera interviews, the primary physical custody award to Samuel, the imputation of income, the equal property division, and the valuation and distribution of many of the assets. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with respect to the court's valuation of one asset, but affirmed all of its other decisions. View "Helen S. K. v. Samuel M. K." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute between three daughters regarding the administration of their deceased mother’s estate. The dispute centered around three documents: (1) a will executed in 1987; (2) a revised will the decedent allegedly executed in 2007 or 2008, which contained a clause revoking all prior wills; and (3) an exhibit that was allegedly an accurate (but unsigned) draft of the revised will. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that: (1) the decedent executed a valid will in 1987; (2) the decedent subsequently executed a revised will, but that will was lost; and (3) the revised will had revoked the 1987 will. Because an executed version of the revised will was never located, the superior court concluded it had been destroyed by the decedent, leaving her estate to be administered under Alaska’s statutory scheme for intestate succession. On appeal, one daughter challenged the superior court’s conclusion that the 1987 will was properly revoked. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to determine whether its finding that the revised will was properly executed is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Court also remanded for the superior court to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to overcome the presumption that the decedent destroyed her will. View "Dan v. Dan" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the division of property between a couple who had been in a relationship for 12 years but never married. The couple and their children resided in a home titled in the man's name. After they separated, pursuant to a domestic violence protective order, the man paid the mortgage while the woman lived in the home with the children. The man filed for custody of the children and the woman counterclaimed for custody and asserted that the parties' property should be divided by the court. The superior court found that the parties were in a domestic partnership and intended to acquire property as though married. It then proceeded to equally divide the property, but considered the post-separation mortgage payments a part of the domestic violence protective order and the equivalent of spousal support. Therefore it did not take them into account when dividing the property. The man appealed, arguing that the superior court erroneously concluded that the parties intended to be in a domestic partnership and that the superior court improperly failed to credit him for mortgage payments made after the separation. Because the superior court properly found that the parties intended to be in a domestic partnership and that the post-separation mortgage payments were made pursuant to a domestic violence protective order, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Reed v. Parrish" on Justia Law

A divorced couple with one child agreed in 2006 that the mother would cover all of the child's travel costs in lieu of paying child support. In 2010, the father filed a motion arguing that the 2006 agreement was invalid under Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, which had not been addressed in the superior court's original order. The father requested that child support from August 2006 through June 2010 be recalculated under Rule 90.3, with the mother paying arrearages. The superior court denied the father's motion for retrospective relief, but allowed prospective relief. The father appealed. Because the father did not file his motion challenging the original order within one year, as required under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(1), the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the father's motion insofar as it sought retrospective relief. Because the 2006 order violated Rule 90.3, the Court affirmed the grant of prospective relief. View "Aldrich v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

A couple had a turbulent relationship over the course of eight months, breaking up and reuniting several times. During the final break-up the woman sought a domestic violence protective order. The superior court granted the protective order based on a finding that the man "used coercion" when, in an effort to get her back, threatened to: (1) provide evidence to the woman’s ex-husband’s lawyers regarding a custody dispute, (2) report the woman’s mother’s alleged marijuana operation to the police, and (3) report the woman to the Office of Children’s Services for sexually abusing her children. The man appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding and that his conduct was constitutionally protected speech. Because there was sufficient evidence to show that the man committed a crime of domestic violence and because he waived his constitutional argument by failing to properly raise it, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "McGraw v. Cox" on Justia Law