Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Yelena R. and George R. were involved in an on-again, off-again relationship for more than a decade and had two children together. Yelena accused George of sexually assaulting her in 2011 while they were living together. After the Kodiak magistrate found Yelena’s testimony unpersuasive and denied her request for a long-term domestic violence protective order, Yelena took the children to Massachusetts without notifying George. A Massachusetts court ordered the children to be returned to Kodiak and this custody case followed. After a custody trial, the superior court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of the children to George and ordered supervised visitation between Yelena and the children. Yelena appealed that order and visitation restrictions. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the superior court had jurisdiction to make final custody decisions regarding the children. The Supreme Court concluded the superior court had jurisdiction, properly declined to apply Alaska's domestic violence presumption, adequately considered Alaska's “best interest” factors, and made no clearly erroneous factual findings. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding custody of the children to George. It was error, however, for the superior court to require supervised visitation without making adequate findings to support the visitation restrictions and by failing to establish a plan for Yelena to achieve unsupervised visitation. It was also an abuse of discretion to delegate to George the authority to end the supervision requirement. The Court affirmed the superior court’s award of custody to George, but remanded the case for further proceedings on the issue of Yelena’s visitation. View "Yelena R. v. George R." on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage exempt from municipal property taxation $150,000 of the assessed value of the residence of an owner who is a senior citizen or disabled veteran. But the full value of the exemption is potentially unavailable if a person who is not the owner’s spouse also occupies the residence. Contending that the exemption program violated their rights to equal protection and equal opportunities, three Anchorage same-sex couples in committed, long-term, intimate relationships sued the State and the Municipality. The superior court ruled for all three couples. The State and Municipality appealed. As to two of the couples, the Supreme Court affirmed: same-sex couples, who may not marry or have their marriages recognized in Alaska, cannot benefit or become eligible to benefit from the exemption program to the same extent as heterosexual couples, who are married or may marry. The exemption program therefore potentially treats same-sex couples less favorably than it treats opposite-sex couples even though the two classes are similarly situated. The identified governmental interests do not satisfy even minimum scrutiny. The exemption program therefore violates the two couples’ equal protection rights as guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. As to the third couple, the Court reversed the ruling in their favor because it concluded that the program did not exempt a residence from taxation unless the senior citizen or veteran had some ownership interest in it. If the senior citizen or veteran has no actual ownership interest, the program treats a same-sex couple the same as a heterosexual couple by denying the exemption to both couples, rendering marital status and the ability to marry irrelevant. Because the senior citizen member of the third couple had no ownership interest in the residence, that couple had no viable equal protection claim. View "Alaska v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Raymond Boulds and Elena Nielsen were unmarried cohabitants for 16 years and raised children together. When their relationship ended, they litigated child custody and property ownership. The court determined that the insurance death benefit and the 401(k) retirement account were not domestic partnership assets and belonged to Boulds alone. But the court determined that the union pension was a domestic partnership asset and was subject to division. Because Boulds appealed to the Supreme court, the superior court had not yet issued an order dividing the union pension. Boulds argued that federal law prohibited dividing his union pension with a non-spouse, and that the superior court misapplied Alaska law by examining only Boulds’s own initial intent to share the union pension with Nielsen for the benefit of their children. The Supreme Court concluded that federal law did not bar Nielsen from receiving a share of the union pension and that the superior court did not err in determining Nielsen was entitled to half of the union pension under Alaska law. View "Boulds v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Jean Kollander sought to modify the pension division in a qualified domestic relations order originally entered by the superior court in 1992. The federal pension administrator paid Jean's share of her former spouse's pension in accelerated lump sum payments from 2007 to 2008. In 2012 Jean brought a claim that she was instead entitled to lifetime monthly payments. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that her claim was barred by laches and awarded full attorney's fees and costs to her former spouse. Jean appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's findings of unreasonable delay and prejudice were not clearly erroneous and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying laches. But because the superior court failed to apply Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 in the award of attorney's fees, the Court reversed that award and remand for a determination of attorney's fees. View "Kollander v. Kollander" on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved with Emma D. and her newborn son, Joey, following reports from Covenant House expressing concern about Emma’s homelessness, inability to care for an infant, and feelings of depression and aggression toward Joey. Emma D. has a history of mental health issues, particularly bipolar disorder, dating back to her early childhood. OCS took the then-six-month-old Joey into emergency custody during Joey’s hospitalization for respiratory syncytial virus and dehydration, during which he was also diagnosed with supraventricular tachycardia, a heart disorder that required regular attention and treatment. OCS staff subsequently made attempts to assist Emma in obtaining regular mental health treatment in order to reunite her with Joey. OCS staff had difficulty communicating and meeting with Emma; she failed to engage in regular treatment, maintain consistent visitation with Joey, or attend her appointments with case workers and service providers. The superior court terminated Emma’s parental rights 14 months after OCS assumed emergency custody. Emma argued on appeal that OCS failed to consider adequately her mental health issues and therefore its efforts were not reasonable. She also appealed the superior court’s finding that she had failed to remedy her conduct in a reasonable time. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no reversible error in the superior court’s decision terminating Emma’s parental rights. View "Emma D. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Harold Hawkins and Rosalind Attatayuk were married until 1981, when they dissolved their marriage. Hawkins was awarded the couple’s home in the dissolution and continued to reside on the property, which was federally owned. In 1993 Attatayuk applied for and received a restricted townsite deed to the land by allegedly fraudulent means. She brought a trespass action against Hawkins, alleging that she had undisputed title to the land. The superior court ruled on summary judgment that Attatayuk’s restricted townsite deed gave her title to the land. Because Alaska state courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate title or right to possession of restricted townsite property, the only issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the superior court adjudicated title to the land in question. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court did adjudicate title and, as a result, exceeded its jurisdiction. View "Hawkins v. Attatayuk" on Justia Law

The superior court granted Brianna Sandberg’s motion to vacate a divorce settlement agreement, valued and divided the couple’s property, and ordered David Sandberg to pay Brianna’s attorney’s fees. In granting Brianna’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the superior court found that Brianna was mistaken in her belief at the time of the parties’ settlement agreement that the marital home was David’s property. David appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no facts in the trial court record supported the superior court’s finding that Brianna mistakenly believed she held no ownership interest in the couple’s marital home. The Court therefore reversed and remanded this case for the superior court’s reconsideration of Brianna’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. View "Sandberg v. Sandberg" on Justia Law

Rowan B., Sr. and Risa F. appealed the adjudication of their children as children in need of aid. The adjudication was based on allegations that Rowan had physically and sexually abused their daughter and Risa's daughters from an earlier relationship and that Risa was too mentally ill to care for the children. Risa challenged the finding that her mental illness prevented her from adequately parenting the children. Rowan raised numerous challenges to the trial court’s actions, including arguments about notice and denial of materials during discovery. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying Rowan access to materials he sought through discovery without at least conducting an in camera review. The Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case to the trial court for further limited proceedings. View "Rowan B. v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

The father appealed the court’s determination of his child support obligations, its factual findings regarding child custody and visitation, its valuation and division of the marital estate, its denial of attorney’s fees, and its denial of a continuance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed on all issues. View "Limeres v. Limeres" on Justia Law

In January 2011, the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of three children. The children had been in the care of their maternal grandparents, but before their removal had returned to their parents. OCS, under the impression that the children were being cared for by the parents at the time of removal, placed the children with the maternal grandparents. The day the trial to terminate the mother’s parental rights was to begin, the mother moved to have the grandmother joined in the proceeding as the children’s Indian custodian. The court denied both the mother’s motion to join the grandmother and the grandmother’s motion to intervene, finding that shortly after the removal the parents revoked the grandmother’s Indian custodian status by asking OCS not to place the children with her. The grandmother moved for reconsideration and argued that her due process rights were violated at the time of the removal. She argued that OCS did not provide her with notice of the right she was entitled to as the children’s Indian custodian, including notice of her right to intervene in the proceeding and of her right to be represented by counsel. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that although OCS breached its duty to provide the grandmother with notice required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because of the short time between the children’s removal and the parents’ revocation of the grandmother’s status as the children’s Indian custodian the grandmother had suffered no significant detriment to her rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that any error OCS may have made regarding the notice provisions of ICWA was harmless. View "Molly O. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law